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Abstract:	   Amidst	   the	   post-­‐war	   turn	   to	   transcend	   international	   law’s	   traditional	   power	  
structures	   in	   the	   narration	   and	   codification	   of	   individual	   rights,	   colonial	   interests	   and	   legal	  
philosophies	   retained	   an	   influence	   on	   the	   framing	   of	   human	   rights	   discourse.	   This	   essay	  
explores	   the	   extent	   to	  which	   the	   particular	   conception	   of	   the	   ‘state	   of	   emergency’	   that	  was	  
distilled	   into	   the	   normative	   framework	   of	   international	   human	   rights	   law	   at	   its	   inception	  
stemmed	   specifically	   from	   Britain’s	   traditions	   of	   colonial	   governance	   and	   legislation.	   The	  
evolution	  of	  emergency	  law	  is	  traced	  from	  martial	  law	  in	  England	  and	  the	  ‘first	  empire’,	  through	  
British	   emergency	   legislative	   codes	   in	   Ireland	   and	   India	   in	   the	   nineteenth	   century,	   to	   the	  
wholesale	   resort	   to	  emergency	  powers	   in	   the	  colonies	  as	   the	  empire	  began	  to	   fragment.	  The	  
genesis	   of	   the	   emergency	   derogation	   provisions	   in	   the	   International	   Covenant	   on	   Civil	   and	  
Political	   Rights	   and	   European	   Convention	   on	   Human	   Rights	   is	   appraised	   in	   the	   light	   of	   the	  
colonial	  emergency	  context	  that	  formed	  the	  backdrop	  to	  their	  drafting.	  The	  essay	  argues	  that	  
the	  accommodation	  of	  colonial	   interests	  at	   that	  point	  embedded	  a	  hegemonic	   legal	   tool	   that	  
remains	  ripe	  for	  exploitation	  by	  regimes	  of	  all	  stripes	  inclined	  to	  repress	  opposition	  and	  dissent	  
in	  a	  ‘post-­‐colonial’	  era.	  In	  the	  illumination	  of	  the	  colonial	  shadows	  from	  which	  the	  doctrine	  of	  
emergency	   emerged,	   the	   state	   of	   emergency	   is	   revealed	   as	   a	   vehicle	   for	   law’s	   violence,	  
grounded	  in	  dynamics	  of	  domination.	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[A]ccepting	  the	  reality	  of	  being	  a	  colonizer	  means	  agreeing	  to	  be	  a	  nonlegitimate	  privileged	  person,	  
that	  is,	  a	  usurper.	  To	  be	  sure,	  a	  usurper	  claims	  his	  place	  and,	  if	  need	  be,	  will	  defend	  it	  by	  every	  means	  
at	   his	   disposal.	   This	   amounts	   to	   saying	   that	   at	   the	   very	   time	   of	   his	   triumph,	   he	   admits	   that	  what	  
triumphs	  in	  him	  is	  an	  image	  which	  he	  condemns.	  His	  true	  victory	  will	  therefore	  never	  be	  upon	  him:	  he	  
need	   only	   record	   it	   in	   the	   laws	   and	  morals.	   For	   this	   he	  would	   have	   to	   convince	   the	   others,	   if	   not	  
himself.	   In	   other	   words,	   to	   possess	   victory	   completely	   he	   needs	   to	   absolve	   himself	   of	   it	   and	   the	  
conditions	  under	  which	  it	  was	  attained.	  This	  explains	  his	  strenuous	  insistence,	  strange	  for	  a	  victor,	  on	  
apparently	   futile	  matters.	   He	   endeavours	   to	   falsify	   history,	   he	   rewrites	   laws,	   he	   would	   extinguish	  
memories—anything	  to	  succeed	  in	  transforming	  his	  usurpation	  into	  legitimacy.	  
—Albert	  Memmi	  ,	  The	  Colonizer	  and	  the	  Colonized1	  
I.	  INTRODUCTION:	  THE	  DISCOURSE	  OF	  EMERGENCY	  AND	  EXCEPTIONALISM	  
The	   fundamental	   quagmire	   of	   international	   law	   as	   it	   has	   developed	   in	   modern	   times	   is	   the	  
tension	   between	   the	   political	   and	   economic	   interests	   of	   nation-­‐states	   and	   the	   rights	   and	  
freedoms	   of	   individuals.	   A	   state	   of	   perceived	   ‘emergency’	   or	   ‘exception’2	   has	   long	   been	  
understood	  as	  only	  exacerbating	  this	  tension.3	  The	  more	  extreme	  the	  perceived	  exigency,	  the	  
greater	  the	  temptations	  to	  disregard	  constitutional	  structures	  and	  expand	  executive	  power,	  at	  
the	  expense	  of	  civil	   liberties	  and	  accountability.	  The	  advent	  of	  an	  international	  system	  for	  the	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This	   draft	   is	   based	   on	   a	   paper	   presented	   at:	   “Concerning	   States	   of	   Mind,	   Disturbing	   Minds	   of	   States”,	   the	   Third	   Annual	  
Conference	  of	  the	  Toronto	  Group	  for	  the	  Study	  of	  International,	  Transnational	  &	  Comparative	  Law,	  29-­‐30	  January	  2010,	  Panel:	  
Law,	  State	   and	  Empire.	   The	   author	  would	   like	   to	   thank	  Kathleen	  Cavanaugh,	  David	  Dyzenhaus,	  Michelle	   Farrell	   and	  Sujith	  
Xavier	  for	  their	  insights.	  
1	  Albert	  Memmi,	  The	  Colonizer	  and	  the	  Colonized	  118	  (Howard	  Greenfeld	  trans.,	  Earthscan	  Publications	  1990)	  (1965).	  
2	  The	  related	  terms	   ‘state	  of	  exception’,	   ‘state	  of	  emergency’	  and	   ‘state	  of	  siege’	  originate	  from	  a	  range	  of	  political	  contexts	  
and	   legal	   systems,	   and	  while	   deviating	   in	   their	   specific	   definitions,	   can	   all	   be	   broadly	   understood	   as	   descriptive	   of	   a	   crisis	  
situation	   in	  fact	  that	  provides	   justification	  for	  digression	  from	  principles	  otherwise	  established	   in	   law.	  The	  expression	   ‘public	  
emergency’	  is	  that	  which	  is	  used	  in	  the	  international	  legal	  instruments	  referred	  to	  herein;	  accordingly	  ‘public	  emergency’	  and	  
‘state	  of	  emergency’	  are	  the	  terms	  that	  will	  generally	  be	  employed	  to	  refer	  to	  situations	  of	  perceived	  threat	  as	  they	  relate	  to	  
human	  rights	   law.	  The	   term	   ‘state	  of	  exception’	   is	  used	  with	  a	  broader	  construction	   in	  mind,	  encompassing	  all	   situations	  of	  
exception	  from	  ‘normal’	  political	  and	  juridical	  orders.	  	  
3	   See,	   for	   example,	  Cecil	   T.	  Carr,	  Crisis	   Legislation	   in	  Britain,	   40	  Columbia	   L.	  Rev.	   1309,	   1324	   (1940):	   “In	   the	   eternal	   dispute	  
between	  government	  and	  liberty,	  crisis	  means	  more	  government	  and	  less	  liberty”.	  
2010]                                                   THE LONG SHADOW OF COLONIALISM 3	  
protection	  of	  human	  rights	  has	  not	   fundamentally	  altered	   the	  state’s	  capacity	  or	   tendency	  to	  
succumb	  to	  such	  temptations.	  
In	  spite	  of	  extensive	  evidence	  of	  abuse,	  the	  discourse	  surrounding	  the	  doctrine	  of	  emergency	  
generally	   fails	   to	   deviate	   from,	   or	   challenge,	   the	   presumption	   that	   provision	   for	   emergency	  
measures	   is	  nonetheless	   legitimate,	   indeed	   imperative.	   In	  the	  context	  of	   international	  human	  
rights	  law,	  emergency	  derogations	  are	  widely	  considered	  to	  be	  a	  “necessary	  evil”;4	  a	  “realistic	  
compromise”.5	  Much	  legal	  analysis	  of	  states	  of	  emergency	  has	  instead	  traditionally	  focused	  on	  
the	   mechanics	   of	   derogations	   or	   on	   the	   tendency	   toward	   abuse	   of	   the	   system	   as	   an	  
unfortunate	   side-­‐effect	   of	   a	   human	   rights	   disclaimer	   that	   is	   assumed	   as	   indispensable.6	   The	  
origins	  and	  underpinnings	  of	  that	  assumption	  have	  rarely	  been	  questioned.7	  
In	   addition,	   both	   the	   states	   of	   emergency/derogations	   and	   ‘war	   against	  
terrorism’/exceptionalism	   discourses	   often	   lack	   historical	   perspective;8	   failing	   to	   explore	   the	  
genesis	  of	  emergency	  powers	  and	  their	  underpinnings	  in	  both	  domestic	  constitutional	  law	  and	  
international	   human	   rights	   law.9	   While	   the	   post-­‐war	   human	   rights	   movement	   may	   have	  
heralded	   some	   progress	   in	   transcending	   international	   law’s	   traditional	   state-­‐centric	   power	  
structures,	  the	  European	  colonial	  mindset	  and	  legal	  philosophy	  retained	  an	  influence	  over	  the	  
framing	  of	   international	  human	  rights	   law	   itself.	  The	  doctrine	  of	  emergency	   is	  one	  cavernous	  
chink	   in	   the	   armour	   of	   rights	   protection,	   colliding	   as	   it	   does	   with	   any	   counter-­‐hegemonic	  
tendencies	  within	  international	  human	  rights	  law.	  
This	  essay	  aims	   to	  add	   some	  historical	  perspective;	   to	  examine	   the	  origins	  of	   the	  doctrine	  of	  
emergency	  in	  order	  to	  inform	  contemporary	  debates	  and	  to	  cast	  some	  light	  on	  the	  limitations	  
4	  Sarah	  Joseph,	  Jenny	  Schultz	  &	  Melissa	  Castan,	  The	  International	  Covenant	  on	  Civil	  and	  Political	  Rights:	  Cases,	  Materials,	  and	  
Commentary	  824	  (2004).	  
5	  Scott	  N.	  Carlson	  &	  Gregory	  Gisvold,	  Practical	  Guide	  to	  the	  International	  Covenant	  on	  Civil	  and	  Political	  Rights	  33	  (2003).	  
6	   See,	   for	   example,	   Thomas	   Buergenthal,	   To	   Respect	   and	   to	   Ensure:	   State	   Obligations	   and	   Permissible	   Derogations,	   in	   The	  
International	  Bill	  of	  Rights:	  The	  International	  Covenant	  on	  Civil	  and	  Political	  Rights	  (Louise	  Henkin	  ed.,	  1981),	  Daniel	  O’Donnel,	  
States	  of	  Exception,	  21	  Rev.	  Int.	  Comm.	  Jurists	  52	  (1978);	  Carlson	  &	  Gisvold,	  supra	  note	  5,	  at	  33-­‐36;	  Joseph,	  Schultz	  &	  Castan,	  
supra	   note	   4,	   at	   823-­‐836;	   International	   Commission	   of	   Jurists,	   States	   of	   Emergency—Their	   Impact	   on	   Human	   Rights:	   A	  
Comparative	  Study	  (1983).	  
7	   In	   referring	  to	  the	  discretion	  of	  states	   to	  derogate	   from	  their	  human	  rights	  obligations	  as	   the	  “Achilles’	  heel	  of	   the	  human	  
rights	   doctrinal	   corpus”,	   Balakrishnan	   Rajagopal	   is	   one	   scholar	   who	   has	   called	   for	   that	   assumption	   to	   be	   questioned.	   See	  
Balakrishnan	  Rajagopal,	  International	  Law	  from	  Below	  176	  (2003).	  	  
8	   For	   example,	   seminal	   texts	   on	   states	   of	   emergency	   in	   international	   law	   often	   devote	   little	  more	   than	   footnotes	   in	   their	  
introductory	   pages	   to	   the	   history	   of	   concepts	   of	   emergency.	   See,	   for	   example,	   Jaime	   Oraa,	   Human	   Rights	   in	   States	   of	  
Emergency	  in	  International	  Law	  (1992).	  
9	  Notable	  exceptions	  include	  Anna-­‐Lena	  Svensson-­‐McCarthy,	  The	  International	  Law	  of	  Human	  Rights	  and	  States	  of	  Exception	  
(1998);	  and	  Oren	  Gross	  &	  Fionnuala	  Ní	  Aoláin,	  Law	  in	  Times	  of	  Crisis:	  Emergency	  Powers	  in	  Theory	  and	  Practice	  (2006).	  
	  
 
4	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of	   human	   rights	   law.	   Delving	   back	   into	   British	   colonial	   history,10	   in	   particular,	   allows	   us	   to	  
understand	  the	  emergency	  as	  a	  technique	  of	  governance	  and	  instrument	  of	  control,	  rather	  than	  
a	   purely	   reactive	   and	   temporary	   response	   to	   an	   isolated	   crisis.	   Owing	   much	   to	   Britain’s	  
influence	  at	  the	  advent	  of	  the	  institutionalisation	  of	  human	  rights—a	  time	  when	  recourse	  was	  
being	  made	  to	  wholesale	  emergency	  powers	  in	  the	  empire	  in	  order	  to	  quell	  resistance,	  violent	  
and	  non-­‐violent	  alike—the	  concept	  of	  emergency	  has	  been	  embedded	  in	  the	  doctrinal	  corpus	  
of	   international	   human	   rights	   law.	   This	   is	   predicated	   on	   an	   accepted	   perception	   of	   it	   as	   the	  
latter	  (temporary	  response),	  when	  in	  reality	   it	  has	  continued	  to	  be	  used	  widely	  as	  the	  former	  
(technique	  of	  governance	  and	  instrument	  of	  control).	  	  
	  
In	   examining	   the	   colonial	   origins	   and	   mutations	   of	   this	   particular	   facet	   of	   modern	   law,	   the	  
theoretical	  terrain	  upon	  which	  this	  essay	  is	  written	  can	  be	  situated	  within	  the	  broad	  ambits	  of	  
postcolonial	  critique	  and	  third	  world	  approaches	  to	  international	  law.11	  It	  considers	  the	  extent	  
to	  which	  emergency	  was	  central	  to	  colonial	  rule;	  and	  the	  consequent	  knock-­‐on	  effects	  on	  the	  
development	  of	  western	  legality	  and,	  in	  turn,	  international	  human	  rights	  law.	  Against	  a	  broader	  
backdrop	  of	  the	  formative	  influence	  of	  colonialism	  on	  modern	  international	  law,12	  we	  can	  seek	  
to	  ascertain	  how	  the	  experience	  of	  colonial	  emergency	  may	  inform	  contemporary	  ‘rule	  of	  law’	  
debates.	   In	   the	   post-­‐colonial	   era,	   the	   supposed	   friction	   between	   sovereign	   power	   and	  
normative	   legal	  rule	  maintains	  a	  constant	  presence	   in	  the	  conceptualisation	  of	  the	  state.	  This	  
friction	  is	  central	  to	  the	  growing	  body	  of	  political	  and	  legal	  theory	  on	  the	  ‘state	  of	  exception’,	  a	  
distinct	   theoretical	   realm	   into	   which	   the	   paper	   ultimately	   necessarily	   veers	   as	   it	   seeks	   to	  
deconstruct	  the	  colonial	  in	  order	  to	  understand	  and	  inform	  the	  modern.	  	  
	  
The	  essay	  begins	  with	  a	  brief	  sketch	  of	  the	  evolutionary	  path	  from	  martial	  law	  in	  England	  and	  
the	   ‘first	   empire’,	   to	   emergency	   legislative	   codes	   in	   Ireland	   in	   the	   nineteenth	   century	   and	  
beyond	  in	  the	  early	  twentieth	  century	  (section	  II),	  to	  the	  declaration	  of	  states	  of	  emergency	  in	  
numerous	  British	  colonies	  in	  the	  years	  following	  the	  Second	  World	  War	  (section	  III).	  The	  latter	  
provides	   insight	   into	   the	   historical,	   political	   and	   legal	   environment	   at	   the	   inception	   of	   an	  
                                                
10	  While	  a	  review	  of	  the	  colonial	  history	  of	  other	  European	  powers	  would	  also	  make	  for	  interesting	  study,	  this	  paper	  is	  focused	  
on	  British	  colonialism	  as	  the	  most	  pervasive	  instance	  of	  emergency	  rule	  and	  legislation.	  	  
11	   On	   third	   world	   approaches,	   see,	   for	   example,	   Frederick	   E.	   Snyder	   &	   Surakiart	   Sathirathai,	   Third	   World	   Attitudes	   to	  
International	   Law:	  An	   Introduction	   (1987);	  Antony	  Anghie,	   Bhupinder	  Chimni,	   Karin	  Mickelson	  &	  Obiora	  Okafor	   (eds.),	   The	  
Third	  World	   and	   International	   Order:	   Law,	   Politics	   and	   Globalization	   (2003);	   Bhupinder	   Chimni,	   Third	  World	   Approaches	   to	  
International	  Law:	  A	  Manifesto,	  8	   Int.	  Community	  L.	  Rev.	  3	   (2006);	  Richard	  Falk,	  Balakrishnan	  Rajagopal	  &	  J.	  Stevens	   (eds.),	  
International	  Law	  and	  the	  Third	  World:	  Reshaping	  Justice	  (2009).	  
12	   Prominent	   voices	   in	   Third	  World	   international	   legal	   scholarship	   have	   concluded	   that	   “[r]ather	   than	   seeing	   colonialism	   as	  
external	  and	  incidental	  to	  international	  law,	  an	  aberration	  that	  could	  be	  quickly	  remedied	  once	  recognized,”	  colonialism	  must	  
be	  understood	  more	  drastically	  as	   “central	   to	   the	   formation	  of	   international	   law.”	  See	  Antony	  Anghie	  &	  Bhupinder	  Chimni,	  
Third	  World	  Approaches	  to	  International	  Law	  and	  Individual	  Responsibility	  in	  Internal	  Conflicts,	  2	  Chinese	  J.	  Int’l.	  L.	  77,	  84	  (2003).	  
See	  also	  Antony	  Anghie,	  Imperialism,	  Sovereignty	  and	  the	  Making	  of	  International	  Law	  (2005).	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international	   system	   for	   the	   protection	   of	   human	   rights.	   An	   appraisal	   of	   the	   genesis	   of	   the	  
derogations/state	  of	  emergency	  provisions	   in	  the	   International	  Covenant	  on	  Civil	  and	  Political	  
Rights	  and	  European	  Convention	  on	  Human	  Rights,	  and	  Britain’s	  particular	   influence	  on	  those	  
provisions	   (section	   IV),	   can	  be	  held	   to	  support	  an	  argument	   that	   the	  particular	  conception	  of	  
emergency	  that	  was	  distilled	  into	  the	  normative	  framework	  of	   international	  human	  rights	   law	  
was	   influenced	   heavily	   by	   British	   traditions	   of	   colonial	   governance	   and	   legislation.	   A	   brief	  
review	   of	   the	   subsequent	   resort	   to	   the	   derogations	   procedure	   in	   practice	   (section	   V)	   lends	  
further	  weight	  to	  that	  claim.	  In	  light	  of	  all	  this,	  elements	  of	  the	  doctrine	  of	  emergency	  as	  it	  has	  
developed	   in	   international	   law	   can	   be	   re-­‐appraised	   (section	   VI).	   The	   colonial	   framework	  
through	   which	   states	   of	   emergency	   are	   explored	   in	   this	   paper	   also	   provides	   an	   additional	  
perspective	   to	   debates	   attempting	   to	   theorise	   the	   state	   of	   exception	   within	   or	   beyond	   law	  
(section	  VII).	  	  	  
	  
	  
II.	  THE	  EVOLUTION	  OF	  THE	  DOCTRINE	  OF	  EMERGENCY	  
	  
The	   employment	   of	   exceptional	   measures	   to	   deal	   with	   crisis	   situations	   is	   not	   a	   recent	  
phenomenon.	  The	  genesis	  of	  the	  idea	  of	  special	  emergency	  powers	  can	  be	  traced	  as	  far	  back	  as	  
the	  aesymneteia,	  the	  ‘elected	  tyrant’	   in	  whom	  the	  people	  of	  ancient	  Greece	  vested	  absolutist	  
powers	  as	  a	  temporary	  exigency	  when	  their	  cities	  were	  under	  threat.13	  Analogy	  is	  also	  drawn	  to	  
the	   institution	  of	   the	  Roman	   ‘dictatorship’	   that	   spanned	   three	  centuries	  of	   the	  Republic,14	   as	  
well	   as	   to	   the	   Roman	   law	   doctrine	   of	   iustitium.15	   Contemporary	   conceptions	   of	   the	   state	   of	  
emergency	  are	  also	  often	  equated	  with	  the	  civil	  law	  notion	  of	  the	  state	  of	  siege	  (l’état	  de	  siège)	  
that	   was	   spawned	   during	   the	   French	   Revolution,	   first	   codified	   by	   a	   Constituent	   Assembly	  
decree	  of	  8	  July	  1791,	  and	  remains	  embedded	  in,	  amongst	  others,	  the	  French	  constitution.16	  My	  
focus	   here,	   however,	   is	   on	   the	   British	   common	   law	   traditions	   of	  martial	   law	   and	   emergency	  
legislative	   systems,	   and	   their	   consequent	   legacy	   as	   it	   relates	   to	   contemporary	   international	  
human	  rights	  law.	  
	  
                                                
13	  See	  Aristotle,	  Politics	  73-­‐74	  (Benjamin	  Jowett	  trans.,	  Batoche	  Books	  1999).	  
14	   For	   an	   overview	  of	   the	   functioning	  of	   the	  Roman	  Dictatorship,	   see	  Clinton	  L.	  Rossiter,	   Constitutional	  Dictatorship:	  Crisis	  
Government	  in	  the	  Modern	  Democracies	  15-­‐28	  (1948).	  
15	  For	  an	  interpretation	  and	  analysis	  of	  iustitium,	  see	  Giorgio	  Agamben,	  State	  of	  Exception	  41-­‐51	  (trans.	  Kevin	  Attell,	  University	  
of	  Chicago	  Press	  2005)	  (2003).	  Agamben	  (at	  47-­‐48)	  asserts	  that	  the	   iustitium	   is	  the	  appropriate	  parallel	  to	  be	  drawn	  with	  the	  
modern	  state	  of	  exception,	  not	  the	  Roman	  dictatorship.	  
16	  See	  Article	  36	  of	  the	  Constitution	  of	  1958.	  For	  analysis	  of	  the	  state	  of	  siege,	  see	  Théodore	  Reinach,	  De	  l’état	  de	  siege:	  Étude	  
historique	  et	  juridique	  (1885).	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A.	  MARTIAL	  LAW	  IN	  BRITAIN	  AND	  THE	  COLONIES	  
	  
The	  concept	  of	  martial	  law	  has	  its	  roots	  in	  medieval	  England,	  where	  it	  operated	  as	  what	  would	  
now	  be	  commonly	  referred	  to	  as	  ‘military	  law’	  –	  a	  system	  of	  regulations	  for	  the	  maintenance	  of	  
order	   and	   discipline	   within	   the	   armed	   forces.	   From	   the	   fourteenth	   century,	   however,	   in	  
addition	  to	  applying	  to	  soldiers	  or	  sailors	  in	  active	  service,	  it	  was	  used	  against	  civilians:	  “rebels	  
and	   traitors,	   discharged	   soldiers	   and	   sailors,	   thieves,	   brigands,	   vagabonds,	   rioters,	   publishers	  
and	   possessors	   of	   seditious	   books,	   even	   poachers,	  were	   condemned	   or	   threatened	  with	   the	  
justice	  of	  martial	  law”.17	  	  
	  
Described	  as	  a	  “summary	  form	  of	  criminal	  justice	  …	  independent	  of	  the	  established	  processes	  
of	  the	  common	  law	  courts”,18	   it	  stood	  for	  a	  vast	  array	  of	  non-­‐statutory,	  extraordinary	  powers	  
aimed	  at	  dealing	  with	  violent	  crises.19	  There	  has	  always	  existed	  a	  considerable	  lack	  of	  clarity	  in	  
English	   legal	   theory	  as	   to	   the	   scope	  of	   those	  powers	  and	   the	   status	  of	  martial	   law.	  Certainly,	  
martial	   law	  as	   it	  developed	   in	  Britain	  did	  not	  mean	  martial	   law	   in	   the	   sense	  of	   the	  complete	  
suspension	   of	   ordinary	   law	   and	   the	   (temporary)	   government	   of	   the	   country	   by	   military	  
tribunals.	   Beyond	   that,	   there	   are	   competing	   theories	   as	   to	   the	   legal	   foundations	   and	  
parameters	  of	  martial	  law.	  	  
	  
Many	  English	  legal	  scholars	  saw	  martial	  law	  as	  deriving	  from	  a	  common	  law	  “right	  of	  the	  Crown	  
and	  its	  servants	  to	  repel	  force	  by	  force	  in	  the	  case	  of	  invasion,	  insurrection,	  riot,	  or	  generally	  of	  
any	  violent	  resistance	  to	  the	  law”.20	  As	  such	  it	  operates	  within	  the	  perceived	  spatial	  parameters	  
of	  a	  rule	  of	  law,	  with	  no	  normative	  differentiation	  in	  the	  legal	  system	  applicable	  in	  normal	  times	  
vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  times	  of	  crisis.	  A.V.	  Dicey’s	  argument	  that	  it	  entailed	  the	  “power	  of	  the	  government	  or	  
of	   loyal	   citizens	   to	  maintain	  public	  order,	  at	  whatever	  cost	  of	  blood	  or	  property	   thus	  may	  be	  
necessary”21	   can	  be	  understood	  as	  a	  manifestation	  of	   the	  common	   law	  defence	  of	  necessity.	  
Necessity,	   in	   terms	   of	   the	   latitude	   allowed	   for	   the	   use	   of	   emergency	   measures	   within	   the	  
normal	   legal	   system,	   was	   construed	   broadly	   (‘at	   whatever	   cost’).	   The	   power	   to	   deploy	   such	  
measures	   “has	   in	   itself	  no	   special	   connection	  with	   the	  existence	  of	  an	  armed	   force”,22	   and	   it	  
was	  contended	  that	  every	  subject	  of	  the	  Crown,	  whether	  soldier	  or	  civilian,	  was	  bound	  to	  assist	  
                                                
17	  J.V.	  Capua,	  The	  Early	  History	  of	  Martial	  Law	  in	  England	  from	  the	  Fourteenth	  Century	  to	  the	  Petition	  of	  Right,	  36:1	  Cambridge	  L.	  
J.	  152,	  153	  (1977).	  
18	  Id.,	  at	  152.	  
19	  Gross	  &	  Ní	  Aoláin,	  supra	  note	  9,	  at	  31.	  
20	  A.V.	  Dicey,	  Introduction	  to	  the	  Study	  of	  the	  Law	  of	  the	  Constitution	  284	  (8th	  ed.	  1915).	  
21	  Id.,	  at	  286.	  
22	  Id.,	  at	  284.	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with	  the	  suppression	  of	  riots.	  Once	  the	  force	  used	  was	   ‘necessary’,	   it	  was	  considered	  to	  have	  
been	   fully	   lawful.	  Where	   the	   force	   used	  was	   ‘excessive’,	   those	   responsible	  were	   liable	   to	   be	  
called	  before	  a	  jury	  for	  the	  use	  of	  unnecessary	  force.	  To	  further	  highlight	  the	  supremacy	  of	  the	  
rule	  of	  law,	  Dicey	  invokes	  the	  fact	  that	  prosecution	  or	  punishment	  of	  non-­‐military	  personnel	  for	  
riot	  or	  rebellion	  by	  court-­‐martial	  would	  be	  illegal.23	  
	  
An	   alternative	   approach	   understands	  martial	   law	   as	   constituting	   a	   special	   system	   of	  military	  
rule	   temporarily	   applicable	   in	   place	   of	   civilian	   rule	   during	   grave	   crises,	   but	   still	   nonetheless	  
operating	  within	   an	  overarching	   rule	  of	   law,	   subject	   to	   certain	   constitutional	   constraints.	   	   As	  
such,	  ordinary	  law	  is	  abrogated	  “only	  to	  the	  extent	  required	  by	  the	  overriding	  consideration	  of	  
preserving	  the	  state”,24	  and	  the	  powers	  that	  are	  necessarily	   invoked,	  while	  extraordinary,	  are	  
not	  exterior	  to	  the	  juridical	  order.	  This	  interpretation	  of	  martial	  law	  sits	  closest	  to	  the	  civil	  law	  
état	   de	   siège,	   under	   which	   “the	   authority	   ordinarily	   vested	   in	   the	   civil	   power	   for	   the	  
maintenance	  of	  order	  and	  police	  passes	  entirely	   to	   the	  army”.25	  While	  military	   tribunals	  may	  
supersede	  the	  jurisdiction	  of	  the	  courts,	  “the	  suspension	  of	  law	  involved	  in	  the	  proclamation	  of	  
a	  state	  of	  siege	  is	  a	  thing	  fully	  recognised	  by	  the	  constitution”.26	  Dicey	  claimed	  that	  martial	  law	  
in	   this	   sense	  “is	  unknown	   to	   the	   law	  of	  England”	   (that	   is,	  under	  English	   law,	  authority	  would	  
never	   pass	   entirely	   to	   the	  military),	   an	   assertion	  which	   serves	   as	   “unmistakable	   proof	   of	   the	  
permanent	  supremacy	  of	  the	  law	  under	  our	  constitution”.	  Significantly,	  however,	  he	  footnotes	  
that	   statement	   as	   having	   “no	   reference	   to	   the	   law	   of	   any	   other	   country	   than	   England,	   even	  
though	  such	  country	  may	  form	  part	  of	  the	  British	  Empire”.27	  
	  
While	  drawn	  from	  quite	  distinct	   theoretical	  perspectives	  and	  ostensibly	  different	   in	   form,	  the	  
substantive	  effects	  of	  these	  two	  approaches	  do	  not	  diverge	  hugely.	  Both	  ultimately	  rest	  on	  the	  
                                                
23	  Dicey	  cites	  the	  granting	  of	  a	  writ	  of	  habeas	  corpus	  in	  the	  case	  of	  United	  Irishmen	  leader	  Wolfe	  Tone—on	  the	  morning	  that	  he	  
was	  due	   to	  be	  executed	   in	  1798	  under	  a	  court-­‐martialled	  sentence—as	   the	  epitome	  of	   the	  “noble	  energy	  with	  which	   judges	  
maintained	  the	  rule	  of	  regular	   law,	  even	  at	  periods	  of	  revolutionary	  violence”.	   Id.,	  at	  289.	  This	  argument	   is	  compromised	  by	  
certain	   facts	  which	  Dicey	   fails	   to	  note	  –	   that	  Wolfe	  Tone’s	  brother	  Matthew,	  and	  numerous	  other	   leaders	  of	   the	  Society	  of	  
United	   Irishmen,	  were	   executed	  after	  being	   tried	  by	   court-­‐martial;	   and	   that	  Wolfe	  Tone’s	   case	  was	   somewhat	  distinct	   (and	  
therefore	  unrepresentative)	  in	  that	  the	  civil	  court	  judge	  who	  granted	  the	  habeas	  corpus	  writ	  for	  his	  release,	  Chief	  Justice	  Lord	  
Kilwarden,	   was	   a	   former	  mentor	   of	   his,	   with	   close	   family	   connections,	   who	   five	   years	   previously	   as	   Attorney-­‐General	   had	  
helped	  Tone	  to	  flee	  to	  America	  to	  escape	  prosecution.	  See	  Marianne	  Elliott,	  Wolfe	  Tone:	  Prophet	  of	  Irish	  Independence	  398-­‐
399	  (1989);	  Thomas	  Pakenham,	  The	  Year	  of	  Liberty:	  The	  Great	   Irish	  Rebellion	  of	  1798	  344-­‐345	  (1969);	  Patrick	  C.	  Power,	  The	  
Courts-­‐Martial	  of	  1798-­‐99	  (1997);	  Henry	  Boylan,	  Theobald	  Wolfe	  Tone	  132-­‐133	  (1981);	  Seán	  Cronin,	  For	  whom	  the	  hangman’s	  
noose	  was	  spun:	  Wolfe	  Tone	  and	  the	  United	  Irishmen	  (1991).	  Unaware	  of	  the	  application	  for	  habeas	  corpus	  being	  made	  on	  his	  
behalf,	  Tone	  had	  attempted	  suicide	  in	  prison	  earlier	  that	  morning	  of	  his	  planned	  execution,	  and	  later	  died	  from	  the	  wounds.	  	  
24	  R.J.	  Sharpe,	  The	  Law	  of	  Habeas	  Corpus	  108	  (1976).	  
25	  Dicey,	  supra	  note	  20,	  at	  283-­‐284.	  	  
26	  Id.,	  at	  289.	  
27	  Id.,	  at	  283-­‐284.	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justification	  of	  necessity,	  albeit	  at	  different	  times	  –	  in	  the	  case	  of	  the	  common	  law	  martial	  law,	  
the	  exercise	  of	  power	  must	  be	  shown	  post	  facto	  to	  have	  met	  the	  test	  of	  necessity	  in	  order	  to	  
preclude	  liability;	  in	  the	  case	  of	  the	  state	  of	  siege	  exceptional	  regime	  of	  military	  rule,	  necessity	  
arises	  ex	  ante	  in	  the	  justification	  of	  the	  invocation	  of	  the	  emergency	  itself.	  	  
	  
A	   third	   view	  holds	   that	  martial	   law	   is	  not	   law	  at	   all,	   but	   rather,	   as	   Lord	  Wellington	   famously	  
stated	   in	   1851	   in	   relation	   to	   the	   use	   of	  martial	   law	   in	   Ceylon,	   the	   “will	   of	   the	   General	   who	  
commands	  the	  army”.28	  It	  is	  a	  practical	  means	  of	  discharging	  the	  common	  law	  duty	  of	  restoring	  
order.29	  This	  model	  places	  emergency	  powers	  outside	  the	  remit	  of	  law,	  with	  the	  General’s	  will	  
(which	  nonetheless	  has	  force	  of	  law)	  constrained	  only	  by	  his	  practical	  judgment.	  The	  exigencies	  
of	   the	   situation	  may	   justify	   (and	   indemnify)	   such	  extra-­‐legal	  measures,	  without	   incorporating	  
them	  into	  the	  ordinary	  system	  of	  laws.	  
	  
Martial	  law	  in	  Britain	  remained	  restricted	  to	  instances	  of	  war	  and	  open	  rebellion	  until	  the	  mid-­‐
sixteenth	  century,	  in	  which	  context	  it	  was	  regularly	  used	  as	  an	  offensive	  rather	  than	  defensive	  
measure.	  During	  the	  ‘Pilgrimage	  of	  Grace’	  rebellion	  in	  1537,	  for	  example,	  Henry	  VIII	  instructed	  
one	  of	  his	   commanding	   lieutenants	   to	   “continue	   to	  proceed	  by	  martial	   law	  until	   the	   country	  
was	  in	  such	  terror	  as	  to	  insure	  obedience”.30	  
	  
From	  the	  mid-­‐1550s,	  the	  Crown	  authorities	  gradually	  expanded	  the	  jurisdiction	  of	  martial	   law	  
into	  spheres	  that	  had	  hitherto	  been	  the	  exclusive	  domain	  of	  regular	  criminal	  law.	  At	  that	  point,	  
a	  period	  of	  severe	  economic	  depression,	  martial	   law	  was	  invoked	  as	  a	  peacetime	  measure	  for	  
the	  first	  time,	  and	  began	  to	  be	  used	  as	  a	  means	  of	  class	  and	  political	  repression	  against	  “general	  
undesirables	  with	  no	  apparent	  means	  of	  support”	  and	  inconvenient	  opposition	  to	  the	  Crown.31	  
With	   some	   initial	   hesitation	   as	   to	   how	   it	   might	   be	   perceived,	   this	   shift	   was	   introduced	  
cautiously,	  with	  care	  taken	  to	  ensure	  that	  the	  first	  to	  be	  subjected	  to	  the	  new	  policy	  were	  not	  
too	  close	   to	  home:	   in	  1556	  Mary	   I	   authorised	   the	  Marshal	  of	   the	  army	   in	   Ireland	   to	  proceed	  
against	   ‘general	   undesirables’	   there	   by	   martial	   law.32	   In	   1562,	   Thomas	   Radcliffe,	   3rd	   Earl	   of	  
Sussex,	  recommended	  to	  the	  Queen	  that	  an	  English-­‐born	  ruler	  be	  appointed	  to	  govern	  the	  Irish	  
province	  of	  Munster,	  with	  the	  “authority	  to	  execute	  the	  martial	   law	  in	  times	  of	  necessity,	  but	  
only	   against	   persons	   that	   have	   no	   possessions”.	   33	   In	   the	   meantime,	   martial	   law	   had	   been	  
                                                
28	  Hansard,	  cxv	  880	  (1	  April	  1851).	  
29	  See	  Lord	  McDermott,	  Law	  and	  Order	  in	  Times	  of	  Emergency,	  17	  Juridical	  Rev.	  1	  (1972).	  
30	  Capua,	  supra	  note	  17,	  at	  161,	  citing	  Letters	  and	  Papers	  Foreign	  and	  Domestic	  of	  the	  Reign	  of	  Henry	  VIII,	  XII,	  i,	  479.	  
31	  Capua,	  supra	  note	  17,	  at	  164.	  
32	  Calendar	  of	  State	  Papers,	  Ireland,	  1509-­‐1573,	  at	  134.	  
33	  Calendar	  of	  the	  Carew	  Manuscripts,	  1515-­‐1574,	  at	  336.	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introduced	  in	  England	  to	  silence	  and	  intimidate	  those	  opposed	  to	  the	  Tudors’	  religious	  policy,	  
and	   to	   suppress	   sedition.34	   This	   resort	   to	   martial	   law	   in	   times	   of	   peace	   continued	   under	  
subsequent	  monarchs,	  including	  the	  Stuart	  kings	  who	  imposed	  the	  ‘justice	  of	  martial	  law’	  as	  a	  
means	  of	  punishing	  civilians,	  including	  by	  execution.	  The	  peacetime	  use	  of	  martial	  law	  was	  then	  
outlawed	  by	  parliament—with	  Charles	  I	  asked	  to	  revoke	  and	  annul	  existing	  commissions	  of	  it—
by	  virtue	  of	  the	  Petition	  of	  Right	  in	  1628.35	  While	  it	  was	  unclear	  whether	  the	  Petition	  of	  Right	  
was	  intended	  to	  preclude	  the	  use	  of	  martial	  law	  in	  times	  of	  war,	  the	  prevailing	  view	  holds	  that	  
“[u]ndoubtedly	  martial	  law	  as	  employed	  in	  the	  later	  sixteenth	  century	  against	  civilians	  was	  the	  
target	  of	  the	  prohibition”,	  and	  it	  would	  only	  henceforth	  be	  applied	  to	  regulate	  affairs	  within	  the	  
King’s	  army.36	  	  
	  
Following	  the	  Petition	  of	  Right,	  the	  use	  of	  martial	  law	  fell	  into	  desuetude	  in	  England.37	  As	  Britain	  
continued	   to	   build	   up	   its	   colonial	   empire	   abroad,	   however,	   the	   government	   resorted	  
increasingly	   frequently	   to	   martial	   law	   in	   the	   colonies.	   It	   became	   “an	   essential	   part	   of	   the	  
security	  apparatus	  of	  many	  parts	  of	   the	  empire”.38	  Abandoned	  at	  home	  partly	  because	  of	   its	  
perceived	   tyrannical	   character,	   the	   imposition	   of	   martial	   law	   against	   the	   non-­‐British	   native	  
                                                
34	  See	  Capua,	  supra	  note	  17,	  at	  164-­‐166.	  
35	  Id.,	  at	  171-­‐172.	  	  
36	  See	   id.,	  at	  171,	  note	  77:	   “the	  debates	   in	   the	  Commons	  seem	  to	  suggest	   that	   the	   framers	  of	   the	  Petition	  did	  not	   intend	   to	  
prohibit	  the	  use	  of	  martial	  law	  in	  the	  army	  when	  it	  was	  actually	  in	  the	  field”.	  
37	  Whilst	  recollections	  as	  to	  when	  martial	   law	  was	  last	  invoked	  in	  England	  range	  from	  1689	  [James	  G.	  Randall,	  Constitutional	  
Problems	   under	   Lincoln	   143	   (1926)]	   to	   1800	   [Rossiter	  maintains	   that	  martial	   law	  was	   last	   resorted	   to	   in	   England	   on	   three	  
occasions	   during	   the	   eighteenth	   century,	   see	   Rossiter,	   supra	   note	   14,	   at	   143],	   it	   is	   not	   disputed	   that	   by	   the	   end	   of	   the	  
eighteenth	  century	  it	  had	  been	  phased	  out	  of	  practice	  completely.	  
38	  R.W.	  Kostal,	  A	  Jurisprudence	  of	  Power:	  Victorian	  Empire	  and	  the	  Rule	  of	  Law	  10	  (2005).	  Martial	  law	  was	  exercised	  in	  parts	  of	  
South	  Africa	  by	   the	  British	   in	   1835-­‐36,	   1846-­‐47,	   1850-­‐53,	   1899-­‐1902,	   and	   1906-­‐08	   in	   relation	   to	   various	   confrontations	  with	  
both	  indigenous	  African	  populations	  and	  rival	  Boer	  colonialists.	  See,	  for	  example,	  Charles	  Townshend,	  Martial	  Law:	  Legal	  and	  
Administrative	  Problems	  of	  Civil	  Emergency	   in	  Britain	  and	  the	  Empire,	  1800-­‐1940,	  25	  The	  Historical	  J.	  167,	  176-­‐182	  (1982).	  The	  
matter	  of	  the	  use	  of	  martial	  law	  during	  the	  Boer	  War	  came	  before	  the	  Judicial	  Committee	  of	  the	  Privy	  Council	  in	  the	  case	  of	  Ex	  
parte	  D.F.	  Marais,	  [1902]	  A.	  C.	  109.	  The	  judgment	  removed	  a	  major	  restriction	  on	  the	  exercise	  of	  martial	  rule	  powers	  in	  holding	  
that	  the	  trial	  of	  civilians	  by	  military	  tribunals	  was	  not	  barred	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  ordinary	  courts	  remained	  open.	  Martial	   law	  
was	  similarly	  availed	  of	  by	  the	  British	  authorities	   in	  Canada	  to	  suppress	  the	  Quebec	  patriots’	  rebellion	  between	  1837-­‐39.	  See	  
Svensson-­‐McCarthy,	  supra	  note	  9,	  at	  22.	  The	  Petition	  of	  Right	  did	  not	  extend	  to	  Ireland,	  where	  martial	  law	  was	  declared	  by	  the	  
British	  in	  response	  to	  the	  uprisings	  of	  1798,	  1803,	  1916	  and	  1920-­‐21.	  Townshend,	  ibid.,	  at	  184,	  notes	  that	  martial	  law	  was	  kept	  
in	  force	  for	  some	  four	  months	  in	  1916	  (the	  Easter	  rising	  was	  quelled	  in	  less	  than	  a	  week),	  and	  it	  was	  under	  General	  Maxwell’s	  
regime	  of	  martial	   law	  that	   the	  “politically	  disastrous”	  executions	  of	   the	   Irish	   leadership	  were	  carried	  out.	   In	  1921	   the	  British	  
courts	   consistently	   followed	   the	  Marais	   precedent	   regarding	   the	   use	   of	   the	   justice	   of	  martial	   law	  while	   the	   ordinary	   courts	  
remained	  open.	  See,	   inter	  alia,	  The	  King	  v.	  Allen	   [1921]	  2	  Ir.	  R.	  241;	  The	  King	  (Garde)	  v.	  Strickland	   [1921]	  2	  Ir.	  R.	  317;	  The	  King	  
(Ronayne	   and	  Mulcahy)	   v.	   Strickland	   [1921]	   2	   Ir.	   R.	   333.	   Regimes	   of	  martial	   law	  were	   also	   regularly	   imposed	   in	   India:	   for	   a	  
reflection	  on	  the	  Amritsar	  massacre	  of	  1919,	  “an	  incident	  which	  was	  neither	  the	  beginning	  nor	  the	  end	  of	  martial	  law”	  in	  India,	  
see	  Nasser	  Hussain,	  Towards	  a	  Jurisprudence	  of	  Emergency:	  Colonialism	  and	  the	  Rule	  of	  Law,	  10	  Law	  &	  Critique	  93	  (1999)	  [quote	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populations	   in	   “that	   standard	   locale	   of	   political	   experimentation,	   the	   colonies”,39	   proved	  
considerably	  less	  controversial.	  Martial	  law	  was	  approved	  of	  as	  a	  mechanism	  to	  protect	  British	  
interests	  over	   those	  of	   the	  native	  other.	  Throughout	   the	  empire,	   from	  the	  Caribbean	  to	  Asia,	  
the	   Crown’s	   agents	   invoked	   martial	   law	   to	   suppress	   native	   protests	   against	   anything	   from	  
colonial	  taxes	  to	  agrarian	  policies	  to	  maltreatment	  of	  slaves.40	  	  
	  
In	   these	   various	   instances,	   the	   raison	   d’être	   of	   the	   resort	   to	   martial	   law	   was	   seen	   as	   the	  
preservation	  of	  the	  “good	  order	  and	  tranquillity”41	  of	  British	  rule	  in	  the	  colony	  concerned;	  that	  
is,	  the	  suppression	  of	  disobedience	  and	  silencing	  of	  dissent	  against	  colonial	  government.	  Such	  
disobedience	  and	  dissent	  from	  the	  native	  population	  served	  to	  plunge	  the	  colony	  into	  “a	  state	  
of	  the	  greatest	  alarm	  and	  danger”,	  thus	  offering	  justification	  for	  the	  invocation	  of	  martial	  law.	  
Once	  invoked,	  the	  result	  would	  often	  be	  a	  period	  of	  violence	  under	  martial	  law	  that	  appeared	  
to	   transgress	   the	   blurry	   threshold	   of	   ‘necessity’	   but	   was	   nonetheless	   justified	   as	   legal.	   The	  
perceived	  legitimacy	  of	  adopting	  extraordinary	  measures	  to	  maintain	  public	  order,	  at	  whatever	  
cost	  of	  blood	  or	  property	  may	  be	  necessary,	  as	  Dicey	  had	  suggested,	  can	  be	  extrapolated	  from	  
the	   parliamentary	   debate	   regarding	   the	   use	   of	   martial	   law	   in	   Ceylon.	   While	   Gladstone	  
questioned	  whether	  the	  action	  taken	  by	  the	  military	  commander	  “has	  not	  been	  done	  under	  the	  
law	  so	  to	  be	  called,	  but	  under	  a	  necessity	  which	  is	  above	  the	  law”,	  Robert	  Peel	  emphasised	  “the	  
right,	  when	  the	  necessity	  arises	  …	  to	  proclaim	  martial	  law	  for	  the	  safety	  of	  the	  colony”.42	  In	  that	  
context,	  the	  safety	  of	  the	  colony	  is	  clearly	  understood	  as	  denoting	  the	  safety	  of	  the	  agents	  of	  
colonialism,	  and	  of	  Britain’s	  control	  of,	  and	  interests	  in,	  the	  colony:	  “[t]he	  threat	  of	  martial	  law	  
was	  an	  essential	  resource	  for	  the	  officials	  who	  maintained	  the	  British	  Empire,	  as	  they	  sought	  to	  
defend	  imperial	  interests	  in	  the	  midst	  of	  an	  often	  very	  hostile	  local	  population”.43	  
	  
                                                
39	  Mark	  Neocleous,	  From	  Martial	  Law	  to	  the	  War	  on	  Terror,	  10:4	  New	  Crim.	  L.	  Rev.	  489,	  493	  (2007).	  
40	   Including	   in	  Demerara	   (1823),	   Barbados	   (1805,	   1816),	   Ceylon	   (1848),	   Cephalonia	   (1849),	   St.	   Vincent	   (1863),	  and,	   perhaps	  
most	   famously,	   in	   Jamaica	   in	   1865,	   “when	  a	   servile	   revolt	  …	  was	  put	  down	  with	   the	   severity	  which	  one	  might	   expect	   from	  
planter	  militia”.	  Charles	  Fairman,	  The	  Law	  of	  Martial	  Rule	  and	  the	  National	  Emergency,	  55	  Harv.	  L.	  Rev.	  1253,	  1254	  (1942).	  For	  
further	  detail	  see	  Bernard	  Semmel,	  Jamaican	  Blood	  and	  the	  Victorian	  Conscience:	  The	  Governor	  Eyre	  Controversy	  (1962),	  and	  
Kostal,	  supra	  note	  38.	  
41	   Letter	   to	   Lieutenant-­‐Colonel	   Goodman,	   Commandant	   of	   the	   Georgetown	  Militia,	   from	   colonists	   in	   Georgetown	   and	   its	  
vicinity,	   22	   January	   1824.	   Reproduced	   in	   Joshua	   Bryant,	   Account	   of	   the	   Insurrection	   of	   the	   Negro	   Slaves	   in	   the	   Colony	   of	  
Demerara	  19	  (1824),	  at	  104.	  
42	  Select	  Committee	  on	  Ceylon,	  Second	  Report,	  12	  Sess.	  Papers,	  paras.	  5476-­‐5477	  (1850),	  quoted	  in	  Fairman,	  supra	  note	  40,	  at	  
1260-­‐1261.	  	  
43	  David	  Dyzenhaus,	  The	  Puzzle	  of	  Martial	  Law,	  59	  Univ.	  Toronto	  L.	  J.	  1	  (2009).	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B.	  FROM	  MARTIAL	  LAW	  TO	  EMERGENCY	  CODES	  
	  
While	  the	  nineteenth	  century	  was	  marked	  by	  the	  widespread	  use	  of	  martial	  law	  throughout	  the	  
empire,	  it	  also	  witnessed	  a	  parallel	  evolution	  from	  martial	  law	  to	  emergency	  legislative	  codes.	  
The	   assimilation	   of	   emergency	   powers	   into	   written	   law	   by	   Britain’s	   colonial	   authorities	   was	  
most	   vociferously	   effected	   not	   in	   the	   distant	   corners	   of	   the	   empire	   but	   across	   the	  water	   in	  
Ireland,	  fully	  annexed	  by	  Britain	  through	  the	  Act	  of	  Union	  in	  1800	  but	  governed	  as	  a	  colony	  for	  
all	   intents	  and	  purposes.	  Martial	   law	  was	   imposed	  by	   the	  King’s	  viceroy	   in	   Ireland	  during	   the	  
attempted	  rebellions	  of	  1798	  and	  1803	  in	  order	  to	  “punish	  all	  persons	  acting,	  aiding,	  or	  in	  any	  
manner	  assisting	   the	   said	   rebellion”.44	  Between	   then	  and	   the	  Easter	   rising	  of	  1916,	  however,	  
the	  use	  of	  martial	   law	  as	  a	   reactive	  measure	  was	   foregone	   in	   favour	  of	  a	  more	  constant	  and	  
pervasive	   framework	   for	   dealing	   with	   ‘disturbances’	   in	   Ireland.	   Thus,	   a	   steady	   stream	   of	  
Insurrection	  Acts,	  Habeas	  Corpus	  Suspension	  Acts	  and	  Coercion	  Acts	  flowed	  into	   Ireland	  from	  
the	  beginning	  of	  nineteenth	  century,	  with	  the	  effect	  that	  “[d]uring	  the	  thirty-­‐five	  years	  which	  
preceded	   Catholic	   emancipation	   the	   ordinary	   laws	   of	   a	   peaceful	   country	   were	   almost	  
uninterruptedly	   superseded	  by	  a	  course	  of	  exceptional	  measures”.45	  Peel	  accordingly	  pointed	  
out	   in	   the	   course	   of	   the	   parliamentary	   debate	   on	   the	   Catholic	   Relief	   Bill	   in	   1829	   that	   “for	  
scarcely	  a	  year	  during	  the	  period	  that	  has	  elapsed	  since	  the	  Union	  has	  Ireland	  been	  governed	  by	  
the	  ordinary	  course	  of	  the	  law”.46	  Formal	  Catholic	  emancipation	  did	  come	  with	  the	  passing	  of	  
that	   bill	   into	   law	   in	   1829,	   but	   “proved	  no	  more	  of	   a	   panacea	   than	   the	  Union	  before	   it”,47	   in	  
terms	   not	   only	   of	   the	   continued	   disenfranchisement	   of	   the	   Irish	   peasant	   population	   on	  
economic	   instead	   of	   religious	   grounds,	   but	   also	   in	   terms	   of	   the	   unrelenting	   enactment	   of	  
                                                
44	  43	  Geo.	  III,	  c.117;	  39	  Geo.	  III,	  c.11.	  
45	  See	  Isaac	  S.	  Leadam,	  Coercive	  Measures	  in	  Ireland,	  1830-­‐1880	  7	  (1886).	  
46	  Hansard	   2,	   xx,	   741-­‐2	   (5	  March	   1829).	   Peel’s	   statement	   provides	   a	   synopsis	   of	   the	   series	   of	   Insurrection	  Acts	   and	  Habeas	  
Corpus	   Suspension	   Acts	   during	   that	   period:	   “In	   1800	   we	   find	   the	   Habeas	   Corpus	   Act	   suspended,	   and	   the	   Act	   for	   the	  
suppression	  of	  the	  rebellion	  in	  force.	  In	  1801	  they	  were	  continued.	  In	  1802,	  I	  believe,	  they	  expired.	  In	  1803,	  the	  insurrection	  in	  
which	   Emmett	   suffered	   broke	   out,	   Lord	   Kilwarden	   was	   murdered	   by	   a	   savage	   mob,	   and	   both	   Acts	   of	   Parliament	   were	  
renewed.	   In	   1804	   they	   were	   continued.	   In	   1805	   renewed.	   In	   1806	   the	   west	   and	   south	   of	   Ireland	   were	   in	   a	   state	   of	  
insubordination,	  which	  was	  with	  difficulty	  repressed	  by	  the	  severest	  enforcement	  of	  the	  ordinary	  law.	  In	  1807,	  in	  consequence	  
chiefly	  of	   the	  disorders	   that	  had	  prevailed	   in	  1806,	   the	  Act	  called	   the	   Insurrection	  Act	  was	   introduced.	   It	  gave	  power	   to	   the	  
Lord-­‐Lieutenant	  to	  place	  any	  district,	  by	  proclamation,	  out	  of	  the	  pale	  of	  the	  ordinary	  law,	  it	  suspended	  trial	  by	  jury,	  and	  made	  
it	  a	  transportable	  offence	  to	  be	  out	  of	  doors	  from	  sunset	  to	  sunrise.	  This	  Act	  continued	  in	  force	  in	  1807,	  1808,	  1809,	  and	  to	  the	  
close	  of	  the	  session	  of	  1810.	   In	  1814	  the	   Insurrection	  Act	  was	  renewed.	   It	  was	  continued	   in	  1815,	  1816,	  1817.	   In	  1822	  Habeas	  
Corpus	   Act	   suspended	   and	   Insurrection	   Act	   again	   revived,	   and	   continued	   during	   the	   years	   1823,	   1824,	   1825.	   In	   1825	   the	  
temporary	  Act	  intended	  for	  the	  suppression	  of	  dangerous	  associations,	  and	  especially	  of	  the	  Roman	  Catholic	  Association,	  was	  
passed.	  It	  continued	  during	  1826,	  1827,	  and	  expired	  in	  1828.	  The	  year	  1829	  brings	  with	  it	  the	  demand	  for	  a	  new	  Act	  to	  suppress	  
the	  Roman	  Catholic	  Association.”	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repressive	  legislation	  that	  followed.	  By	  the	  halfway	  point	  of	  the	  nineteenth	  century,	  Ireland	  had	  
been	  ruled	  under	  ‘the	  ordinary	  course	  of	  the	  law’	  for	  only	  five	  years	  of	  the	  preceding	  fifty.48	  	  
	  
One	   of	   the	   first	   statutes	   to	   institute	   a	   system	  of	   emergency	   law,	   the	   1833	  Act	   for	   the	  More	  
Effective	   Suppression	   of	   Local	   Disturbances	   and	   Dangerous	   Associations	   in	   Ireland,49	   is	  
described	   by	   Brian	   Simpson	   as	   “the	   ancestor	   of	   the	  modern	   code	   of	   emergency	   law”.50	   The	  
Lord-­‐Lieutenant,	   the	   King’s	   viceroy,	  was	   empowered	   to	   trigger	   the	   application	   of	   the	   law	   by	  
declaring	   a	   county	   to	   be	   affected	   by	   local	   disturbances	   or	   ‘dangerous’	   organisations	   to	   the	  
extent	  that	  extraordinary	  powers	  not	  allowed	  for	  by	  the	  common	  law	  were	  required.	  As	  such,	  
the	   Lord-­‐Lieutenant	   was	   essentially	   mandated	   to	   declare	   what	   we	   now	   know	   as	   a	   ‘state	   of	  
emergency’.	   He	   was	   given	   powers	   to	   suppress	  meetings	   and	   impose	   curfews,	   with	   offences	  
under	  the	  Act	  to	  be	  tried	  by	  courts-­‐martial.	  Nothing	  done	  under	  the	  Act	  could	  be	  questioned	  in	  
any	   court	   of	   law.	   The	   ostensible	   aim	   of	   the	   legislation	   was	   to	   stifle	   agitation	   from	   the	   Irish	  
peasantry.	  There	  was	  a	  distinct	  divergence	  of	  opinion	  in	  Westminster,	  however,	  as	  to	  the	  level	  
of	  violence	  that	  was	  actually	  occurring	  in	  Ireland	  at	  the	  time.	  At	  the	  second	  reading	  of	  the	  Bill	  in	  
the	   House	   of	   Commons,	   John	   Key	   MP	   spoke	   of	   what	   was	   reported	   to	   him	   as	   a	   state	   of	  
“disgraceful	   insubordination”51	   prevailing	   in	   Ireland.	   Joseph	   Hume	   MP,	   on	   the	   other	   hand,	  
relayed	  accounts	  that	  Ireland	  was	  in	  “a	  state	  of	  perfect	  tranquillity.”52	  Such	  ambiguity	  naturally	  
gives	  rises	  to	  suspicions	  that	  the	  degree	  of	  extant	  ‘insubordination’	  may	  have	  been	  overplayed	  
with	   a	   view	   to	   ensuring	   that	   more	   fundamental	   political	   interests	   would	   be	   served	   by	   the	  
passing	  of	   the	   legislation.	   In	   this	   regard,	   the	   comments	  of	   the	  Earl	  of	  Roden	   in	   the	  House	  of	  
Lords	  debate	  shed	  much	  light:	  he	  spoke	  of	  the	  importance	  of	  “suppressing	  agitation	  in	  Ireland”	  
in	  order	  to	  preserve	  “the	  integrity	  of	  the	  empire”.	  The	  protection	  of	  the	  Protestant	  interest	  by	  
the	  British	  government	  was	  essential;	  otherwise	   “it	  would	  be	  utterly	   impossible	   to	  prevent	  a	  
Repeal	  of	  the	  Union,	  or,	  in	  other	  words,	  a	  dismemberment	  of	  the	  Empire”.53	  Viewed	  through	  a	  
lens	  that	  recognises	  the	  primacy	  of	  the	  preservation	  and	  integrity	  of	  the	  empire,	  the	  motivation	  
behind	  the	  sweeping	  deprivation	  of	  constitutional	  rights	  that	  the	  1833	  Act	  heralded	  in	  Ireland	  
comes	   into	   clearer	   focus.	   Such	   an	   analysis	   is	   consonant	   with	   the	   British	   colonial	   outlook	  
whereby	  every	   instance	  of	  disorder	  or	  opposition	   in	  a	  given	  colony	  was	   “considered	   from	  an	  
empire-­‐wide	  perspective”.54	  
                                                
48	  John	  L.	  Hammond,	  Gladstone	  and	  the	  Irish	  Nation	  16	  (1938).	  
49	  1833,	  3	  Will.	  IV,	  c.	  4.	  
50	  A.W.B.	  Simpson,	  Human	  Rights	  and	  the	  End	  of	  Empire:	  Britain	  and	  the	  Genesis	  of	  the	  European	  Convention	  79	  (2001).	  
51	  Hansard,	  vol.	  16	  c.450	  (HC	  Deb	  8	  March	  1833).	  
52	  Hansard,	  vol.	  16	  c.406	  (HC	  Deb	  8	  March	  1833).	  
53	  Hansard,	  vol.	  16	  c.1312-­‐1313	  (HL	  Deb	  1	  April	  1833).	  
54	  Frank	  Füredi,	  Colonial	  Wars	  and	  the	  Politics	  of	  Third	  World	  Nationalism	  156	  (1994).	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The	  web	   of	   emergency	   legislation	   continued	   to	   be	   spun	   throughout	   the	   nineteenth	   century.	  
The	  Crime	   and	  Outrage	  Act	   of	   1847	  was	   passed	  during	   the	  Great	   Famine	   in	   response	   to	   the	  
“system	  of	  terror”	  that	  Sir	  George	  Grey	  claimed	  that	  English	  landlords	  were	  subjected	  to	  by	  the	  
Irish	   peasantry;55	   a	   populace	   that	   Britain	   and	   the	   landlords	   had	   exploited	   to	   the	   point	   of	  
“poverty,	  disaffection,	  and	  degradation	  without	  a	  parallel	  in	  the	  world.”56	  This	  law	  empowered	  
the	   Lord-­‐Lieutenant	   to	   proclaim	   districts	   ‘disturbed’,	   and	   to	   impose	   restrictions	   accordingly.	  
Other	  notable	  additions	  included	  further	  Habeas	  Corpus	  Suspension	  Acts	  (1848-­‐49,	  1866-­‐69),	  as	  
well	   as	   the	  Protection	  of	   Life	  and	  Property	   (Ireland)	  Act	  of	  187157	  and	   the	  Act	   for	   the	  Better	  
Protection	  of	  Person	  and	  Property	  in	  Ireland	  of	  1881.58	  Both	  of	  the	  latter	  allowed	  for	  detention	  
of	   suspects	   without	   charge	   or	   any	   form	   of	   judicial	   supervision.	   The	   Prevention	   of	   Crime	  
(Ireland)	  Act	  of	  188359	   “conferred	  a	  variety	  of	  other	   repressive	  powers	  on	   the	   Irish	   [colonial]	  
authorities;	  jury	  trial	  could	  be	  abolished	  for	  certain	  offences,	  meetings	  prohibited,	  newspapers	  
seized	  and	  suspects	  out	  of	  doors	  at	  night	  arrested	  without	  warrant.”60	  The	  trend	  continued	  thus	  
through	  the	  turn	  of	   the	  century	  and	  rising	  cultural,	  political	  and	  socio-­‐economic	  resistance	  to	  
British	  rule;	  the	  last	  major	  act	  of	  legislation	  that	  allowed	  for	  emergency	  regulations	  before	  Irish	  
independence	  was	  the	  Restoration	  of	  Order	  in	  Ireland	  Act	  of	  1920,	  essentially	  an	  extension	  of	  
the	  Defence	  of	  the	  Realm	  Act	  of	  1914	  that	  had	  been	  enacted	   in	  Britain	  upon	  the	  outbreak	  of	  
the	   First	   World	   War.	   	   The	   1920	   Act	   marked	   an	   attempt	   to	   increase	   convictions	   of	   Irish	  
nationalist	   leaders	  while	  averting	   the	  need	   to	   impose	  martial	   law.61	  Thus,	   the	  case	  of	   Ireland	  
from	   1800	   until	   its	   independence	   in	   1922	   can	   be	   seen	   as	   the	   embryo	   in	   which	   the	  
institutionalisation	  of	  emergency	  codes	  and	  the	  notion	  of	  a	  permanent	  exception	  developed.	  
	  
The	  statement	  of	  the	  Earl	  of	  Roden	  referred	  to	  above	  is	  largely	  representative	  of	  the	  thinking	  of	  
the	  British	  political	  establishment	  during	  this	  time,	  and	  helps	  to	  explain	  why	  Britain	  took	  such	  
extensive	   measures	   to	   legislate	   for	   the	   continuing	   repression	   of	   any	   form	   of	   opposition	   to	  
colonial	   rule	   in	   Ireland.	  There	  was	  a	  broader	  empire	  at	   stake,	   and	  palpable	   fear	  of	   a	  domino	  
effect.	  Ireland	  had	  been	  subjugated	  by	  Britain	  for	  longer	  than	  most	  of	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  empire;	  its	  
                                                
55	  Hansard,	  20	  November	  1847,	  cited	  in	  Leadam,	  supra	  note	  45,	  at	  20.	  
56	   The	   Times,	   24	   March	   1847,	   quoted	   in	   Christopher	   Morash	   &	   Richard	   Hayes,	   Fearful	   Realities:	   New	   Perspectives	   on	   the	  
Famine	  (1996).	  
57	  34	  Vict.	  c.	  25.	  
58	  44	  Vict	  c.	  4.	  
59	  46	  Vict.	  c.	  25.	  
60	  Simpson,	  supra	  note	  50,	  at	  80.	  




14	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  CLPE	  RESEARCH	  PAPER	  SERIES	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  [VOL.	  06	  NO.	  05	  
anti-­‐colonial	  resistance	  had	  reached	  a	  more	  advanced	  stage.	   If	   Ireland	  was	  allowed	  to	  go,	  the	  
thinking	   went,	   it	   would	   signify	   an	   insecurity	   for	   Britain	   that	   could	   potentially	   reverberate	  
around	  the	  empire.	  It	  was	  on	  this	  basis	  that	  Gladstone’s	  bill	  proposing	  ‘Home	  Rule’	  for	  Ireland	  
in	  1886	  was	  defeated.	  The	  majority	  of	  MPs	   feared	   that	  a	  partially	   independent	   Ireland	  could	  
herald	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  dismemberment	  of	  the	  empire.	  	  
	  
Instead,	   a	   domino	   effect	   of	   another	   sort	   can	   be	   identified.	   The	   use	   of	   martial	   law,	   long	  
abandoned	   on	   mainland	   Britain,	   had	   been	   normalised	   in	   the	   overseas	   empire	   and	   spread	  
throughout	  its	  vast	  reach.	  It	  was,	  however,	  a	  somewhat	  amorphous	  concept.	  As	  the	  traditional	  
common	  law	  propensity	  to	  avoid	  elaborate	  codification	  of	  laws	  began	  to	  recede	  somewhat,	  the	  
British	   authorities	   steadily	   developed	   an	   institutionalised	   system	   of	   emergency	   legislation	   in	  
Ireland,	   as	   a	  more	   refined	   and	   defined	   alternative	   to	  martial	   law,	   and	  more	   pervasive	   in	   its	  
application.	  The	  essence	  was	  the	  same,	  however:	  emergency	  codes	  created	  “a	  form	  of	  statute-­‐
based	  martial	  law	  in	  which	  the	  will	  of	  the	  executive	  is	  supreme”.62	  Such	  a	  system,	  it	  transpired,	  
is	  exactly	  what	  was	  perceived	  as	  needed	  at	  home	   in	  Britain	  when	   the	  First	  World	  War	  broke	  
out.	   The	   British	   authorities	   and	  military	   required	   broad	   and	   clearly-­‐mandated	   powers	   to	   act	  
decisively.	   The	  matrix	   of	   sweeping	   legislative	   powers	   enacted	   in	   Ireland	   –	  most	   notably	   the	  
1833	  Act	  –	   thus	  provided	  a	   ready-­‐made	  normative	   source	   for	   the	   series	  of	  Orders	   in	  Council	  
that	  were	  authorised	  by	  a	  parent	  act,	   the	  Defence	  of	  the	  Realm	  Act	   (DORA)	  of	  1914.63	  Under	  
this	   system,	   powers	   could	   be	   acquired,	   modified	   and	   enhanced	   by	   the	   executive	   without	  
further	  reference	  to	  parliament.	  Thus,	  for	  example,	  executive	  detention,	  which	  had	  never	  been	  
mentioned	  when	  the	  parent	  act	  went	  through	  parliament,	  was	  introduced	  in	  1915	  by	  Order	  in	  
Council.64	   Simpson	  notes	   that	   “[t]he	   structure	  of	   government	  under	  DORA	   closely	   resembled	  
the	  situation	  in	  those	  colonial	  territories	  where	  the	  Governor	  and	  executive	  could	  force	  through	  
any	  legislation	  desired”.65	  	  
	  
Having	  been	  based	  on	  a	  model	  developed	  in	  colonial	  territories,	  primarily	  in	  Ireland,	  this	  system	  
would	  now	  spill	  over	  to	  much	  of	  the	  empire.	  A	  similar	  emergency	  code	  was	  exported	  to	  India	  
under	  the	  1915	  Defence	  of	  India	  Act,	  whereby	  the	  Governor-­‐General	  in	  Council	  was	  given	  free	  
reign	  to	  enact	  rules	  for	  “the	  purpose	  of	  public	  safety	  and	  defence	  of	  British	  India”.66	  Emergency	  
powers	  were	   continued	   after	   the	  war	   under	   the	   Anarchical	   and	   Revolutionary	   Crimes	   Act	   of	  
                                                
62	  A.W.B.	  Simpson,	  Round	  Up	   the	  Usual	  Suspects:	   The	   Legacy	   of	  British	  Colonialism	  and	   the	  European	  Convention	   on	  Human	  
Rights,	  41	  Loyola	  Law	  Review	  629,	  640	  (1996).	  
63	  4	  &	  5	  Geo.	  V,	  c.	  29.	  
64	  Simpson,	  supra	  note	  50,	  at	  81.	  
65	  Id.	  
66	  Simpson,	  supra	  note	  62,	  at	  646.	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1919,	   the	  Criminal	   Tribes	  Act	  of	  1924	  and	   the	  Bengal	  Criminal	   Law	  Amendment	  Act	  of	  1925,	  
with	   significant	   consequences	   in	   terms	   of	   the	   controlled	   residence,	   forcible	   transfer	   and	  
internment	  of	  Indians.67	  
	  
In	  Palestine,	  under	  mandate	  rule	  following	  the	  First	  World	  War,	  the	  British	  authorities	  enacted	  
the	  Palestine	  (Defence)	  Orders	   in	  Council	  of	  193168	  and	  1937.69	  The	  legal	  situation	  created	  by	  
those	  statutes	  bore	  substantial	  resemblance	  to	  that	  of	  Ireland	  under	  the	  Defence	  of	  the	  Realm	  
legislation,	   with	   Britain’s	   High	   Commissioner	   empowered	   to	   declare	   a	   public	   emergency	   in	  
Palestine,	   whereupon	   collective	   punishment,	   property	   destruction,	   movement	   restrictions,	  
deportation	  and	  detention	  became	  par	  for	  the	  course.	  	  
	  
The	   evolutionary	   shift	   in	   colonial	   mentality	   towards	   a	   more	   defined	   and	   widely	   applicable	  
emergency	  legislation	  system	  that	  had	  occurred	  was	  highlighted	  by	  an	  assertion	  of	  the	  Colonial	  
Secretary	  with	  regard	  to	  the	  situation	  in	  Palestine	  during	  the	  1930s.	  The	  declaration	  of	  martial	  
law	  would,	  according	  to	  him,	  be	  avoided	  unless	  the	  rebellion	  became	  “so	  serious,	  widespread	  
and	  effective,	  that	  there	  was	  a	  complete	  breakdown	  of	  the	  functions	  of	  civil	  government”;	  that	  
is,	  effectively	  only	  in	  the	  case	  of	  full-­‐scale	  war.	  Otherwise,	  the	  Colonial	  Secretary	  felt	  it	  “unwise	  
on	   constitutional	   and	   practical	   grounds	   to	   mix	   up	   with	   emergency	   powers	   legislation	   the	  
doctrine	  of	  Martial	  law.”70	  As	  opposition	  to	  Britain’s	  rule	  intensified	  around	  the	  empire	  through	  
the	   1940s	   and	   1950s,	   similar	   emergency	   powers	   to	   those	   developed	   in	   Ireland,	   India	   and	  
Palestine	  would	  be	  invoked	  in	  many	  of	  Britain’s	  colonial	  territories.	  
	  
	  
III.	  SUNSET	  EMERGENCIES:	  	  
THE	  POLITICAL,	  CULTURAL	  AND	  LEGAL	  ENVIRONMENT	  IN	  A	  FADING	  EMPIRE	  
	  
With	  Britain’s	  grip	  of	  the	  ‘first	  empire’	  of	  its	  ‘new	  world’	  settler	  colonies	  loosened	  upon	  the	  loss	  
of	  the	  American	  colonies,	   it	  began	  to	  divert	   its	  gaze	  eastwards	  towards	  the	  lures	  of	  a	  ‘second	  
empire’.	  Britain’s	  “imperial	  century”71	  from	  1815-­‐1914	  was	  marked	  by	  the	  assumption	  of	  direct	  
political	  control	  over	  trading	  colonies	   in	  Asia,	  and	  successful	  scrambling	   in	  Africa.	  By	  the	  time	  
the	  spoils	  of	  the	  First	  World	  War	  were	  distributed	  under	  League	  of	  Nations	  mandates,	  Britain	  
had	   amassed	   an	   uninterrupted	   spine	   of	   colonial	   territories	   through	   Africa	   from	   the	   Cape	   to	  
                                                
67	  Id.,	  at	  647-­‐648.	  
68	  3	  Government	  of	  Palestine	  Ordinances,	  Regulations,	  Rules,	  Orders	  and	  Notices	  259	  (19	  April	  1936).	  	  
69	  2	  Government	  of	  Palestine	  Ordinances,	  Regulations,	  Rules,	  Orders	  and	  Notices	  261	  (20	  March	  1937).	  	  
70	  William	  Ormsby-­‐Gore,	  Cabinet	  Memorandum:	  Palestine:	  Defence	  Orders	  in	  Council,	  CP	  86	  (37)	  P.R.O.	  W.O.	  32	  9618.	  
71	  Ronald	  Hyam,	  Britain's	  Imperial	  Century,	  1815-­‐1914:	  A	  Study	  of	  Empire	  and	  Expansion	  (2002).	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Cairo,	  and	  onwards	  through	  its	  mandate	  territories	  in	  the	  Middle	  East.72	  Over	  the	  course	  of	  that	  
century,	  the	  British	  empire	  had:	  	  
	  
ceased	   to	   be	   an	   empire	   largely	   composed	   of	   communities	   of	   free	   peoples	   of	   British	  
origin	   tied	   to	   Britain	   by	   trade	   regulations	   and	   naval	   power.	   It	   was	   now	   an	   empire	  
including	   numerous	   peoples	   who	   were	   not	   British	   in	   origin	   and	   who	   had	   been	  
incorporated	   into	   the	   empire	   by	   conquest	   and	   who	   were	   ruled	   without	  
representation.73	  	  
	  
Whilst	   glossing	   over	   matters	   of	   conquest	   and	   race	   that	   were	   certainly	   not	   absent	   from	   the	  
earlier	   temporal	   period	   of	   Britain’s	   imperial	  misadventures,	  most	   notably	   in	   Ireland	   and	   the	  
Caribbean,	   this	   description	   is	   broadly	   representative	   of	   the	   shift	   in	   colonial	   paradigm	   that	  
occurred	  as	  the	  empire’s	  tentacles	  extended	  throughout	  Asia	  and	  Africa.	  Without	  the	  presence	  
of	   significant	   communities	  of	   settlers	   to	  provide	  political	   support,	   and	   cultural	   and	  economic	  
links	   to	   the	  metropole,	  Britain	  was	   inevitably	  more	  vulnerable	   to	   resistance	   to	   its	   rule	   in	   the	  
‘second	  empire’.	  	  
	  
The	   dissent	   and	  disobedience	  of	   the	   natives	   had	   always	   been	  perceived	   as	   a	   fact	   of	   colonial	  
governance,	  long	  before	  the	  advent	  of	  ‘third	  world’	  nationalism.74	  Hence	  there	  had	  been	  strong	  
insistence	   from	  Britain	   on	   recourse	   to	   the	   discretionary	   authority	   of	   the	   central	   executive	   in	  
order	  to	  sustain	  a	  regime	  of	  conquest.	  With	  the	  rise	  of	  anti-­‐colonial	  nationalism	  in	  Africa	  and	  
Asia	  during	   the	   first	  half	  of	   the	   twentieth	  century	  coinciding	  with	  Britain’s	  declining	  status	  as	  
the	   world’s	   dominant	   power,	   it	   became	   clear	   that	   it	   was	   facing	   a	   serious	   threat	   to	   the	  
continuing	  integrity	  of	  the	  empire.	  India	  was	  at	  the	  forefront	  of	  such	  resistance,	  and	  the	  special	  
powers	   measures	   of	   the	   1920s	   and	   1930s,	   by	   which	   the	   British	   sought	   to	   counter	   an	  
increasingly	  radical	  nationalism,	  evoked	  an	  idiom	  of	  terrorist	  threat	  and	  a	  shift	  towards	  special	  
tribunals	   that	  would	   be	   instantly	   recognisable	   today.75	   Britain’s	   actions	   in	   this	   regard	   can	   be	  
seen	   to	   have	   exemplified	   an	   emergent	   mechanism	   of	   governance	   “that	   comprehends	   and	  
confronts	  a	  threat	  through	  an	  administrative	  rationality”.76	  
	  
                                                
72	   For	   a	   celebratory	   account	   of	   the	   reach	  of	   the	   empire	   at	   its	   height,	   spanning	   approximately	   a	   quarter	   of	   the	  world’s	   land	  
surface	  area,	  see,	  for	  example,	  Niall	  Ferguson,	  Empire	  (2004).	  
73	  P.J.	  Marshall,	  Empire	  and	  Authority	  in	  the	  later	  Eighteenth	  Century,	  25:2	  J.	  Imperial	  &	  Commonwealth	  History	  105,	  115	  (1987).	  
74	  Hussain,	  supra	  note	  38,	  at	  100.	  
75	  See	  Nasser	  Hussain,	  Hyperlegality,	  10	  New	  Crim.	  L.	  Rev.	  514,	  521-­‐523	  (2007),	  citing	  the	  Bengal	  Criminal	  Law	  Amendment	  Act	  
of	  1925	  and	  the	  Bengal	  Emergency	  Powers	  Ordinance	  of	  1931.	  	  
76	  Id.,	  at	  523.	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It	  was	  to	  this	  mechanism	  that	  Britain	  would	  resort	  as	   it	  became	  embroiled	   in	  more	  and	  more	  
political	  and	  military	  struggles	  to	  maintain	  the	  stability	  and	  continued	  sovereignty	  of	  its	  colonial	  
regimes	  at	  the	  advent	  of	  the	  UN	  era.	  Thus,	  its	  last	  major	  wave	  of	  colonial	  wars	  during	  the	  late	  
1940s	  and	  1950s,	  were	  “euphemistically	  self-­‐styled	  as	  ‘emergencies’”,77	  so	  that	  mass	  resistance	  
could	   be	   dealt	   with	   by	   special	   powers	   enacted	   in	   the	   name	   of	   the	   restoration	   of	   normalcy	  
(rather	   than	   the	   competing,	   and	   less	   flattering,	   narrative	   of	   resort	   to	   force	   to	   sustain	  
hegemonic	   control).	   The	   post-­‐war	   British	   political	   establishment	   “had	   every	   intention	   of	  
retaining	   the	  empire”,	  but	   “the	  use	  of	   force	   for	   the	  maintenance	  of	   the	  empire	  had	  become	  
problematic	  …	  international	  and	  domestic	  opinion	  posed	  limits”.78	  A	  communication	  from	  Lord	  
Killearn	   in	   the	  Cairo	  embassy	  back	   to	  London	  emphasised	   that	  “the	   time	  has	  already	  gone	   in	  
Egypt	   and	   in	   the	  Middle	   East	   as	   a	   whole	   when	  we	   can	   rely	   on	   force	   alone	   to	  maintain	   our	  
position”.79	   Not	   just	   force,	   but	   force	   of	   law	  was	   required	   to	   suppress	   growing	   resistance	   to	  
colonial	   rule	   throughout	   the	   empire.	   The	   1948	   “Panic	   in	   Whitehall”,	   generated	   by	   the	  
somewhat	  belated	  realisation80	  that	  the	  foundations	  of	  the	  empire	  were	  crumbling,	  resulted	  in	  
colonial	  officials	  looking	  “to	  special	  powers	  to	  give	  them	  a	  breathing	  space	  in	  which	  they	  could	  
reclaim	   the	   initiative.	  When	   the	   normal	   forms	   of	   political	  management	   failed	   to	   contain	   the	  
nationalist	  challenge,	  the	  calling	  of	  an	  emergency	  was	  always	  a	  plausible	  option”.81	  To	  this	  end	  
Britain	  sought	  to	  rely	  on	  law	  and	  on	  the	  notion	  of	  emergency	  in	  order	  to	  preserve	  a	  perception	  
of	   legitimacy,	  presenting	   its	  use	  of	   force	   in	   the	  colonies	  as	  having	   little	   to	  do	  with	   imperialist	  
expansion,	   and	   relating	   rather	   to	   upholding	   ‘law	   and	   order’	   under	   the	   duress	   of	   emergency.	  
Analyses	   of	   British	   policy	   at	   this	   time	   have	   concluded	   that	   “every	   imperial	   response	   to	   anti-­‐
colonial	  protest	  contained	  elements	  of	  an	  informal	  emergency,	  while	  every	  formal	  emergency	  
possessed	  a	  political	  dimension”.82	  
	  
A	  shroud	  of	  administrative	  legality	  was	  used	  to	  conceal	  underlying	  political	  objectives	  in	  many	  
of	   the	   colonies	   where	   Britain	   sought	   to	   suppress	   radical	   anti-­‐colonial	   movements	   and	   to	  
promote	   their	   more	   moderate	   counterparts.	   Hence	   the	   ‘Gold	   Coast	   experiment’	   whereby	  
                                                
77	  Rajagopal,	  supra	  note	  7,	  at	  178.	  
78	  Füredi,	  supra	  note	  54,	  at	  143.	  
79	  Public	  Record	  Office,	  FO	  370/895,	  General	  Correspondence:	  Lord	  Killearn	  to	  Sir	  Maurice	  Peterson,	  17	  January	  1944.	  
80	   Füredi	   sketches	   a	   dividing	   line	   between	  British	   government	   policies	   in	   the	   colonies	   pre	   and	   post	   1948:	   “Whitehall’s	   new	  
attitude	  towards	  the	  problem	  of	  order	  in	  the	  colonies	  –	  expressed	  through	  a	  willingness	  to	  use	  special	  measures,	  emergencies	  
and	  high-­‐profile	  policing	  to	  manage	  political	  opposition	  –	  becomes	  apparent	  from	  early	  1948.	  Until	  this	  period,	  especially	  up	  
until	  mid-­‐1947,	  Whitehall	  was	   comparatively	   relaxed	   about	   the	   problem	  of	   order	   in	   the	   colonies.	  Often	   it	  was	   the	  Colonial	  
Office	  that	  tried	  to	  curb	  the	  enthusiasm	  of	  the	  local	  administration	  for	  enacting	  new	  special	  powers	  and	  emergencies.”	  Füredi,	  
supra	  note	  54,	  at	  94-­‐95.	  
81	  Id.,	  at	  4.	  
82	  Id.,	  at	  5.	  
	  
 
18	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  CLPE	  RESEARCH	  PAPER	  SERIES	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  [VOL.	  06	  NO.	  05	  
Britain	  sought	  to	  mitigate	  the	  challenge	  to	  its	  rule	  in	  Ghana	  through	  the	  quasi-­‐solution	  of	  “semi-­‐
responsible	  government”,	  as	  opposed	  to	  actual	  self-­‐government	  or	  independence.83	  In	  the	  late	  
1940s,	   in	   the	   Gold	   Coast	   and	   Malaya	   in	   particular,	   the	   state	   of	   emergency	   was	   used	   as	   a	  
methodology	  of	  governance	  derived	  from	  the	  need	  to	  re-­‐establish	  control	  over	  a	  deteriorating	  
situation	  in	  order	  that	  it	  could	  be	  managed	  to	  Britain’s	  advantage.	  States	  of	  emergency	  in	  these	  
territories	  were	   declared	   by	   the	   respective	   colonial	   Governors	   under	   the	   Emergency	   Powers	  
(Colonial	  Defence)	  Order	  in	  Council	  of	  1939,	  which	  had	  decreed	  that:	  
	  
the	  Governor	  may	  make	  such	  regulations	  as	  appear	  to	  him	  to	  be	  necessary	  or	  expedient	  
for	   securing	   the	  public	   safety,	   the	  defence	  of	   the	   territory,	   the	  maintenance	  of	  public	  
order	   and	   the	   suppression	   of	  mutiny,	   rebellion	   and	   riot,	   and	   for	  maintaining	   supplies	  
and	  services	  essential	  to	  the	  life	  of	  the	  community.84	  
	  
Interpreting	   their	  mandate	  extremely	  broadly,	   colonial	   governors	   invoked	  emergency	  powers	  
not	  merely	  as	  a	   reactive	  mechanism	   to	  avert	  prevailing	  or	   imminent	   crises,	  but	  as	   calculated	  
pre-­‐emptive	  measures	  infused	  into	  the	  ongoing	  governance	  of	  their	  respective	  territories.85	  
	  
Deployed	  as	  part	  of	  the	  colonial	  public	  relations	  machinery,	  fear	  of	  the	  native	  ‘savage’	  became	  
a	  dominant	  theme	  in	  Eurocolonial	  discourse	  as	  it	  related	  to	  Third	  World	  resistance.86	  This	  fear	  
dovetailed	  with	  the	  prevalent	  distrust	  of	  nationalism	  that	  fascism	  had	  provoked	  in	  Europe,	  and	  
the	   pejorative	   connotation	   that	   the	   term	   had	   come	   to	   acquire	   as	   it	   gained	   traction	   in	   the	  
colonies,	   particularly	   in	   Africa.87	   These	   two	   elements,	   fear	   of	   the	   savage	   and	   concern	   over	  
expressions	   of	   nationalism,	   were	   exemplified	   by	   the	   comments	   of	   Sir	   Charles	   Arden-­‐Clarke,	  
British	  governor	  in	  the	  Gold	  Coast,	  in	  describing	  Ghanaian	  political	  leader	  Kwame	  Nkrumah	  in	  a	  
letter	   back	   to	   England	   in	   1950	   as	   “our	   local	   Hitler”.88	   In	   this	   vein	   the	   policy	   of	   deriding	  
nationalism	  against	   imperial	   rule	  was	  a	  much	  adhered-­‐to	  colonial	   tactic,	   and	  could	  be	  clearly	  
witnessed	  in	  the	  way	  that	  emergencies	  were	  implemented.	  	  
                                                
83	   For	   the	  historical	   context	   see,	   for	  example,	  Martin	  Meredith,	  The	  State	  of	  Africa	  17-­‐29	   (2005).	   For	   the	  perspective	  of	   the	  
British	   colonial	   governor	   see	  Charles	  Arden-­‐Clarke,	  Gold	  Coast	   into	  Ghana:	  Some	  Problems	  of	   Transition,	   34:1	   Int.	  Affairs	   49	  
(1958).	  	  
84	  Section	  6(1),	  Emergency	  Powers	  (Colonial	  Defence)	  Order	  in	  Council,	  1939.	  
85	   Füredi,	   supra	   note	   54,	   at	   97,	   noting	   that:	   “In	   this	   climate,	   even	   relatively	   liberal	   administrators	   were	   busy	   integrating	  
emergency	   powers	   into	   their	   overall	   strategy.	   So	   Sir	   John	  Macpherson,	   governor	   of	   Nigeria,	   passed	   ‘legislation	   conferring	  
emergency	  powers	  on	  the	  executive’	  in	  December	  1948.	  Macpherson,	  like	  other	  governors,	  was	  planning	  ahead.	  Throughout	  
the	  empire	  police	  forces	  and	  security	  arrangements	  were	  being	  reviewed	  and	  contingency	  plans	  drawn	  up.”	  
86	  Rajagopal,	  supra	  note	  7,	  at	  179.	  
87	  For	  an	  insightful	  discussion	  of	  imperial	  attitudes	  towards	  Third	  World	  nationalism,	  see	  Füredi,	  at	  109-­‐139.	  
88	  Quoted	  in	  Meredith,	  supra	  note	  83,	  at	  19.	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Fascism	  was	  just	  one	  brush	  that	  opposition	  to	  colonial	  rule	  was	  tarred	  with.	  The	  spillover	  of	  the	  
Cold	   War	   into	   colonial	   Africa	   and	   Asia	   was	   also	   very	   much	   apparent	   by	   the	   1950s.	   The	  
nationalist	  struggles	  throughout	  the	  British	  empire,	  as	  well	  as	  those	  in	  other	  European	  colonies	  
(most	  notably	  Algeria),	  were	  depicted	  as	  evidence	  of	  the	  steady	  encroachment	  of	  communism	  
and	  of	  the	  rising	  threat	  to	  Western	  values.	  The	  catch-­‐all	  slur	  of	   ‘terrorism’	  was	  also	  projected	  
onto	  any	  dissent	  or	  resistance	  emanating	  from	  the	  colonised	  populations,	  and	  the	  same	  broad	  
strokes	  were	  applied	  across	  the	  colonial	  canvas,	  from	  South	  America	  to	  Africa	  to	  east	  Asia.	  By	  
way	  of	  just	  one	  example,	  one	  of	  the	  arguments	  used	  by	  a	  British	  constitutional	  commission	  to	  
justify	  the	  suspension	  of	  the	  constitution	  in	  British	  Guiana	  in	  1953	  (an	  act	  characterised	  by	  the	  
American	  consul	  at	  the	  time	  as	  a	  coup	  d’état)	  was	  that	  its	  minister	  for	  education	  had	  created	  an	  
African	  and	  Colonial	  Affairs	  Committee	  which	  “declared	  support	  for	  the	  Mau	  Mau	  in	  Kenya	  and	  
the	   Communist	   terrorists	   in	   Malaya”.89	   The	   use	   of	   emergency	   measures	   to	   repress	   the	  
perceived	  communist	  threat	  went	  hand	  in	  hand	  with	  the	  economic	  objectives	  of	  colonialism.	  In	  
the	   run-­‐up	   to	   the	  declaration	  of	   the	   state	  of	  emergency	   in	  Malaya,	   for	  example,	   the	  colonial	  
administrators	  had	  “demanded	  special	  powers	  for	  crushing	  trade	  unionism”	  from	  London,	  and	  
“European	  plantation	  interests	  were	  vociferous	  in	  their	  demand	  for	  tough	  action”.90	  
	  
By	   consistently	   referring	   to	   ‘terror’	   and	   couching	   the	   situations	   of	   increasing	   unrest	   in	   the	  
colonies	  within	   the	   realm	  of	   criminality	  and	  public	  order	   rather	   than	  as	  political	  or	  economic	  
resistance	  against	  the	  hegemony	  of	  the	  regime	  concerned,	  the	  colonial	  authorities	  were	  able	  to	  
frame	   the	   situations	   as	   emergencies	   whereby	   special	   powers	   were	   needed	   to	   counter	  
subversive	  terrorist,	  communist	  threats.	  A	  clear	  desire	  to	  render	  the	  political	  objectives	  of	  anti-­‐
colonial	  nationalism	  invisible	  as	  a	  factor	  was	  manifest.	  Emphasis	  on	  the	  need	  to	  restore	  ‘order’	  
allowed	   colonial	   governors	   to	   label	   and	   treat	   opponents	   as	   criminals	   or	   as	   dangerous	   and	  
subversive	   agitators	   firmly	   positioned	   on	   the	   wrong	   side	   of	   the	   iron	   curtain.	   Emergency	  
regulations	  were	  rolled	  out	  and	  helped	  to	  create	  an	  air	  of	  legitimacy	  for	  policies	  of	  detention,	  
curfew	  and	  censorship	  that	  were	  ultimately	  designed	  to	  maintain	  colonial	  control.	  To	  a	  certain	  
extent,	   the	   emergencies	   would	   allow	   Britain	   to	   ‘normalise’	   its	   techniques	   of	   colonial	  
governance	   and	   to	   implement	   political	   and	   economic	   reforms	   without	   being	   constrained	   by	  
normal	  legal	  checks	  and	  balances.	  	  
	  
This	  is	  indicative	  of	  a	  more	  fundamental	  effect	  of	  colonial	  discourse,	  described	  by	  one	  authority	  
as	  the	  “dynamic	  of	  difference”,91	  whereby	  the	  coloniser’s	  world	  of	  law,	  state	  and	  civilisation	  is	  
                                                
89	  Robertson	  Commission,	   quoted	   in	   Füredi,	   supra	  note	   54,	   at	   2.	   See	   also	  The	  Robertson	  Commission,	   Report	   of	   the	  British	  
Guiana	  Constitutional	  Commission	  (1954),	  presented	  by	  the	  Secretary	  of	  State	  for	  the	  Colonies	  to	  Parliament	  by	  Command	  of	  
Her	  Majesty,	  September	  1954.	  
90	  Füredi,	  supra	  note	  54,	  at	  160-­‐161.	  
91	  Anghie,	  supra	  note	  12,	  at	  267	  (2005).	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posited	  against	  the	  other’s	  negative	  equivalents,	  portrayed	  through	  the	  lens	  of	  backwardness:	  
custom,	   tribe	   and	   savagery.	   The	   assessment	   by	  M.S.	   O’Rorke,	   the	   commissioner	   of	   police	   in	  
Kenya,	  that	  the	  Mau	  Mau	  movement	  sprung	  from	  a	  “return	  to	  the	  savage	  and	  primitive	  which	  
there	  is	  good	  reason	  to	  believe	  is	  the	  heart	  of	  the	  whole	  movement”,92	  is	  indicative.	  The	  idea	  of	  
racial	  superiority	  was	  prevalent	  in	  the	  Anglo-­‐American	  intellectual	  tradition,	  and	  was	  tempered	  
only	  by	  the	  exposure	  of	  the	  consequences	  of	  Nazism.	  In	  this	  regard,	  Füredi	  draws	  our	  attention	  
to	  a	  lecture	  given	  to	  colonial	  administrators	  in	  1938	  by	  Oxford	  University	  Professor	  of	  Anatomy	  
Wilfrid	  Edward	  Le	  Gros	  Clark,	  in	  which	  he	  argued	  that	  although	  the	  mentality	  of	  a	  Kenyan	  boy	  
compared	  favourably	  with	  that	  of	  his	  European	  counterpart,	  by	  the	  time	  he	  reached	  maturity	  
his	  development	  was	  “retarded”.93	  	  
	  
Britain’s	  primitive	  and	  backward	  colonial	  subjects	  were	  seen	  as	  driven	  by	   fear	  and	   ignorance,	  
thus	  easily	  corrupted	  by	  the	  forces	  of	  evil.	  Looking	  at	  international	  law	  through	  a	  Third	  World	  
lens	   that	   sees	   the	   discipline	   as	   integral	   to	   the	   ‘civilising	  mission’	   of	   governing	   non-­‐European	  
peoples	   (and	   exploiting	   their	   territories	   and	   resources	   economically94),	   the	   invocation	   of	  
emergency	   can	   be	   understood	   as	   an	   extension	   of	   that	   purpose.	   It	  was	   used	   as	   a	  method	   to	  
contain	  the	  barbarism	  of	  the	  natives	  and	  to	  facilitate	  the	  continuance	  of	  the	  civilising	  mission.	  
The	   centrality	   of	   a	   racial	   discourse	   to	   the	   colonial	   project	   is	   inescapable.	   In	   Jamaica,	   for	  
example,	  “[o]n	  the	  pretext	  of	  crushing	  a	  dangerous	  rebellion,	  British	  officials	  had	  indulged	  in	  a	  
racially	  charged	  reign	  of	  terror”.95	  
	  
States	  of	  emergency	  were	  thus	  proclaimed	  by	  Britain	  in	  Malaya	  in	  June	  1948;	  in	  the	  Gold	  Coast	  
in	  March	  1948	  and	  January	  1950;	   in	  Kenya	   in	  October	  1952;	  and	   in	  British	  Guiana	   in	  October	  
1953.	   Emergency	   regulations	   were	   imposed	   pursuant	   to	   the	   Emergency	   Powers	   (Colonial	  
Defence)	  Order	   in	   Council	   of	   1939,	   entailing	  wholesale	   powers	   of	   censorship,	   curfew,	   arrest,	  
detention	  and	  deportation.	  These	  episodes	  were	  playing	  out	  concomitant	  to	  the	  drafting	  of	  the	  
foundational	  charters	  of	  the	  fledgling	  international	  human	  rights	  system.	  The	  positions	  adopted	  
by	  Britain	  during	  that	  drafting	  process	  in	  the	  late	  1940s	  and	  early	  1950s,	  therefore,	  cannot	  be	  
viewed	  in	  isolation	  from	  events	  in	  the	  colonies	  at	  the	  time.	  
	  
	  
                                                
92	  Quoted	  in	  Füredi,	  supra	  note	  54,	  at	  111.	  
93	  Quoted	  in	  Füredi,	  id.,	  at	  128.	  
94	  By	  1965	  Memmi	  had	  arrived	  at	  the	  conclusion	  that	  “[t]oday,	  the	  economic	  motives	  of	  colonial	  undertakings	  are	  revealed	  by	  
every	  historian	  of	  colonialism.	  The	  cultural	  and	  moral	  mission	  of	  a	  colonizer,	  even	  in	  the	  beginning,	  is	  no	  longer	  tenable”.	  See	  
Memmi,	  supra	  note	  1,	  at	  69.	  
95	  Kostal,	  supra	  note	  38,	  at	  461.	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IV.	  THE	  EMERGENCY	  DEROGATION	  PROVISIONS	  IN	  THE	  ECHR	  AND	  ICCPR	  
	  
Extensive	  emergency	  legislation	  had	  also	  been	  introduced	  for	  the	  duration	  of	  the	  Second	  World	  
War	   in	  Britain	   itself,	  where	  substantial	  numbers	  of	  people	  were	  detained	  by	   the	  government	  
without	  charge,	  or	  trial,	  or	  term	  set.	  This	  was	  justified	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  national	  security,	  and	  the	  
majority	   of	   those	   detained	  were	   refugees	   from	   Europe	   –	   defined	   as	   “enemy	   aliens”	   for	   the	  
purpose	   of	   their	   detention.	   British	   citizens	   were	   also	   detained	   under	   Regulation	   18B	   of	   the	  
Defence	  Regulations,	  recourse	  to	  which	  was	  made	  extensively	  by	  Churchill’s	  administration	   in	  
the	   early	   years	   of	   the	   war.96	   Later	   on	   in	   the	   war,	   however,	   Churchill	   himself	   came	   to	   feel	  
increasingly	   uncomfortable	   with	   the	   trampling	   of	   civil	   liberties	   in	   Britain.	   In	   anticipating	  
opposition	   to	   the	  planned	   release	   from	   internment	  of	  Oswald	  Mosley,	   founder	  of	   the	  British	  
Union	  of	  Fascists,	  Churchill	   reminded	  his	  Home	  Secretary	   in	   late	  1943	  that	  detention	  without	  
charge	  or	  trial	  “is	  the	  foundation	  of	  all	  totalitarian	  government	  whether	  Nazi	  or	  Communist”.97	  
The	  post-­‐war	  movement	   for	   the	   international	   protection	  of	   human	   rights	   emerged	   largely	   in	  
response	   to	   such	   totalitarianism;	   conceived	   of	   in	   order	   to	   preclude	   the	   types	   of	   abuses	  
perpetrated	   during	   the	   Second	   World	   War.	   International	   organisations	   such	   as	   the	   United	  
Nations	  and	  the	  Council	  of	  Europe	  went	  about	  institutionalising	  mechanisms	  to	  serve	  that	  end.	  	  
	  
However,	   some	   of	   the	   major	   international	   human	   rights	   conventions	   formulated	   over	   the	  
course	  of	   the	   years	   following	   the	  war	  would	  ultimately	   grant	   States	   a	  pass	   to	  derogate	   from	  
many	   of	   their	   newly-­‐codified	   human	   rights	   obligations	   in	   the	   event	   of	   a	   self-­‐diagnosed	  
emergency.98	   Churchill’s	   sentiments	   on	   detention	   without	   trial	   appear	   to	   have	   been	   quickly	  
forgotten.	   The	   genesis	   of	   the	   state	   of	   emergency/derogations	   clauses	   of	   two	   of	   the	   major	  
human	   rights	   conventions	   whose	   drafting	   process	   Britain	   was	   involved	   in	   at	   the	   time,	   the	  
European	   Convention	   on	   Human	   Rights	   (ECHR)	   and	   the	   International	   Covenant	   on	   Civil	   and	  
Political	  Rights	  (ICCPR),	  will	  be	  reviewed	  in	  this	  section.99	  What	  transpires	  is	  evidence	  of	  staunch	  
British	  advocacy	  for	  states	  to	  reserve	  the	  discretion	  to	  deploy	  extraordinary	  measures	  beyond	  
the	  pale	  of	  the	  nascent	  human	  rights	  system	  as	  and	  when	  they	  deem	  necessary.	  	  
                                                
96	   For	   a	   detailed	   exploration	   of	   the	   use	   of	   Regulation	   18B,	   see	   A.W.B.	   Simpson,	   In	   the	   Highest	   Degree	  Odious:	   Detention	  
without	  Trial	  in	  Wartime	  Britain	  (1992).	  
97	  Telegram	  sent	   from	  Cairo	  by	  Prime	  Minister	  Winston	  Churchill	   to	  Home	  Secretary	  Herbert	  Morrison,	  21	  November	   1943.	  
Quoted	  in	  Simpson,	  id.,	  at	  391.	  
98	  See	  Article	  4	  of	  the	  International	  Covenant	  on	  Civil	  and	  Political	  Rights;	  Article	  15	  of	  the	  Council	  of	  Europe	  Convention	  for	  
the	  Protection	  of	  Human	  Rights	  and	  Fundamental	  Freedoms	  (commonly	  referred	  to	  as	  the	  European	  Convention	  on	  Human	  
Rights);	  Article	  27	  of	  the	  American	  Convention	  on	  Human	  Rights.	  	  
99	  The	  other	  component	  of	  the	  International	  Bill	  of	  Rights,	  the	  International	  Covenant	  on	  Economic,	  Social	  and	  Cultural	  Rights	  
(ICESCR),	   is	   not	   included	   here	   as	   it	   does	   not	   provide	   for	   states	   to	   derogate	   from	   its	   provisions	   in	   the	   event	   of	   a	   state	   of	  
emergency.	   The	   rights	   set	   down	   in	   the	   ICESCR	   are	   subject	   to	   ‘progressive	   realisation’	   according	   to	   the	   state’s	   available	  
resources.	   As	   such	   the	   obligations	   on	   states	   are	   not	   immediately	   binding,	   and	   on	   that	   basis	   it	   is	   likely	   that	   provision	   for	  
emergency	  derogation	  was	  considered	  superfluous.	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This	   naturally	   raises	   questions	   as	   to	  why	  Britain,	   in	   the	   context	   of	   developing	   safeguards	   for	  
human	  rights,	  was	  determined	  to	  provide	  for	  the	  suspension	  of	  those	  safeguards	  by	  virtue	  of	  
emergency	  powers,	  the	  likes	  of	  which	  its	  wartime	  leader	  had	  described	  as	  the	  “foundation	  of	  all	  
totalitarian	   government”.	   The	   above	   discussion	   of	   Britain’s	   historical	   use	   of	   martial	   law	   and	  
emergency	   legislation	   in	   its	   overseas	   colonies100	   and	   of	   the	   colonial	   ‘emergencies’	   that	  were	  
playing	  out	  at	  the	  time	  of	  the	  drafting	  of	  the	  conventions101	  suggest	  that	  the	  answer	  relates	  to	  
the	   preservation	   of	   control	   in	   situations	   where	   government	   is	   conducted	   by	   threat	   of	   force	  
rather	  than	  by	  consent.	   In	  this	  regard,	  a	  statement	  made	  by	  the	  British	  representative	  during	  
the	  drafting	  process	  of	  the	  ECHR	  regarding	  the	  importance	  of	  deploying	  the	  Convention	  against	  
threats	   to	   political	   stability	   “from	   within	   or	   without”102	   is	   testament	   to	   the	   interrelation	  
between	  the	  newly	  evolving	  international	  legal	  mechanisms	  and	  Britain’s	  wartime	  and	  colonial	  
emergency	  powers.	  Another	  particular	  aspect	  of	   the	   legal	  historical	  context	  also	  bears	  noting	  
here.	  The	   first	  major	  human	  rights	   instrument	   to	  be	  drawn	  up	  and	  adopted	  after	   the	  Second	  
World	  War	  was	  the	  Universal	  Declaration	  of	  Human	  Rights.	  During	  the	  drafting	  process	  for	  that	  
document,	   the	  question	  of	   the	  application	  of	  human	  rights	   to	  colonies—absent	  entirely	   from	  
initial	   deliberations	   and	   drafts—was	   raised	   in	   1947	   by	   the	   Soviet	   Union,	   the	   self-­‐proclaimed	  
leader	  of	  the	  world’s	  “anti-­‐imperialist	  camp”.103	  After	  that,	  “the	  British	  and	  Soviet	  delegations	  
clashed	  more	   than	  once	  over	   the	   implications	  of	   the	  Declaration	   for	   the	  peoples	   living	   in	   the	  
colonies”.104	  Britain	  repeatedly	  moved	  to	  have	  the	  proposed	  article	  affirming	  the	  application	  of	  
the	  Declaration	  to	  Non-­‐Self-­‐Governing-­‐Territories	  (which	   includes	  colonial	   territories)	  deleted.	  
This	  would	  have	  been	  inconsistent	  with	  the	  UN	  Charter	  and	  the	  principles	  of	  non-­‐discrimination	  
and	   self-­‐determination,	   and	   thus	   while	   the	   British	   eventually	   succeeded	   in	   having	   the	  
‘application	  to	  the	  colonies’	  provision	  demoted	  from	  its	  own	  separate	  article,	  it	  was	  decided	  to	  
explicitly	   confirm,	   by	   virtue	   of	   the	   Preamble	   and	   as	   a	   part	   of	   Article	   2,	   that	   the	   Declaration	  
would	  apply	  to	  the	  colonies.105	  Thus	  a	  declaratory	  principle	  of	  the	  applicability	  of	  human	  rights	  
law	  to	  all	  territories,	  including	  colonies,	  under	  a	  state’s	  jurisdiction	  was	  established.	  As	  a	  result,	  
Britain	  entered	  the	  drafting	  process	  for	  the	  relevant	   legally	  binding	  human	  rights	   instruments	  
                                                
100	  Section	  II,	  supra.	  
101	  Section	  III,	  supra.	  
102	  See	  Council	  of	  Europe,	  Collected	  Edition	  of	  the	  Travaux	  Préparatoires	  of	  the	  European	  Convention	  on	  Human	  Rights	  Vol.	  I	  
30	  (1975-­‐1985).	  
103	   Andrei	   Zhadanov,	   then	   chairman	   of	   the	   Soviet	   of	   the	  Union,	   quoted	   in	   Johannes	  Morsink,	   The	  Universal	  Declaration	   of	  
Human	  Rights:	  Origins,	  Drafting,	  and	  Intent	  97	  (1999).	  
104	  Morsink,	  id.,	  at	  97.	  
105	  For	  a	  concise	  overview	  of	  the	  debate	  on	  this	  issue,	  see	  Morsink,	  id.,	  at	  96-­‐101.	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wary	  of	  the	  need	  to	  retain	  the	  necessary	  latitude	  to	  deal	  with	  the	  ‘emergencies’	  it	  was	  facing	  in	  
certain	  parts	  of	  the	  empire.106	  
	  
A.	  ARTICLE	  15,	  EUROPEAN	  CONVENTION	  ON	  HUMAN	  RIGHTS	  
	  
As	   far	   as	   international	   conventions	   go,	   the	   drafting	   process	   of	   the	   European	   Convention	   on	  
Human	  Rights	  was	  relatively	  swift.	  Stemming	  from	  an	  initiative	  of	  the	  Consultative	  Assembly	  of	  
the	  newly-­‐formed	  Council	  of	  Europe	  during	  its	  August-­‐September	  1949	  sitting,	  the	  Committee	  
of	  Ministers	  worked	  through	  a	  number	  of	  alternative	  drafts	  proposed	  by	  an	  intergovernmental	  
‘Committee	  of	  Experts’	  formed	  in	  early	  1950.	  The	  Committee	  of	  Ministers	  adopted	  the	  text	  of	  a	  
“draft	   Convention	   for	   the	   Protection	   of	   Human	   Rights	   and	   Fundamental	   Freedoms”	   in	  
Strasbourg	   in	   August	   of	   that	   year;	   the	   Convention	   was	   signed	   in	   Rome	   by	   November	   1950,	  
entering	  into	  force	  in	  September	  1953.107	  	  
	  
The	  starting	  point	  for	  the	  Convention	  was	  a	  draft	  text	  included	  in	  a	  recommendation	  adopted	  in	  
September	  1949	  by	  the	  Consultative	  Assembly	  of	  the	  Council	  of	  Europe	  on	  “measures	  for	  the	  
fulfilment	   of	   the	   declared	   aim	   of	   the	   Council	   of	   Europe,	   in	   accordance	  with	   Article	   1	   of	   the	  
Statute	   in	   regard	   to	   the	   safeguarding	   and	   further	   relation	   of	   human	   rights	   and	   fundamental	  
freedoms”.108	  This,	  the	  first	  working	  draft	  of	  the	  European	  Convention,	  contained	  no	  reference	  
to,	   or	   provision	   for,	   derogation	   from	   human	   rights	   safeguards	   in	   time	   of	   emergency.	   It	   did,	  
however,	  contain	  in	  draft	  Article	  6	  a	  general	   limitation	  clause	  that	  echoed	  Article	  29(2)	  of	  the	  
Universal	  Declaration	  of	  Human	  Rights.109	  
	  
                                                
106	  Although	   in	   the	  case	  of	   the	  ECHR	  Article	  63	  would	  ultimately	  be	   framed	  so	  as	   to	  waive	   the	  automatic	  application	  of	   the	  
Convention	  to	  non-­‐metropolitan	  territories,	  by	  that	  stage	  the	  inclusion	  of	  the	  emergency	  derogation	  clause	  had	  been	  secured.	  
The	  European	  powers	  would	  thus	  be	  able	  to	  extend	  the	  Convention	  to	  their	  colonial	  territories	  while	  falling	  back	  on	  the	  option	  
of	   derogation	   under	   Article	   15	  whenever	   necessary.	   This	   was	   the	   tack	   that	   Britain	  would	   take,	   while	   France,	   on	   the	   other	  
hand—where	   the	  discrimination	   that	  was	  effectively	   allowed	   for	  by	  Article	  63	  was	  met	  with	   vehement	  opposition	   from	   the	  
elected	  representatives	  of	  the	  French	  colonial	  territories—chose	  not	  to	  ratify	  the	  Convention	  until	  1974,	  long	  after	  most	  of	  its	  
colonies	  had	  achieved	  independence,	  and	  with	  a	  reservation	  to	  Article	  15	  at	  that.	  See	  27	  Yearbook	  of	  the	  European	  Convention	  
on	  Human	  Rights	  4	  (1974).	  
107	  The	  fullest	  available	  account	  of	  the	  drafting	  process	  and	  reproduction	  of	  published	  documents	  can	  be	  found	  in	  Council	  of	  
Europe,	  supra	  note	  102.	  
108	  See	  European	  Commission	  of	  Human	  Rights,	  Preparatory	  Work	  on	  Article	  15	  of	  the	  European	  Convention	  on	  Human	  Rights,	  
Council	  of	  Europe	  Doc.	  DH	  (56)	  4,	  para.	  2,	  p.	  2	  (22	  May	  1956).	  
109	  Council	  of	  Europe	  Doc.	  AS	  (1)	  108,	  p.	  262.	   It	  appears	  that	  general	   limitations	  established	  by	  law	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  public	  
order	   and	   security	  were	   considered	   sufficient	   to	   deal	  with	   exceptional	   circumstances.	  When	   the	   possible	   need	   to	   explicitly	  
authorise	   state	   signatories	   to	   the	  proposed	  Convention	   to	   take	   “special	  measures”	   to	  deal	  with	   incitement	   to	   violence,	   the	  
Committee	  on	  Legal	  and	  Administrative	  Questions	  determined	  this	  to	  be	  unnecessary,	  as	  such	  situations	  were	  already	  covered	  
by	  the	  text	  of	  draft	  Article	  6.	  See	  Council	  of	  Europe	  Doc.	  AS	  (1)	  77,	  para.	  16,	  p.	  201.	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The	  records	  of	  the	  Consultative	  Assembly’s	  first	  session	  provide	  an	  early	  indication	  of	  Britain’s	  
position	  that	  the	  purpose	  of	  enacting	  a	  human	  rights	  convention	  was	  not	  only	  the	  protection	  of	  
individuals,	  but	  that	  its	  central	  functions	  would	  also	  include	  the	  strengthening	  of	  governments’	  
legal	  armoury	   in	  suppressing	  opposition	  to	  their	   rule.	  The	  British	  representative,	  Lord	  Layton,	  
stressed	   to	   the	   Assembly	   the	   importance	   of	   operationalising	   the	   convention	   “as	   a	  means	   of	  
strengthening	   the	   resistance	   in	  all	  our	  countries	  against	   insidious	  attempts	   to	  undermine	  our	  
democratic	  way	  of	  life	  from	  within	  or	  without,	  and	  thus	  to	  give	  to	  Western	  Europe	  as	  a	  whole	  
greater	  political	  stability”.110	  	  
	  
It	  was	  perhaps	  with	  this	  in	  mind	  that	  the	  UK	  sought	  to	  introduce	  a	  provision	  at	  the	  meetings	  of	  
the	  Committee	  of	  Experts	  from	  2-­‐8	  February	  1950	  allowing	  for	  derogation	  from	  the	  majority	  of	  
the	  rights	  enumerated	  in	  the	  Convention	  during	  times	  of	  public	  emergency.	  In	  advance	  of	  those	  
meetings,	   the	   Secretariat-­‐General	  had	  drawn	  up	  a	   ‘preparatory	   report	  on	  a	  preliminary	  draft	  
convention	  for	  the	  collective	  guarantee	  of	  Human	  Rights’.	  Part	  of	  that	  report	  was	  devoted	  to	  a	  
comparison	  between	  the	  draft	  International	  Covenant	  on	  Human	  Rights	  in	  progress	  at	  the	  time,	  
and	  the	  draft	  European	  Convention	  as	  recommended	  by	  the	  Consultative	  Assembly.	  In	  relation	  
to	  the	  state	  of	  emergency/derogation	  provision	  being	  mooted	  for	  the	  International	  Covenant,	  
the	   report	   found	   that	   “the	   inclusion	   of	   this	   provision	   in	   the	   European	   system	   appears	   to	   be	  
unnecessary”,	   having	   regard	   to	   the	   existing	   limitation	   clauses	   in	   the	   Consultative	   Assembly’s	  
draft.111	  Despite	   this,	   on	   4	   February	   1950,	   Sir	  Oscar	  Dowson	   submitted	   to	   the	   Committee	   of	  
Experts	  on	  behalf	  of	   the	  UK	  an	  amendment	   to	   the	  Consultative	  Assembly	  draft	   to	   include	  an	  
article	   allowing	   states	   to	   derogate	   from	   their	   obligations	   in	   “time	   of	   war	   or	   other	   public	  
emergency	  threatening	  the	  interests	  of	  the	  people”.112	  
	  
Such	  a	  right	  of	  derogation	  in	  exceptional	  circumstances	  was	  still	  deemed	  by	  other	  states	  to	  be	  
superfluous	   to	   the	   requirements	   and	   aims	   of	   the	   Convention,	   and	   the	   preliminary	   draft	  
Convention	  developed	  by	  the	  Committee	  of	  Experts	  during	  its	  February	  1950	  session	  contained	  
no	  such	  clause.113	  	  
	  
Britain	  retained	  an	  unyielding	  position,	  however,	  and	  at	  the	  second	  session	  of	  the	  Committee	  of	  
Experts	   from	   6-­‐10	   March	   tabled	   a	   new	   amendment,	   with	   some	   clarifications	   but	   the	   same	  
                                                
110	  Report	  of	  the	  Consultative	  Assembly,	  First	  Session,	  Part	  I,	  Fifth	  Sitting	  (16	  August	  1949),	  p.	  83-­‐85;	  quoted	  in	  Council	  of	  Europe,	  
supra	  note	  102,	  Vol.	  I,	  at	  30.	  
111	  Council	  of	  Europe	  Doc.	  B	  22,	  p.	  18.	  
112	  See	  Report	  of	  the	  Meetings	  of	  the	  Committee	  of	  Experts,	  sitting	  of	  4	  February	  1950,	  Council	  of	  Europe	  Doc.	  A	  782.	  
113	  Preliminary	  Draft	  Convention	  for	  the	  Maintenance	  and	  Further	  Realisation	  of	  Human	  Rights	  and	  Fundamental	  Freedoms,	  
Council	   of	   Europe	   Doc.	   A	   833,	   15	   February	   1950.	   This	   draft	   retained,	   with	   slightly	   different	   wording,	   the	   Article	   6	   general	  
limitation	  clause	  of	  the	  original	  Consultative	  Assembly	  draft	  of	  September	  1949.	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general	   thrust	   as	   its	   previous	   proposed	   amendment.114	   Following	   lengthy	   discussion	   on	   a	  
number	  of	  contentious	  issues,	  the	  Committee	  of	  Experts	  decided	  to	  submit	  alternative	  texts	  to	  
the	   Committee	   of	   Ministers	   without	   indicating	   a	   preference.	   On	   its	   proposed	   amendment	  
regarding	   emergency	   derogations,	   Britain	   was	   insistent.	   Having	   successfully	   secured	   its	  
inclusion	   in	   the	   first	   set	   of	   alternatives,	   the	   British	   representative	   rallied	   for	   it	   to	   also	   be	  
included	  in	  the	  second	  set.	  In	  response,	  the	  French	  and	  Italian	  representatives	  stated	  that	  they	  
were	  opposed	  to	   its	   insertion	   in	   the	  text	  of	  alternatives	  A	  and	  A/2.	  They	  considered	  that	   this	  
provision	  was	  contrary	  to	  the	  system	  of	  these	  alternatives,	  since	  it	  provides	  detailed	  regulations	  
concerning	  the	  kind	  of	  cases	  already	  covered	  by	  the	  general	  provisions	  of	  Articles	  6,	  7	  and	  10.115	  
Ultimately,	  other	  members	  of	  the	  Committee	  came	  down	  on	  the	  British	  side,	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  a	  
belief	  that	  the	  procedure	  laid	  down	  in	  the	  derogation	  clause	  “could	  prove	  to	  be	  useful	  for	  the	  
protection	   of	   Human	   Rights	   in	   exceptional	   circumstances”.116	   Thus,	   both	   sets	   of	   alternative	  
drafts	  annexed	  to	  the	  Committee	  of	  Expert’s	  Report	  to	  the	  Committee	  of	  Ministers	  contained	  
similar	   emergency	   derogation	   provisions.117	   Notably,	   that	   report	   draws	   attention	   to	   the	  
importance	   attached	   by	   Britain	   to	   the	   imposition	   of	   clearly	   defined	   limitations	   on	   the	   rights	  
enumerated	  in	  the	  Convention.	  While	  noting	  that	  all	  members	  of	  the	  Committee	  were	  in	  favour	  
of	  drawing	  up	  a	  Convention	  aimed	  foremost	  at	  safeguarding	  human	  rights,	  the	  report	  observes	  
that:	  
	  
Certain	  members,	   however	  —	  particularly	   the	   representatives	   of	   the	  United	   Kingdom	  
and	  the	  Netherlands	  —	  considered	  that	  the	  fundamental	  rights	  to	  be	  safeguarded,	  and,	  
even	   more	   important,	   the	   limitations	   of	   these	   rights,	   should	   be	   defined	   in	   this	  
Convention	  in	  as	  detailed	  as	  manner	  as	  possible.118	  
	  
A	   reading	  of	   the	   travaux	  préparatoires	  of	   the	  European	  Convention	  suggests	   throughout	   that	  
the	   British	   interest	   was	   concerned	   with	   the	   limitations	   on	   the	   rights	   prescribed	   in	   the	  
Convention	  as	  much	  as,	  if	  not	  more	  than,	  the	  rights	  themselves.	  	  
	  
With	   the	   derogations	   clause	   incorporated	   into	   both	   sets	   of	   alternatives	   proposed	   by	   the	  
Committee	  of	  Experts,	  its	  inclusion	  in	  the	  final	  text	  of	  the	  Convention	  was	  all	  but	  secured.	  The	  
British	   derogation	   provision	   was	   included	   in	   June	   1950	   draft	   Convention,119	   and	   remained	  
                                                
114	  See	  Council	  of	  Europe	  Doc.	  CM/WP	  1	  (50)	  2,	  pp.	  1-­‐2.	  	  
115	  Council	  of	  Europe	  Doc.	  CM/WP	  1	  (50)	  15,	  p.	  20.	  
116	  Id.	  
117	  Council	  of	  Europe	  Doc.	  CM/WP	  1	  (50)	  15	  Appendix,	  alternatives	  A	  and	  A/2,	  p.	  4;	  alternatives	  B	  and	  B/2,	  p.	  5-­‐6.	  
118	  Council	  of	  Europe	  Doc.	  CM/WP	  1	  (50)	  15;	  A	  924,	  16	  March	  1950,	  reproduced	  in	  Council	  of	  Europe,	  supra	  note	  102,	  Vol.	  IV,	  at	  
8.	  
119	  Council	  of	  Europe	  Doc.	  CM/WP	  4	  (50)	  16,	  Appendix;	  A	  1445.	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unchanged	  in	  subsequent	  drafts,	  save	  for	  one	  significant	  change:	  the	  term	  “the	  interests	  of	  the	  
people”	   was	   replaced	   with	   “the	   life	   of	   the	   nation”.120	   No	   explanation	   for	   this	   last	   minute	  
amendment	  is	  given	  in	  the	  report	  of	  the	  Conference	  Senior	  Officials;	  all	  that	  can	  be	  surmised	  is	  
that	   an	   intervention	  was	  made	   in	   order	   to	   relate	   emergencies	   justifying	   derogation	  more	   to	  
national,	  or	   state,	   interests,	   and	   less	   to	   the	   interests	  of	   the	  population	  or	   its	   individuals.	   The	  
same	  issue	  of	  terminology	  would	  also	  arise	  in	  relation	  to	  Article	  4	  of	  the	  ICCPR,	  and	  is	  discussed	  
further	  in	  part	  ii	  of	  this	  section.	  
	  
The	   emergency	  derogation	  provision	  was	   adopted,	  without	   any	   special	   reference	   to	   it	   in	   the	  
course	   of	   the	   Consultative	   Assembly’s	   debate,121	   as	   Article	   15	   of	   the	   Convention	   for	   the	  
Protection	  of	  Human	  Rights	  and	  Fundamental	  Freedoms,	  signed	  on	  4	  November	  1950.	  The	  final	  
text	  of	  Article	  15	  reads	  as	  follows:	  
	  
1.	  In	  time	  of	  war	  or	  other	  public	  emergency	  threatening	  the	  life	  of	  the	  nation	  any	  High	  
Contracting	   Party	   may	   take	   measures	   derogating	   from	   its	   obligations	   under	   this	  
Convention	   to	   the	  extent	   strictly	   required	  by	   the	  exigencies	  of	   the	   situation,	  provided	  
that	   such	  measures	  are	  not	   inconsistent	  with	   its	  other	  obligations	  under	   international	  
law.	  
2.	  	  No	  derogation	  from	  Article	  2,	  except	  in	  respect	  of	  deaths	  resulting	  from	  lawful	  acts	  of	  
war,	  or	  from	  Articles	  3,	  4	  (paragraph	  1)	  and	  7	  shall	  be	  made	  under	  this	  provision.122	  
3.	   Any	  High	   Contracting	   Party	   availing	   itself	   of	   this	   right	   of	   derogation	   shall	   keep	   the	  
Secretary-­‐General	  of	  the	  Council	  of	  Europe	  fully	  informed	  of	  the	  measures	  which	  it	  has	  
taken	  and	  the	  reasons	  therefor.	  It	  shall	  also	  inform	  the	  Secretary-­‐General	  of	  the	  Council	  
of	   Europe	   when	   such	   measures	   have	   ceased	   to	   operate	   and	   the	   provisions	   of	   the	  
Convention	  are	  again	  being	  fully	  executed.	  
	  
The	   individual	   limitation	   clauses	   for	   specific	   rights,	   that	   had	   been	   proposed	   originally	   as	   an	  
alternative	  to	  full	  powers	  of	  derogation,	  were	  also	  included	  in	  the	  Convention.123	  
	  
                                                
120	  Council	  of	  Europe	  Doc.	  CM/WP	  4	  (50)	  19	  annexe;	  CM/WP	  4	  (50)	  16	  rev.;	  A	  1452.	  
121	  Council	  of	  Europe	  Doc.	  AS	  (2)	  104,	  p.	  1035.	  
122	  Article	  2	  relates	  to	  the	  right	  to	  life;	  Article	  3	  to	  the	  right	  to	  freedom	  from	  torture	  and	  inhuman	  or	  degrading	  treatment	  or	  
punishment;	  Article	  4(1)	  to	  freedom	  from	  slavery	  and	  servitude;	  Article	  7	  to	  the	  non-­‐retroactivity	  of	  criminal	  law.	  	  
123	  See	  Articles	  8-­‐11.	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B.	  ARTICLE	  4,	  INTERNATIONAL	  COVENANT	  ON	  CIVIL	  AND	  POLITICAL	  RIGHTS	  
	  
The	   European	   Commission	   of	   Human	   Rights	   noted	   in	   1956	   that	   “[a]s	   the	   preparatory	   work	  
clearly	  shows,	  Article	  15	  of	  the	  European	  Convention	  of	  Human	  Rights	  closely	  followed,	  at	  the	  
beginning,	   that	   of	   Article	   4	   of	   the	   United	   Nations	   draft	   Covenant”.124	   Indeed,	   at	   its	   initial	  
introduction,	  the	  British	  proposed	  amendment	  to	  the	  draft	  European	  Convention	  “appeared	  to	  
be	  an	  almost	  textual	  reproduction”125	  of	  draft	  Article	  4	  of	  the	  Covenant.	  
	  
The	  process	  that	  would	  lead	  to	  adoption	  of	  the	  ICCPR	  began	  with	  the	  Drafting	  Committee	  of	  UN	  
Commission	   on	   Human	   Rights	   in	   1947,	   mandated	   to	   prepare	   an	   international	   bill	   of	   human	  
rights.126	  The	  proposal	  for	  an	  emergency	  clause	  came	  from	  a	  draft	   international	  bill	  of	  human	  
rights	   submitted	   by	   Britain	   to	   the	   first	   session	   of	   the	   Drafting	   Committee.	   The	   Drafting	  
Committee	  also	  had	  before	  it	  a	  number	  of	  draft	  outlines	  of	  an	  international	  bill	  of	  human	  rights	  
prepared	  by	  the	  Division	  of	  Human	  Rights	  of	  the	  Secretariat,	  the	  United	  States	  of	  America	  and	  
France,	  none	  of	  which	  made	  any	  provision	  for	  derogation	  or	  emergency	  measures.127	  Article	  4	  
of	   the	   British	   draft,	   on	   the	   other	   hand,	   stipulated	   that	   “[i]n	   time	   of	   war	   or	   other	   national	  
emergency,	  a	  State	  may	  take	  measures	  derogating	  from	  its	  obligations	  under	  Article	  2	  above	  to	  
the	   extent	   strictly	   limited	   by	   the	   exigencies	   of	   the	   situation”.128	   The	   sweeping	   nature	   of	   this	  
proposed	  right	  of	  derogation	   is	  brought	   into	  sharp	  focus	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  Article	  2	  of	  Britain’s	  
draft	   Bill	   provided	   for	   states’	   obligations	   to	   secure	   and	   support	   all	   of	   the	   human	   rights	   and	  
fundamental	   freedoms	   set	   out	   in	   the	   Bill,	   as	  well	   as	   to	   provide	   effective	   remedy	   in	   cases	   of	  
violation.	  The	  proposal	  therefore	  left	  every	  right	  enumerated	  exposed	  to	  derogation	  in	  times	  of	  
emergency,	  allowing	  no	  exceptions	  in	  favour	  of	  non-­‐derogable	  rights.	  It	  was	  passed	  on	  by	  the	  
Drafting	   Committee	   to	   the	   Commission	   on	   Human	   Rights,	   where	   the	   proposed	   article	   was	  
rejected	  by	  a	  vote	  at	  the	  Commission’s	  second	  session	  in	  December	  1947.129	  	  
	  
                                                
124	  European	  Commission	  of	  Human	  Rights,	  supra	  note	  108,	  para.	  15,	  p.	  10.	  
125	  Id.,	  para.	  7,	  p.	  5.	  
126	  The	   International	  Bill	  of	  Human	  Rights	  would	  ultimately	   take	  the	   form	  of	   three	  documents:	   the	  Universal	  Declaration	  on	  
Human	  Rights,	  adopted	  by	  the	  UN	  General	  Assembly	  in	  1948,	  and	  two	  international	  treaties	  –	  the	  International	  Covenant	  on	  
Civil	   and	   Political	   Rights,	   and	   the	   International	   Covenant	   on	   Economic,	   Social	   and	   Cultural	   Rights	   –	   both	   of	   which	   were	  
adopted	  by	  the	  UN	  in	  1966	  and	  entered	  into	  force	  in	  1976.	  
127	   See	   Report	   of	   the	   Drafting	   Committee	   to	   the	   Commission	   on	   Human	   Rights,	   UN	   Doc.	   E/CN.4/21,	   annexes	   A,	   C,	   and	   D	  
respectively.	  
128	  British	  Foreign	  Office,	  United	  Kingdom	  Draft	  of	  an	  International	  Bill	  of	  Human	  Rights	  (1947),	  Appendix	  2,	  p.	  8.	  Reproduced	  
in	  UN	  Doc.	  E/CN.4/21,	  annex	  B.	  
129	  UN	  Doc.	  E/CN.4/AC.3/SR.8,	  p.	  11.	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Britain	   resubmitted	   an	   almost	   identical	   draft	   provision	   in	   the	   Commission130	   and	   this	   time	  
successfully	  lobbied	  for	  its	  inclusion	  in	  the	  draft	  covenant.131	  This	  draft	  derogation	  clause	  thus	  
went	  back	  to	  the	  Drafting	  Committee,	  where	  it	  was	  criticised	  by	  a	  number	  of	  states,	  the	  United	  
States	   being	   the	  most	   vocal	   among	   them.132	   Following	   the	   adoption	   of	   a	   number	   of	   special	  
limitation	  clauses	  in	  relation	  to	  particular	  rights,	  the	  US	  moved	  to	  strike	  the	  entire	  derogation	  
clause	   on	   the	   basis	   that	   it	   was	   rendered	   superfluous	   by	   the	   limitation	   clauses.133	   France	  
proposed	   a	   compromise	   text,	  which	   amounted	   to	   a	   general	   limitation	   clause	   that	  would	   not	  
apply	   to	   a	   wide	   range	   of	   non-­‐limitable	   rights.134	   Britain	   maintained	   its	   unwavering	   position	  
favouring	  derogation	  over	   limitation,	  however,	  and	  revised	  the	  French	  draft	   into	  a	  derogation	  
clause	  with	  a	  narrower	  range	  of	  non-­‐derogable	  rights.135	  This	  was	  the	  version	  of	  Article	  4	  that	  
was	   provisionally	   adopted	   by	   the	   Commission	   on	   Human	   Rights	   at	   its	   fifth	   session	   in	   June	  
1949.136	  
	  
From	   that	   point	   onward,	   the	   British	   revision	   formed	   the	   basis	   for	   further	   tinkering	  with	   the	  
wording	  of	  Article	  4,	  but	  despite	  continuing	  opposition	   from	  some	  quarters,	   the	   fundamental	  
premise	  of	  the	  right	  of	  states	  to	  derogate	  during	  emergencies	  was	  not	  to	  be	  dislodged	  from	  the	  
covenant.137	  Interestingly,	  however,	  the	  travaux	  préparatoires	  do	  provide	  evidence	  that	  the	  risk	  
that	   Britain’s	   proposal	   to	   permit	   human	   rights	   to	   be	   abrogated	   during	   emergencies	   “might	  
produce	   complicated	   problems	   of	   interpretation	   and	   give	   rise	   to	   considerable	   abuse”138	  was	  
foreseen	   at	   the	   time.	   Britain	   persuaded	   enough	   members	   of	   the	   Commission	   that	   it	   was	  
necessary	   to	   envisage	   possible	   conditions	   of	   emergency	   when	   derogations	   from	   the	   law	   of	  
human	  rights	  “would	  become	  essential”.139	  Somewhat	   ironically,	   “reference	  was	  made	   to	   the	  
history	   of	   the	   past	   epoch	   during	   which	   emergency	   powers	   had	   been	   invoked	   to	   suppress	  
                                                
130	  See	  UN	  Doc.	  E/CN.4/SR.423,	  p.	  4.	  
131	  The	  proposal	  was	  accepted	  by	  four	  votes	  to	  three	  with	  eight	  abstentions.	  UN	  Doc.	  E/CN.4/SR.431,	  p.	  5.	  
132	  US	  opposition	  was	  based	  principally	  on	  the	  belief	  that	  a	  single,	  general	  limitation	  clause	  in	  the	  vein	  of	  Article	  29(2)	  of	  the	  
Universal	  Declaration	  of	  Human	  Rights	  was	   sufficient,	   and	  preferable.	   The	  US	   representative	   submitted	   an	   alternative	   text	  
accordingly.	  See	  UN	  Doc.	  E/800.	  
133	  See	  UN	  Docs.	  E/CN.4/AC.1/SR.22;	  E/CN.4/SR.127;	  E/CN.4/170.Add.1.	  
134	  UN	  Doc.	  E/CN.4/187.	  
135	  UN	  Doc.	  E/CN.4/188.	  
136	  See	  UN	  Docs.	  E/CN.4/187;	  E/1371,	  Article	  4.	  
137	  A	  Chilean	  proposal	   to	  delete	  Article	  4	  was	  rejected	  at	   the	  sixth	  session	  of	   the	  Commission	  on	  Human	  Rights	   in	  1950.	  UN	  
Doc.	  E/CN.4/SR.195.	  
138	  Annotations	  on	   the	   text	   of	   the	  draft	   International	  Covenants	   on	  Human	  Rights,	   prepared	  by	   the	  UN	  Secretary-­‐General,	  UN	  
Doc.	  A/2929,	  1	  July	  1955,	  Chap.	  V,	  para.	  36.	  
139	  Id.,	  Chap.	  V,	  para.	  37.	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human	   rights	   and	   to	   set	   up	  dictatorial	   regimes”140	   in	   support	   of	   the	  position	   that	   the	  use	  of	  
emergency	  powers	  should	  be	  formally	  authorised	  and	  monitored,	  rather	  than	  precluded.	  
	  
Throughout	  the	  1950s	  and	  early	  1960s,	  as	  the	  drafting	  process	  continued,	  debates	  cropped	  up	  
in	   respect	   of	   various	   aspects	   of	   the	   wording	   of	   Article	   4.	  Worth	   noting	   is	   the	   discussion	   on	  
whether,	   in	   order	   for	   derogation	   to	   be	   justified,	   the	   “public	   emergency”	   referred	   to	   in	   the	  
article	  must	  pose	  a	  threat	  to	  “the	  interests	  of	  the	  people”	  or	  “the	  life	  of	  the	  nation”.	  On	  this,	  
	  
It	  was	  thought	  that	  the	  reference	  to	  a	  public	  emergency	  ‘which	  threatens	  the	  life	  of	  the	  
nation’	  would	  avoid	  any	  doubt	  as	  to	  whether	  the	  intention	  was	  to	  refer	  to	  all	  or	  some	  of	  
the	  people,	  although	  it	  was	  suggested	  that	  a	  reference	  to	  ‘the	  interests	  of	  the	  people’	  
was	  more	  appropriate	  in	  a	  covenant	  which	  dealt	  with	  the	  rights	  of	  individuals	  and	  that	  
such	   a	   phrase	  would	   also	   prohibit	  Governments	   from	  acting	   contrary	   to	   the	   interests	  
and	  welfare	  of	  their	  people.141	  	  
	  
Again	   it	   was	   Britain	   that	   took	   the	   lead,	   replacing	   existing	   proposals	   that	   spoke	   of	   “public	  
emergency	  gravely	   threatening	   the	   interests	  of	   the	  people”142	  with	   a	   revision	   that	   related	   to	  
“public	  emergency	  threatening	  the	  life	  of	  the	  nation”143	  that	  was	  adopted	  at	  the	  eight	  session	  
of	  the	  Commission	  on	  Human	  Rights	  in	  1952.144	  This	  would	  remain	  unaltered	  in	  the	  Article	  4	  of	  
the	   instrument	   that	  would	   ultimately	   be	   adopted	   as	   the	   International	   Covenant	   on	   Civil	   and	  
Political	  Rights	  in	  1966.	  
	  
	  
V.	  DEROGATIONS	  IN	  PRACTICE	  
	  
The	  major	  wave	  of	  decolonisation	  that	  surged	  through	  the	  Third	  World	  was	  to	  peak	  during	  the	  
1950s	  and	  early	  1960s,	  while	  the	  ICCPR	  was	  still	   in	  gestation	  but	  by	  which	  time	  the	  ECHR	  was	  
very	  much	   alive	   and	   kicking.	   The	   contention	   that	   the	   inclusion	   of	   the	   emergency	   derogation	  
provision	   in	   the	   Convention	  would	   allow	  Britain	   to	   cast	   a	   light	   of	   lawfulness	   on	   policies	   that	  
were	  becoming	  increasingly	  repressive,	  as	  the	  knots	  binding	  the	  empire	  began	  to	  unravel,	  was	  
borne	  out	  by	  practice	  in	  the	  early	  years	  of	  the	  ECHR’s	  application.	  	  
	  
                                                
140	  Id.,	  Chap.	  V,	  para.	  38.	  
141	  Id.,	  Chap.	  V,	  para.	  40.	  
142	  Proposals	  in	  UN	  Docs.	  E/CN.4/365	  and	  E/CN.4/498.	  
143	  See	  UN	  Docs.	  E/CN.4/L.139	  and	  E/CN.4/L.139/Rev.1.	  
144	  UN	  Doc.	  E/CN.4/SR.331,	  p.	  5.	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In	  the	  decade	  following	  the	  entry	  into	  force	  of	  the	  ECHR,	  Britain	  availed	  of	  its	  right	  to	  derogate	  
on	   numerous	   occasions,	   not	   in	   mainland	   Britain,	   but	   in	   various	   colonial	   contexts.	   The	  
Convention	   came	   into	   force	   in	   September	   1953.	  Within	   the	   first	   year	   of	   its	   application,	   the	  
British	  government	   submitted	  a	  notification	  of	  derogation	  pursuant	   to	  extant	  emergencies	   in	  
Kenya,	  Uganda,	  the	  Federation	  of	  Malaya,	  the	  Colony	  of	  Singapore,	  and	  British	  Guiana.145	  In	  the	  
subsequent	  years	  Britain	  invoked	  Article	  15	  of	  the	  Convention	  to	  derogate	  from	  obligations	  in	  
Cyprus,146	   the	   Protectorate	   of	   Northern	   Rhodesia,147	   the	   Protectorate	   of	   Nyasaland,148	   the	  
Colony	  of	  Aden,149	  the	  Zanzibar	  Protectorate150	  and	  Mauritius.151	  It	  also	  notified	  the	  Council	  of	  
Europe	  of	  further	  derogations	  in	  respect	  of	  Kenya152	  and	  Singapore.153	  
	  
For	  perspective,	  if	  Turkey154	  is	  taken	  out	  of	  the	  equation,	  this	  batch	  of	  derogations	  by	  Britain	  in	  
eleven	  different	  colonial	  situations	   in	  a	  decade	  amounts	  to	  more	  derogations	  than	  have	  been	  
made	  by	  the	  Council	  of	  Europe’s	  other	  45	  member	  states	  combined	  in	  more	  than	  fifty	  years	  of	  
the	   Convention’s	   application.155	   Britain’s	   resort	   to	   emergency	   powers,	   however,	   ultimately	  
proved	   incapable	  of	  deflecting	   the	   “wind	  of	   change”156	   that	  was	  blowing	   through	  Africa	  and,	  
indeed,	  much	  of	  the	  empire	  by	  the	  start	  of	  1960s.	  The	  derogations	  that	  had	  not	  been	  revoked	  
                                                
145	  Note	  verbale	  of	  24	  May	  1954,	  1	  Yearbook	  of	  the	  European	  Convention	  on	  Human	  Rights	  48-­‐49	  (1958).	  
146	  Note	  verbale	  of	  7	  October	  1955,	  1	  Yearbook	  of	  the	  European	  Convention	  on	  Human	  Rights	  49	  (1958);	  Note	  verbale	  of	  13	  
April	   1956,	   1	   Yearbook	   of	   the	   European	   Convention	   on	   Human	   Rights	   49-­‐50	   (1958);	   Note	   verbale	   of	   21	   January	   1959,	   2	  
Yearbook	  of	  the	  European	  Convention	  on	  Human	  Rights	  78	  (1959).	  It	  is	  worth	  noting	  that	  the	  emergencies	  mentioned	  in	  this	  
section	  generally	  entailed	  special	  powers	  of	  detention,	  and	  in	  some	  cases	  deportation,	  but	  it	  was	  only	  with	  regard	  to	  Cyprus	  
that	  Britain’s	  notification	  expressly	  indicated	  derogation	  from	  Article	  5	  of	  the	  Convention	  pertaining	  to	  the	  right	  to	  liberty	  and	  
security	  of	  person.	  
147	  Note	  verbale	  of	  16	  August	  1957,	  1	  Yearbook	  of	  the	  European	  Convention	  on	  Human	  Rights	  51	  (1958).	  
148	  Note	   verbale	   of	   25	  May	   1959,	   2	   Yearbook	   of	   the	   European	  Convention	   on	  Human	  Rights	   84	   (1959);	  Note	   verbale	   of	   11	  
January	  1961,	  4	  Yearbook	  of	  the	  European	  Convention	  on	  Human	  Rights	  39	  (1961).	  
149	  Note	  verbale	  of	  7	  January	  1960,	  3	  Yearbook	  of	  the	  European	  Convention	  on	  Human	  Rights	  68	  (1960).	  
150	  Note	  verbale	  of	  5	  December	  1961,	  4	  Yearbook	  of	  the	  European	  Convention	  on	  Human	  Rights	  44	  (1961).	  	  
151	  Undated	  notice	  in	  8	  Yearbook	  of	  the	  European	  Convention	  on	  Human	  Rights	  14-­‐17	  (1965).	  
152	  Note	  verbale	  of	  21	  September	  1960,	  3	  Yearbook	  of	  the	  European	  Convention	  on	  Human	  Rights	  48	  (1960).	  
153	  Note	  verbale	  of	  11	  May	  1960,	  3	  Yearbook	  of	  the	  European	  Convention	  on	  Human	  Rights	  75	  (1960).	  
154	  Turkey	  has	  derogated	  under	  Article	  15	  several	  times,	  including	  in	  1963,	  1974,	  1978,	  1979,	  1980,	  and	  1990.	  A	  number	  of	  these	  
derogations	  relate	  to	  the	  situation	  in	  Cyprus.	  
155	  Derogations	  include	  those	  made	  by	  Greece	  (1967);	  Ireland	  (1957,	  1976);	  France	  (1985,	  in	  respect	  of	  New	  Caledonia);	  Albania	  
(1997);	  Armenia	  (2008)	  
156	  Speech	  of	  British	  Prime	  Minister,	  Harold	  MacMillan	   to	   the	  Parliament	  of	  South	  Africa,	   3	   February	   1960.	  For	  analysis	   see	  
Frank	  Myers,	  Harold	  Macmillan's	  "Winds	  of	  Change"	  Speech:	  A	  Case	  Study	  in	  the	  Rhetoric	  of	  Policy	  Change,	  3:4	  Rhetoric	  &	  Public	  
Affairs	  555	  (2000).	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by	   the	   time	   the	   territories	   concerned	   acquired	   independence	   lapsed	   upon	   such	   acquisition.	  
Widespread	  decolonisation	  was	  held	  up	  as	  the	  decisive	  banner	  in	  support	  of	  the	  powerful	  claim	  
that	  international	  law	  had	  finally	  become	  truly	  universal.	  	  
	  
In	  one	  of	  the	  colonial	  conflicts	  that	  remained,	  however,	  Britain	  continued	  to	  rely	  on	  emergency	  
as	  a	  tool	  of	  domination.	  Northern	  Ireland	  was	  subjected	  to	  derogation	  from	  June	  1957157	  until	  
August	  1984,158	  with	  special	  powers	  of	  detention,	  search	  and	  seizure,	  and	  censorship	  reserved	  
by	  Britain.	  After	  a	  temporary	  lapse,	  Britain	  invoked	  its	  right	  to	  derogate	  again;	  this	  emergency	  
would	   last	   from	   1988	   until	   2001.159	   These	   declarations	   of	   what	   ended	   up	   as	   entrenched	  
emergencies	   were	   supported	   by	   a	   steady	   spate	   of	   statutes—Emergency	   Powers	   Acts	   and	  
Prevention	   of	   Terrorism	   Acts.	   These	   acts	  made	   further	   legislative	   allowance	   for	   the	   state	   of	  
emergency	  that	  had	  effectively	  been	  in	  place	  in	  the	  north	  of	  Ireland	  since	  the	  enactment	  of	  the	  
Civil	  Authorities	  (Special	  Powers)	  Act	  (Northern	  Ireland)	  of	  1922,	  which	  remained	  in	  place	  until	  
the	   enactment	   of	   the	   Northern	   Ireland	   (Emergency	   Provisions)	   Act	   of	   1973.	   The	   emergency	  
powers	   were	   expanded	   into	   mainland	   Britain	   starting	   with	   the	   Prevention	   of	   Terrorism	  
(Temporary	   Provisions)	   Act	   of	   1974,	   which	   introduced	   new	   powers	   to	   exclude	   from	   Great	  
Britain	   persons	   suspected	   of	   involvement	   in	   terrorism	   associated	  with	  Northern	   Ireland,	   and	  
provided	  the	  police	  with	  powers	  to	  arrest	  and	  detain	  suspects	  without	  warrant	  for	  up	  to	  a	  total	  
of	  seven	  days.160	  The	  presentation	  of	   the	  threat	   to	  security	   in	   the	  Northern	   Irish	  context	  was	  
not	   dissimilar	   to	   that	   which	   had	   underpinned	   Britain’s	   discourse	   of	   emergency	   in	   Kenya,	  
Malaya,	  and	  elsewhere.	  	  
	  
Britain’s	   emergency	   laws	   and	   derogations	   have	   come	   under	   the	   judicial	   microscope	   of	   the	  
European	   Court	   of	   Human	   Rights	   numerous	   times.	   One	   chain	   of	   events	   in	   this	   regard	   is	  
particularly	  telling.	  The	  case	  of	  Brogan161	  related	  to	  emergency	  powers	  promulgated	  under	  the	  
Prevention	  of	  Terrorism	  Act	  of	  1984	  that	  allowed	  persons	  suspected	  to	  have	  been	  involved	  in	  
acts	   of	   terrorism	   to	   be	   detained	   for	   seven	   days	   without	   charge	   and	   without	   being	   brought	  
before	   a	   judge.	   The	   Court	   found	   such	  measures	   to	   constitute	   a	   violation	   of	   Article	   5	   of	   the	  
Convention.	   As	   noted	   above,	   Britain’s	   long-­‐standing	   derogation	   to	   the	   Convention	   had	   been	  
                                                
157	  See	  letter	  of	  27	  June	  1957,	  1	  Yearbook	  of	  the	  European	  Convention	  on	  Human	  Rights	  50	  (1958).	  
158	  Council	  of	  Europe,	  Information	  Bulletin	  on	  Legal	  Activities	  Within	  the	  Council	  of	  Europe	  and	  in	  Member	  States,	  vol.	  21,	  p.2	  
(1985).	  
159	  Note	  verbal	  of	  23	  December	  1988,	  31	  Yearbook	  of	  the	  European	  Convention	  on	  Human	  Rights	  15-­‐16	  (1988);	  Letter	  from	  the	  
Permanent	  Representative	  of	  the	  United	  Kingdom	  to	  the	  Secretary-­‐General	  of	  the	  Council	  of	  Europe,	  19	  February	  2001.	  
160	   The	   Prevention	   of	   Terrorism	   (Temporary	   Provisions)	   Act	   1974,	   §	   7(1)	   allowed	   police	   to	   detain	   individuals	   on	   their	   own	  
authority	   for	   forty-­‐eight	   hours,	   while	   §	   7(2)	   provided	   for	   an	   extension	   of	   detention	   for	   a	   further	   period	   of	   up	   to	   five	   days	  
authorised	   by	   the	   Secretary	   of	   State.	   This	   1974	   Act	   was	   augmented	   and	   expanded	   upon	   by	   the	   Prevention	   of	   Terrorism	  
(Temporary	  Provisions)	  Acts	  of	  1976,	  1984,	  and	  1989.	  
161	  Brogan	  &	  Others	  v.	  the	  United	  Kingdom,	  no.	  11209/84;	  11234/84;	  11266/84;	  11386/85,	  ECHR	  judgment	  29	  November	  1988.	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withdrawn	   in	   1984.	   The	   Court’s	   decision	   in	   Brogan	   “undoubtedly	   came	   as	   a	   surprise	   to	   the	  
British	   government,	   and	   it	   quickly	   had	   to	   decide	   how	   to	   react”.162	   The	   response	  was	   not	   to	  
revoke	   the	   special	   powers	   of	   detention,	   but	   rather	   to	   immediately	   lodge	   a	   new	   derogation	  
under	  Article	  15	  in	  order	  to	  exempt	  the	  seven-­‐day	  executive	  detention	  power	  from	  compliance	  
with	   the	  Convention.163	  Britain’s	  argument	   in	   this	   regard	  was	   that	   it	  had	  believed	   itself	   to	  be	  
operating	  within	  the	  boundaries	  of	  Article	  5,	  and	  that	  when	  the	  contrary	  was	  established	  by	  the	  
Court,	   derogation	  was	   reverted	   to.	   In	   response	   to	   a	   subsequent	   petition	   that	   challenged	   the	  
validity	   of	   the	   new	   derogation,	   the	   Court	   came	   down	   on	   Britain’s	   side.	   This	   decision	   in	  
Brannigan	  &	  McBride	  v.	  UK164	  was	  seen	  by	  commentators	  as	  confirmation	  of	  “an	  exceptionally	  
undemanding	  standard	  of	  review	  by	  the	  organs	  where	  derogations	  are	  concerned”.165	  	  
	  
The	   decision	   was,	   however,	   not	   inconsistent	   with	   the	   European	   Court’s	   own	   earlier	  
jurisprudence	   on	   the	   matter.	   In	   the	   1970s	   the	   Irish	   government	   brought	   an	   inter-­‐state	  
application	  challenging	  the	   legality	  of	  Britain’s	  policies	  and	  practices	  of	   internment,	  detention	  
and	  interrogation	  in	  the	  north	  of	  Ireland	  between	  1971	  and	  1975.	  The	  British	  defence	  relied	  on	  
the	  derogation	  that	  had	  been	  in	  place	  as	  justification	  for	  the	  practices.	  Regarding	  Article	  5,	  on	  
the	   right	   to	   liberty,	   the	   Court	   found	   that	   while	   the	  measures	   of	   extrajudicial	   deprivation	   of	  
liberty	  were	  not	   in	  conformity	  with	   the	  Convention,	   they	  were	   required	  by	   ‘exigencies	  of	   the	  
situation’	  and	  thus	  that	  the	  derogation	  under	  which	  they	  were	  effected	  was	  permissible.166	  The	  
decision	  asserted	   the	  granting	  of	   a	   “wide	  margin	  of	   appreciation”	   to	   states	   in	   the	   context	  of	  
Article	   15,	   both	   in	   relation	   to	   the	   existence	   of	   an	   emergency	   in	   the	   first	   place,	   and	   the	  
appropriate	  measures	  to	  be	  taken	  in	  deviation	  from	  the	  Convention:	  	  
	  
It	  falls	  in	  the	  first	  place	  to	  each	  Contracting	  State,	  with	  its	  responsibility	  for	  "the	  life	  of	  
[its]	  nation",	  to	  determine	  whether	  that	  life	  is	  threatened	  by	  a	  "public	  emergency"	  and,	  
if	  so,	  how	  far	  it	  is	  necessary	  to	  go	  in	  attempting	  to	  overcome	  the	  emergency.	  By	  reason	  
of	   their	   direct	   and	   continuous	   contact	   with	   the	   pressing	   needs	   of	   the	   moment,	   the	  
national	  authorities	  are	  in	  principle	  in	  a	  better	  position	  than	  the	  international	  judge	  to	  
decide	   both	   on	   the	   presence	   of	   such	   an	   emergency	   and	   on	   the	   nature	   and	   scope	   of	  
derogations	  necessary	  to	  avert	  it.167	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In	   a	   situation	   of	   colonialism	   or	   hegemonic	   control,	   the	   benefits	   afforded	   to	   states	   by	   this	  
reasoning	  are	  palpable.	  The	  notion	  of	  a	  code	  of	  emergency	  legislation	  had	  thus	  found	  its	  way	  
back	  full	  circle	  to	  its	   island	  of	  origin	  via	  extension	  to	  distant	  corners	  of	  the	  British	  empire	  and	  
effective	   endorsement	   from	   the	   European	   Court	   of	   Human	   Rights.	   In	   terms	   of	   the	   extent	   of	  
recourse	  to	  derogation,	  and	  the	  wide	  margin	  of	  appreciation	  afforded	  it	   in	  this	  respect	  by	  the	  
Court,	   it	   appears	   that	   Britain,	   the	   driving	   force	   behind	   Article	   15	   of	   the	   ECHR,	   may	   have	  
benefitted	  most	  from	  its	  inclusion	  in	  the	  Convention.	  	  
	  
Stemming	   from	   the	   colonial	   experience,	   a	   tendency	   to	   rely	   on	   emergency	   derogations	   was	  
etched	   into	   the	  British	  mindset	   from	   the	   inception	  of	   the	   international	  human	   rights	   system.	  
The	  influence	  of	  that	  tendency	  persists	  today,	  and	  bears	  noting.	  As	  a	  direct	  consequence	  of	  the	  
attacks	  of	  11th	  September	  2001	  in	  the	  United	  States,	  the	  British	  government	  chose	  to	  derogate	  
from	  certain	  provisions	  of	  the	  ECHR.168	  The	  fact	  that	  France,	  Germany,	  Italy	  and	  other	  European	  
states	  subject	   to	  a	  similar	  general	   increased	  risk	  of	   terrorist	  activity	  did	  not	   issue	  derogations	  
from	   the	   Convention	   has	   been	   highlighted,	   including	   by	   the	   Committee	   of	   Privy	   Counsellors	  
established	  pursuant	  to	  Britain’s	  Anti-­‐terrorism,	  Crime	  and	  Security	  Act	  of	  2001.169	  
	  
	  
VI.	  REFLECTIONS	  ON	  THE	  DOCTRINE	  OF	  EMERGENCY	  IN	  ITS	  COLONIAL	  SHADOW	  
	  
In	  eventually	  accepting	  Britain’s	  arguments	  for	  the	  inclusion	  of	  an	  emergency	  derogation	  clause	  
in	   the	   European	   Convention	   on	   Human	   Rights,	   the	   majority	   of	   the	   other	   members	   of	   the	  
Council	  of	  Europe	  reasoned	  that	  “it	  had	  the	  advantage	  of	  excluding,	  even	  in	  the	  case	  of	  war	  or	  
threat	  to	  the	  life	  of	  the	  nation,	  any	  derogation	  of	  certain	  fundamental	  rights,	  and	  because	  the	  
procedure	   laid	   down	   in	   paragraph	   3	   could	   prove	   to	   be	   useful	   for	   the	   protection	   of	   Human	  
Rights	  in	  exceptional	  circumstances”.170	  This	  depiction	  presents	  the	  provision	  in	  its	  positive	  light	  
in	  that	  certain	  rights	  are	  excluded	  from	  derogation	  and	  some	  form	  of	  accountability	  is	  entailed	  
by	   virtue	  of	   the	  procedure	   to	  be	   followed	  when	  emergency	  powers	   are	   introduced.	   The	   less	  
rosy	   perspective—that	   the	   institutionalisation	   of	   a	   framework	   under	   which	   derogations	   can	  
take	   place	   during	   a	   self-­‐proclaimed	   emergency	   may	   serve	   to	   cast	   a	   light	   of	   legitimacy	   on	  
emergency	  powers	  themselves—foreseen	  though	  it	  may	  have	  been	  during	  the	  drafting	  process,	  
was	   in	   the	  end	   reduced	   to	   second	   fiddle.	  Questions	  beg	  as	   to	  what	  extent	   this	  was	  due	   to	  a	  
well-­‐intended,	  but	   in	   retrospect	   somewhat	  naïve,	  expectation	  on	  behalf	  of	   the	  drafters	  as	   to	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how	   states	   would	   henceforth	   conduct	   themselves	   in	   exceptional	   circumstances;	   and,	  
conversely,	   to	  what	   extent	   it	   was	   due	   to	   the	   realities	   of	   the	   enduring	   intrinsic	   structures	   of	  
international	   law,	   whereby	   states	   will	   ultimately	   legislate	   with	   their	   own	   interests	   primarily	  
accounted	  for.	  	  
	  
The	  doctrine	  of	  emergency	  remains	  prone	  today	  to	  exploitation	  by	  regimes	  inclined	  to	  repress	  
opposition	   and	   dissent.	   As	   such,	   the	   merits	   of	   bestowing	   universal	   applicability	   upon	   a	  
paradigm	  derived	  from	  a	  distinctly	  colonial	  context	  can	  be	  appraised	  on	  a	  number	  of	  levels.	  
	  
A.	  TEMPORALITY	  AND	  THE	  LANGUAGE	  OF	  EMERGENCY	  
	  
The	  term	  ‘emergency’	  is	  synonymous	  with	  a	  sudden	  and	  unexpected	  event,	  typically	  potentially	  
disastrous	   in	   its	  consequences	  and	  requiring	  a	  swift	  and	  urgent	   response	  that	   is	  not	  afforded	  
the	   luxury	   of	   planning.	  While	   the	   architects	   of	   the	   emergency	   derogation	   clauses	   in	   human	  
rights	  treaties	  may	  argue	  that	  it	  is	  a	  similarly	  narrow	  notion,	  in	  theory,	  which	  they	  intended	  to	  
legislate	   for,	   the	   concept	   of	   ‘emergency’	   has	   been	   given	   a	   much	   broader	   construction	   in	  
practice.	  The	  idea	  of	  a	  prolonged	  or	  indefinite	  emergency	  evolved	  as	  the	  armoury	  of	  emergency	  
legislation	   on	   Britain’s	   statute	   books	   to	   deal	   with	   threats	   and	   disturbances	   in	   the	   overseas	  
empire	  steadily	  expanded	  throughout	  the	  nineteenth	  century,	  to	  the	  point	  that	  territories	  such	  
as	   Ireland	   and	   India	   were	   in	   states	   of	   emergency	   more	   often	   than	   they	   were	   in	   states	   of	  
‘normalcy’.	   ‘Normalcy’,	   for	   its	  part,	   is	  defined	  by	   the	  predominance	  of	   the	  norm,	   the	  general	  
rule,	  the	  habitual	  state	  of	  affairs	  that	  prevails	  most	  frequently.	  This	  understanding	  of	  ‘normalcy’	  
was	  turned	  on	  its	  head	  somewhat	  by	  the	  entrenchment	  of	  quasi-­‐permanent	  emergencies	  that	  
veered	  towards	  “a	  new	  conception	  of	  normality	  that	  takes	  vastly	  extended	  controls	  for	  granted,	  
and	   thinks	  of	   freedom	   in	  smaller	  and	  smaller	  dimensions”.171	  We	  have	  seen	  how	   Ireland	  was	  
effectively	  governed	  by	  emergency	  rule	  for	  over	  a	  century	  before	  independence,	  an	  approach	  
that	  continued	  in	  Northern	  Ireland,	  post-­‐partition.	  In	  spite	  of	  evidence	  of	  this	  ‘new	  conception’,	  
emergency	  derogations	  were	  indoctrinated	  in	  various	  international	  human	  rights	  conventions,	  
and	  the	   idea	  of	   temporal	   limitations	  on	  the	  discretion	  of	   the	  state	  to	  proclaim	  an	  emergency	  
has	   been	   exposed	   as	   a	   fallacy.	   Today’s	   ‘permanent’	   states	   of	   emergency	   around	   the	   world,	  
most	   notably	   in	   North	   Africa	   (Algeria,	   Egypt)	   and	   the	   Middle-­‐East	   (Israel,	   Syria)	   display	   no	  
indication	   of	   coming	   to	   a	   close.	   In	   such	   instances,	   the	   nomenclature	   of	   ‘emergency’	   and	  
‘normalcy’	  is	  rendered	  meaningless.	  	  
	  
The	  language	  of	  human	  rights	  law	  itself	  in	  the	  context	  of	  states	  of	  emergency	  is	  also	  reflective	  
of	  the	  colonial	  origins	  of	  the	  doctrine.	  Pursuant	  to	  the	  extant	  emergency	  legislative	  system,	  the	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British	   executive	   would	   typically	   authorise	   repressive	   measures	   against	   “any	   person	   who	   is	  
suspected	  of	  acting	  or	  having	  acted	  or	  of	  being	  about	  to	  act	   in	  any	  manner	  prejudicial	   to	  the	  
public	  safety	  or	  the	  defence	  of	  the	  Realm”.172	  That	  threat	  to	  the	  defence	  of	  the	  imperial	  ‘Realm’	  
finds	  parallel	  in	  the	  threat	  to	  the	  ‘life	  of	  the	  nation’	  that	  triggers	  the	  right	  of	  states	  to	  derogate	  
from	  their	  human	  rights	  law	  obligations.	  In	  the	  colonial	  ‘emergencies’	  that	  formed	  the	  backdrop	  
for	  the	  assumption	  of	  special	  powers,	  the	  threat	  in	  question	  was	  invariably	  to	  the	  metropole’s	  
national	  or	  governmental	  interest	  in	  the	  colony,	  rather	  than	  to	  the	  interest	  of	  the	  people	  of	  the	  
colony	  or	  even	  the	  people	  of	   the	  metropole	   itself.	  Thus	  the	  Defence	  of	   India	  Act	  of	  1915,	   for	  
example,	  allowed	  the	  Governor-­‐General	  to	  make	  regulations	  for	  securing	  “the	  public	  safety	  and	  
defence	  of	  British	  India”.173	  The	  language	  of	  the	  Emergency	  Powers	  (Colonial	  Defence)	  Order	  in	  
Council	   of	   1939—which	  was	   invoked	   as	   the	   basis	   for	   emergency	   regulations	   throughout	   the	  
empire	   not	   just	   during	   the	   Second	   World	   War	   but	   also	   subsequent	   to	   it—entails	   similar	  
allusions	  to	  Britain’s	  ambitions	  of	  retaining	  territorial	  control	  of	  its	  colonies:	  	  
	  
the	  Governor	  may	  make	  such	  regulations	  as	  appear	  to	  him	  to	  be	  necessary	  or	  expedient	  
for	   securing	   the	  public	   safety,	   the	  defence	  of	   the	   territory,	   the	  maintenance	  of	  public	  
order	  and	  the	  suppression	  of	  mutiny,	  rebellion	  and	  riot.174	  
	  
The	  not	  insignificant	  amendments	  made	  to	  the	  drafts	  of	  both	  the	  ECHR	  and	  ICCPR	  to	  allow	  for	  
derogation	  in	  the	  case	  of	  a	  threat	  to	  ‘the	  life	  of	  the	  nation’	  rather	  than	  a	  threat	  to	  ‘the	  interests	  
of	  the	  people’	  as	  per	  the	  original	  text	  is	  discussed	  in	  section	  IV,	  above.	  It	  bears	  reiterating	  that	  
this	  statist-­‐leaning	  adjustment	  was	  made	  at	  Britain’s	  behest	  in	  spite	  of	  contentions	  made	  during	  
the	  drafting	  process	  “that	  a	  reference	  to	  ‘the	  interests	  of	  the	  people’	  was	  more	  appropriate	  in	  a	  
covenant	  which	  dealt	  with	  the	  rights	  of	  individuals	  and	  that	  such	  a	  phrase	  would	  also	  prohibit	  
Governments	  from	  acting	  contrary	  to	  the	  interests	  and	  welfare	  of	  their	  people”.175	  	  
	  
B.	  THE	  SPACE	  BETWEEN:	  SPATIAL	  ASPECTS	  OF	  THE	  NORMALCY-­‐EMERGENCY	  DIVIDE	  	  
	  
We	  have	  seen	  how	  resort	   to	  martial	   law	   in	  mainland	  Britain	  was	  effectively	  abolished	  by	   the	  
Petition	   of	   Right	   in	   1628,	   while	   its	   use	   was	   continued	   and	   even	   expanded	   in	   the	   empire	  
overseas.	   In	  the	  nineteenth	  century,	  Britain	  enjoyed	  relative	  stability	   in	  both	  the	  political	  and	  
socio-­‐economic	   sense	  and	  had	  become	   increasingly	  governable	  within	   the	  ordinary	   course	  of	  
                                                
172	  This	  example	  is	  taken	  from	  a	  regulation	  promulgated	  in	  Ireland	  in	  1918	  pursuant	  to	  the	  Defence	  of	  the	  Realm	  Act.	  See	  Colm	  
Campbell,	  Emergency	  Law	  in	  Ireland,	  1918-­‐1925	  104	  (1994).	  
173	  Emphasis	  added.	  
174	  Section	  6(1),	  Emergency	  Powers	  Order	  in	  Council,	  1939.	  
175	  Annotations	  on	  the	  text	  of	  the	  draft	  International	  Covenants	  on	  Human	  Rights,	  supra	  note	  138,	  Chap.	  V,	  para.	  40.	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the	   law.	   Across	   the	   water,	   Ireland,	   by	   contrast,	   was	   in	   a	   state	   of	   political	   discontent	   and	  
economic	  turmoil.	  Civil	  disobedience	  was	  provoked	  by	  discriminatory	  religious	  laws	  and	  taxes,	  
while	   the	   country’s	   predominantly	   agrarian	   population	  was	   strangled	   by	   British	   land	   policies	  
and	  exploitation	  of	  resources,	  resulting	  in	  mass	  starvation	  and	  emigration.	  It	  was	  in	  this	  context	  
that	  the	  array	  of	  colonial	  emergency	  legislation	  was	  enacted	  in	  Ireland.	  	  
	  
The	  reliance	  on	  martial	   law	  and	  emergency	  codes	  to	  maintain	  control	   in	  the	  colonies,	  while	  a	  
‘normal’	  legal	  regime	  was	  maintained	  in	  mainland	  Britain,	  exemplifies	  a	  dichotomy	  of	  diverging	  
legal	   regimes	   operating	   contemporaneously	   but	   independently	   in	   two	   spaces	  within	   a	   single	  
‘control	  system’.	  As	  such	  it	  can	  be	  understood	  as	  the	  antecedent	  of	  the	  spatial	  distinction	  that	  
is	  often	  perceived	  as	  separating	  situations	  of	  emergency	  and	  normalcy.	  In	  such	  situations,	  “the	  
claim	   is	   that	   the	   two	   realities	   and	   the	   two	   concomitant	   legal	   regimes	   –	   that	   of	   emergency	  
applicable	   to	   the	   dependent	   territory	   and	   that	   of	   normalcy	   applicable	   to	   the	   controlling	  
territory	  –	  are	  maintained	  separately	  and	  do	  not	  affect	  each	  other.”176	  However,	  such	  a	  claim	  of	  
absolute	   separation	   is	   untenable	   and	   “misguided”;177	   geographic	   boundaries	   are	   often	  
permeable	   when	   emergency	   powers	   are	   concerned.	   The	   examples	   of	   the	   World	   Wars	   are	  
indicative,	  whereby	  emergency	  measures	  employed	  by	   the	  British	  army	  abroad	  did	   find	   their	  
way	  onto	  the	  statute	  books	  governing	  mainland	  Britain.	  It	  might	  be	  argued	  that	  this	  was	  a	  mere	  
temporary	   blip	   necessitated	   by	   the	   truly	   exceptional	   circumstances	   of	   the	   major	   wars,	   that	  
normalcy	   was	   subsequently	   restored	   in	   Britain,	   and	   that	   engagement	   with	   the	   international	  
human	  rights	  treaties	  consolidated	  the	  rule	  of	  law	  and	  human	  rights.	  However,	  experience	  has	  
demonstrated	  otherwise.	  Britain’s	  influence	  ensured	  the	  human	  rights	  treaties	  were	  crafted	  in	  
such	  a	  way	  so	  as	  not	  to	  unduly	  hamper	  the	  administration	  of	  the	  colonies,	  which	  had	  come	  to	  
rely	  heavily	  on	  the	  use	  of	  emergency	  powers.	  The	   facility	   to	  derogate	   from	  such	  treaties	  was	  
availed	  of	  initially	  only	  in	  the	  colonies,	  but	  invariably	  spilled	  back	  over	  again.	  Britain	  derogated	  
from	  the	  ECHR	  in	  Northern	  Ireland	  in	  1957	  on	  account	  of	  the	  emergency	  powers	  it	  had	  invoked	  
there.	  Derogation	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  Irish	  threat	  subsequently	  encompassed	  mainland	  Britain,	  
to	   which	   derogation	   has	   also	   applied	   in	   the	   more	   recent	   context	   of	   the	   transnational	   ‘war	  
against	  terrorism’.	  
	  
On	   this	   basis,	   the	   space	   that	   is	   created	   between	   normalcy	   and	   emergency	   along	   territorial	  
boundary	  lines	  appears	  as	  an	  artificial	  construction,	  ungrounded	  in	  reality.	  Such	  a	  division	  may	  
have	   been	   tenable	   in	   the	   1800s	  when	  martial	   law	  was	   commonplace	   in	   its	   application	   from	  
Canada	  to	  the	  Caribbean	  and	  South	  Africa	  to	  Sri	  Lanka,	  but	  precluded	  from	  the	  domestic	  legal	  
system	   at	   home	   in	   Britain.	   Spatial	   distinctions	   between	   norm	   (metropole)	   and	   exception	  
(colony)	   are	   much	   more	   blurred	   in	   the	   modern	   context,	   even	   in	   situations	   that	   may	   be	  
                                                
176	  Gross	  &	  Ní	  Aoláin,	  supra	  note	  9,	  at	  181.	  
177	  Id.	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characterised	   as	   colonial	   in	   nature,	   such	   as	   that	   of	   Israel	   and	   the	   Palestinian	   territories,	   or	  
Britain	   and	   the	   north	   of	   Ireland.	   This	   blurring	   of	   the	   lines	   highlights	   the	   incongruity	   of	  
international	   human	   rights	   law	   incorporating	   a	   provision	   for	   universal	   application	   into	   its	  
doctrinal	   corpus	   that	  was	  heavily	   influenced	  by	   the	   specific	  political	   and	  historical	   context	  of	  
colonial	  governance.	  	  
	  
The	  relation	  between	  the	  state	  of	  emergency	  and	  international	  humanitarian	  law	  also	  warrants	  
mention.	  The	  origins	  of	  humanitarian	  law	  can	  be	  traced	  to	  the	  1859	  Battle	  of	  Solferino,	  “a	  very	  
European	  battle”,	  with	  its	  norms	  at	  that	  time	  designed	  exclusively	  for	  European	  enjoyment.178	  
There	  was	  no	  incentive	  for	  European	  states	  to	  limit	  the	  scope	  of	  military	  campaigns	  outside	  of	  
Europe,	   with	   non-­‐European	   peoples	   and	   their	   territories	   having	   been	   stripped	   of	   any	   legal	  
personality	   upon	   subjection	   to	   colonial	   domination.179	   Thus	   the	   European	   powers	   did	   not	  
consider	  their	  forces	  constrained	  in	  the	  pursuit	  of	  imperial	  conquest,	  nor	  in	  their	  use	  of	  martial	  
law	  in	  the	  colonies,	  even	  after	  the	  inception	  of	  international	  humanitarian	  law.	  By	  the	  time	  that	  
the	  push	   to	  dismantle	   the	   colonial	   empires	  had	  gained	   irreversible	  momentum	   in	   the	  1950s,	  
international	   humanitarian	   law	   was	   still	   not	   a	   factor	   in	   the	   protection	   of	   the	   rights	   of	   the	  
‘natives’.	  
	  
In	   contemporary	   situations	   where	   a	   state	   of	   emergency	   occurs	   in	   the	   context	   of	   an	   armed	  
conflict	  or	  belligerent	  occupation,	  the	  tendency	  of	  states	  to	  exploit	  the	  vulnerability	  of	  human	  
rights	   law	  by	  the	   invocation	  of	   the	  doctrine	  of	  emergency	  has	   recently	  been	  accompanied	  by	  
parallel	   attempts	   to	   undermine	   the	   relevance	   of	   humanitarian	   law	   on	   the	   basis	   that	   it	   is	  
insufficient	   to	  deal	  with	   ‘exceptional’	   or	   ‘asymmetrical’	   threats	   faced	  by	   the	   given	   state.	   The	  
state	  of	  exception	  narrative	  that	  has	  sought	  to	  establish	  legal	  ‘black	  holes’	  in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  
war	   against	   terrorism	   is	   well-­‐documented.	   The	   Israeli	   occupation	   of	   Palestinian	   territory	   is	  
another	  case	  in	  point;	   Israel’s	  engagement	  with	  international	  humanitarian	  law	  in	  the	  context	  
the	   occupation	   and	   its	   own	   long-­‐established	   state	   of	   emergency	   has	   culminated	   in	   the	  
formulation	   of	   a	   concerted	   strategy	   aimed	   at	   amending	   the	   law	   in	   order	   to	   “to	   legitimise	  
military	  policies	  which	  disregard	   the	   core	   IHL	  principles	  of	  distinction	  and	  proportionality”.180	  
Palestinian	  activism	  based	  around	   international	   law	  has	  provoked	  an	   Israeli	   reaction	  which	   is	  
drawing	  upon	  a	  ‘lawfare’	  narrative	  in	  an	  attempt	  to	  recast	  international	  humanitarian	  law	  in	  its	  
nineteenth-­‐century	   colonial	   mould.	   The	   Israeli	   military’s	   International	   Law	   Department	   is	  
essentially	   advocating	   a	   full-­‐circle	   return	   to	   the	   colonial	   paradigm	   of	   non-­‐application	   to	   the	  
                                                
178	  Frederic	  Mégret,	  From	  ‘Savages’	  to	  ‘Unlawful	  Combatants:	  A	  Post-­‐Colonial	  Look	  at	  International	  Humanitarian	  Law's	  ‘Other',	  
in	  International	  Law	  and	  its	  ‘Others’	  (Anne	  Orford	  ed.	  2006)	  265,	  270.	  
179	  See	  Anghie,	  supra	  note	  12,	  at	  65-­‐84.	  
180	  Michael	  Kearney,	  Lawfare,	  Legitimacy	  and	  Resistance:	  The	  Weak	  and	  the	  Law,	  16	  Palestine	  Yearbook	  of	   International	  Law	  
79,	  104	  (2010).	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indigenous	  population,	  arguing	  that	  the	  state’s	  right	  to	  self-­‐defence	  has	  been	  emasculated	  by	  
extant	   principles	   of	   international	   humanitarian	   law.	   This	   is	   predicated	   on	   the	   idea	   that	   the	  
protections	  and	  restrictions	  of	  Geneva	  Conventions	  are	  reasonable	  in	  situations	  of	  ‘fair	  combat’	  
between	  regular	  armies,	  but	  are	  ill-­‐equipped	  to	  accommodate	  the	  emergency	  situation	  created	  
by	   exceptional	   terrorist	   threats	   posed	   by	   non-­‐state	   actors.181	   In	   this	   sense	   we	   begin	   to	   see	  
implications	  of	  the	  doctrine	  of	  emergency	  beyond	  human	  rights	  law.	  	  
	  
C.	  THE	  RULE	  OF	  EMERGENCY:	  INTERNATIONAL	  HUMAN	  RIGHTS	  LAW’S	  COLONIAL	  INHERITANCE	  
	  
While	   the	   UN-­‐era	   human	   rights	   movement	   may	   have	   heralded	   progress	   in	   transcending	  
international	   law’s	   traditional	   focus	   on	   nation-­‐states	   rather	   than	   individuals	   or	   communities,	  
the	  state-­‐centric	  structure	  of	  the	  discipline,	  and	  of	  the	  world	  order,	  was	  kept	  intact.	  The	  norms	  
applied	  to	  crisis	  situations	  that	  constitute	  public	  emergencies	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  testament	  to	  this.	  
In	  such	  circumstances,	  security	  considerations	  take	  precedence,	  often	  with	  the	  underlying	  motif	  
of	   preservation	   of	   power,	   while	   respect	   for	   human	   rights	   obligations	   becomes	   more	  
constraining	  and	  burdensome	  on	  a	  state.	  Accordingly,	  human	  rights	  law	  explicitly	  provides	  for	  
exemptions,	   although	   it	   is	   precisely	   in	   such	   situations	   that	   rights	   are	   often	  most	   in	   need	   of	  
protection.	   As	   described	   previously,	   these	   exemptions	   were	   nailed	   down	   in	   the	   midst	   of	  
Britain’s	   imperial	   emergencies	   abroad.	   The	   notion	   of	   emergency	   as	   developed	   in	   the	   British	  
colonies	   was	   in	   essence	   a	   methodology	   of	   government	   by	   special	   powers,	   as	   opposed	   to	  
government	   by	   consent.	   From	   the	   perspective	   of	   a	   foreign	   power	   faced	   with	   increasing	  
resistance	   to	   its	   rule	   from	   subjugated	   populations,	   this	   represented	   the	   ‘legal’	   alternative	   of	  
suppression	  by	  legislation,	  which	  from	  a	  legitimacy	  point	  of	  view	  was	  favourable	  to	  the	  ‘extra-­‐
legal’	  approach	  of	   suppression	  by	  pure	   force.	  On	   the	  back	  of	   this	  experience,	   the	  doctrine	  of	  
emergency	  was	   incorporated	   into	   the	  normative	   anatomy	  of	   international	   human	   rights	   law,	  
and	  has	  become	  a	  coercive	  tool	  of	  choice	  for	  many	  states	  in	  their	  suppression	  of	  opposition	  and	  
preservation	  of	  political	  stability:	  
	  
In	   practice,	   there	   is	   an	   incurable	   tendency,	   particularly	   on	   the	   part	   of	   military	  
dictatorships,	  to	  misuse	  the	  tool	  of	  emergency	  to	  maintain	  their	  own	  positions	  of	  power	  
...	   In	   many	   States,	   emergency	   and	   other	   states	   of	   exception	   have	   in	   some	   respects	  
become	  a	  “normal”	  form	  of	  the	  exercise	  of	  State	  authority.182	  
	  
This	   ‘incurable	   tendency’	   would	   come	   as	   no	   surprise	   to	   students	   of	   British	   colonial	   history,	  
which	   is	   replete	   with	   precedents	   of	   misuse	   of	   the	   tool	   of	   emergency	   to	   legitimise	   and	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  Id.	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  Manfred	  Nowak,	  UN	  Covenant	  on	  Civil	  and	  Political	  Rights:	  Commentary	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perpetuate	  Britain’s	  position	  of	  power	  and	  control	   in	   the	  empire.	   In	  April	   1918,	   for	  example,	  
there	   was	   an	   extension	   of	   emergency	   powers	   of	   detention	   in	   Ireland	   “for	   a	   purely	   political	  
purpose:	   to	   cripple	   the	   Irish	  Sinn	  Féin	  party”.183	  The	   same	   tactic	  was	  deployed	   in	   the	  African	  
and	  Asian	  colonies	  until	  the	  last	  days	  of	  the	  empire,	  in	  a	  bid	  to	  protect	  British	  interests	  from	  the	  
competing	   interests	   of	   the	   native	   ‘other’	   —	   with	   whom	   Britain	   sought	   to	   maintain,	   in	   the	  
Saidian	   sense,	   a	   relationship	   of	   power,	   of	   domination,	   of	   varying	   degrees	   of	   a	   complex	  
hegemony.184	   The	   invocation	   of	   an	   emergency	   was	   seen	   by	   the	   coloniser	   as	   an	   à	   la	   carte	  
governance	  option	   to	  be	   selected	  when	   ‘normal’	   political	   strategies	  met	  difficulties:	  “For	   the	  
Colonial	   Office,	   opting	   for	   an	   emergency	  was	   based	   on	   the	   recognition	   that	   its	   conventional	  
form	   of	   political	   management	   had	   not	   succeeded”.185	   The	   arguments	   used	   to	   justify	   the	  
declaration	   of	   emergency	   were	   “often	   based	   on	   fiction”;	   in	   the	   cases	   of	  Malaya	   and	   British	  
Guiana,	  for	  example,	  emergency	  measures	  were	  introduced	  in	  response	  to	  alleged	  communist-­‐
inspired	   conspiracies	   to	   overthrow	   government,	   claims	   for	   which	   “[i]n	   reality,	   no	   evidence	  
exists”.186	  On	   this	   basis,	   the	   emergencies	   are	   related	   less	   to	   actual	   extraordinary	   crises	   and	  
more	  to	  the	  prevailing	  geopolitical	  landscape.	  The	  granting	  of	  a	  pivotal	  position	  to	  the	  concept	  
of	   emergency	  within	   the	   international	   system	   for	   the	  protection	  of	   human	   rights	   reveals	   the	  
inability	  of	  human	  rights	  law	  to	  fully	  shield	  itself	  from	  the	  corrupting	  vested	  interests	  of	  colonial	  
powers	  that	  have	  plagued	  other	  elements	  of	  public	  international	  law.	  	  	  
	  
The	  use	  of	  the	  state	  of	  emergency	  as	  a	  governmental	  tool	  of	  choice	   in	  contemporary	  politics,	  
and	  the	  absorption	  of	  the	  exception	  into	  the	  norm	  is	  starkly	  illustrated	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  arguably	  
the	  most	   draconian	   piece	   of	   British	   emergency	   legislation—the	   Terrorism	   Act	   of	   2000—was	  
enacted	  after	   the	   1998	   Good	   Friday	   Agreement	   heralded	   the	   diminution	   of	   overt	   conflict	   in	  
Northern	   Ireland,	   and	   before	   the	   attacks	   of	   11th	   September	   2001	   and	   7th	   July	   2005.	   The	  
inferences	  to	  be	  drawn	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  extent	  of	  the	  truly	   ‘emergency’	  nature	  of	  such	  an	  
emergency	   regime	   are	   clear.	   The	   widely	   accepted	   discourse	   suggests	   a	   shift	   in	   paradigm	  
brought	   about	   by	   the	   post-­‐2001	   transnational	   ‘war	   against	   terrorism’	   and	   the	   onset	   of	  
exceptionalism	  in	  the	  form	  of	  suspension	  or	  dilution	  of	  the	  normal	  rule	  of	  international	  law.	  We	  
must	  question,	  however,	  whether	  an	  exceptional	  situation	  has	  in	  fact	  been	  created,	  or	  whether	  
the	   invocation	   of	   extraordinary	   powers	   in	   the	   war	   against	   terrorism	   context	   is	   simply	   the	  
successor	  of	  colonial	  traditions	  of	  emergency	  as	  a	  form	  of	  governance.	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  Simpson,	  supra	  note	  62,	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  643.	  
184	  Terminology	  borrowed	  from	  Edward	  W.	  Said,	  Orientalism	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  Füredi,	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The	  doctrine	  of	  emergency	  is	  symptomatic	  of	  the	  fatal	  flaws	  of	  international	  human	  rights	  law	  
not	   only	   in	   its	   origins	   but	   also	   in	   its	   implementation.	   To	   the	   extent	   that	   it	   is	   used	   by	  
governments	   as	   a	   political	   tool	   to	   circumvent	   legal	   obligations,	   the	   emergency	   derogations	  
regime	  is	  prone	  to	  exploitation	  as	  a	  ‘get-­‐out	  clause’,	  counter	  to	  the	  principle	  of	  good	  faith,	  and	  
has	   effectively	   encouraged	   non-­‐compliance.	   In	   so	   doing,	   it	   reinforces	   perceptions	   of	   the	  
‘softness’	  of	  human	  rights	  law	  and	  international	  law	  more	  generally.	  Domestic	  and	  international	  
judicial	   systems	   are	   also	   implicated.	   With	   the	   threat	   ‘from	   within	   or	   without’	   remaining	   in	  
colonial,	  neo-­‐colonial	  and	  post-­‐colonial	  situations,	  states	  are	  granted	  a	  virtually	  unfettered	  right	  
to	   invoke	   a	   state	   of	   emergency	   by	   the	   judicial	   apparatus	   of	   both	   the	   state	   itself	   and	   the	  
international	  human	  rights	  system.	  	  
	  
The	  wide	  ‘margin	  of	  appreciation’	  allowed	  to	  states	  to	  derogate	  from	  the	  ECHR	  under	  Article	  15	  
was	   discussed	   in	   section	  V.	  On	   this,	   the	   language	   of	   the	   European	   Court	   of	  Human	  Rights	   is	  
replicated	   word	   for	   word	   from	   its	   decisions	   on	   British	   derogations	   in	   relation	   to	   the	   ‘Irish	  
terrorist	  threat’	  in	  the	  1970s	  to	  the	  ‘Islamic	  terrorist	  threat’	  today.	  In	  its	  2009	  judgment	  in	  A	  v.	  
UK,	  the	  Court	  recalls	  that:	  
	  
it	   falls	   to	  each	  Contracting	  State,	  with	   its	   responsibility	   for	  “the	   life	  of	   [its]	  nation”,	   to	  
determine	  whether	  that	  life	  is	  threatened	  by	  a	  “public	  emergency”	  and,	  if	  so,	  how	  far	  it	  
is	  necessary	  to	  go	  in	  attempting	  to	  overcome	  the	  emergency.	  By	  reason	  of	  their	  direct	  
and	  continuous	  contact	  with	  the	  pressing	  needs	  of	  the	  moment,	  the	  national	  authorities	  
are	   in	   principle	   better	   placed	   than	   the	   international	   judge	   to	   decide	   both	   on	   the	  
presence	   of	   such	   an	   emergency	   and	   on	   the	   nature	   and	   scope	   of	   the	   derogations	  
necessary	  to	  avert	  it.	  Accordingly,	  in	  this	  matter	  a	  wide	  margin	  of	  appreciation	  should	  be	  
left	  to	  the	  national	  authorities.187	  
	  
On	   this	   basis,	   the	   Court	   adjudged	   that	   although	   the	   measures	   implemented	   pursuant	   to	  
Britain’s	   ‘war	   against	   terrorism’	   derogation	   were	   discriminatory	   and	   disproportionate,	   the	  
declaration	  of	  emergency	  and	  the	  derogation	  itself	  were	  endorsed	  as	  legitimate.188	  In	  so	  doing,	  
the	  decision	  upheld	  the	  ruling	  of	  the	  House	  of	  Lords,	  where	  eight	  of	  the	  nine	  justices	  accepted	  
the	  claim	  of	  the	  Secretary	  of	  State	  for	  the	  Home	  Department	  that	  the	  question	  of	  the	  existence	  
of	  an	  emergency	   is	  “pre-­‐eminently	  one	  within	  the	  discretionary	  area	  of	   judgment	  reserved	  to	  
the	  Secretary	  of	  State	  and	  his	  colleagues,	  exercising	  their	  judgment	  with	  the	  benefit	  of	  official	  
advice,	  and	  to	  Parliament.”189	  Citing	  “the	  unintrusive	  approach	  of	  the	  European	  Court	  to	  such	  a	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question”190	   with	   approval,	   the	   House	   of	   Lords	   had	   thus	   abstained	   from	   challenging	   the	  
government’s	   derogation	   from	   the	   European	   Convention.	   In	   his	   dissenting	   opinion,	   Lord	  
Hoffman,	  while	   recognising	   that	   “the	   necessity	   of	   draconian	   powers	   in	  moments	   of	   national	  
crisis	   is	   recognised	   in	   our	   constitutional	   history”,191	   argued	   that	   the	   threshold	   for	   such	   a	  
necessity	  had	  not	  been	  met	  in	  this	  case.	  In	  a	  thought-­‐provoking	  discussion	  of	  the	  meaning	  of	  a	  
‘threat	  to	  the	  life	  of	  the	  nation’,	  Lord	  Hoffman	  accepted	  that	  there	  was	  credible	  evidence	  of	  a	  
threat	  of	  serious	  terrorist	  activity	  in	  Britain,	  but	  considered	  that	  it	  would	  not	  destroy	  the	  life	  of	  
the	   nation,	   since	   the	   threat	   was	   not	   so	   fundamental	   as	   to	   imperil	   “our	   institutions	   of	  
government	  or	  our	  existence	  as	  a	  civil	  community”.192	  He	  concluded	  that	  “[t]he	  real	  threat	  to	  
the	  life	  of	  the	  nation,	  in	  the	  sense	  of	  a	  people	  living	  in	  accordance	  with	  its	  traditional	  laws	  and	  
political	  values,	  comes	  not	  from	  terrorism	  but	  from	  laws	  such	  as	  these.”193	  Lord	  Hoffman	  was	  
unanimously	   overruled	   by	   his	   House	   of	   Lords	   colleagues,	   and	   subsequently	   by	   the	   European	  
Court	  of	  Human	  Rights.	  	  
	  
The	   question	   of	   judicial	   supervision	   of	   derogation	   is	   perhaps	   most	   exposed	   by	   the	   cases	   of	  
Brogan	  v.	  UK	   and	  Brannigan	  &	  McBride	  v.	  UK.	  As	  noted	  earlier,	   in	   response	   to	   the	  European	  
Court’s	  decision	   in	  Brogan	   that	   its	  detention	  procedures	  were	   in	  violation	  of	   the	  Convention,	  
the	   British	   government	   derogated	   under	   Article	   15.	   Pursuant	   to	   the	   ‘margin	   of	   appreciation’	  
doctrine,	   the	   Court	   upheld	   the	   derogation	   in	  Brannigan	  &	  McBride,	   without	   any	   substantive	  
inquiry	  into	  the	  facts	  on	  the	  ground	  at	  the	  time.	  Had	  it	  done	  so	  and	  effectively	  supervised,	  the	  
Court	  would	  have	  noted	   that	   the	   level	  of	  political	  violence	  had	  actually	  decreased	  during	   the	  
period	  that	  elapsed	  between	  the	  two	  cases,	  and	  on	  that	  basis	  that	  the	  derogation	  was	  arguably	  
not	  justified.	  	  	  
	  
D.	  CAUSE	  AND	  EFFECT?:	  COLONIAL	  TO	  POST-­‐COLONIAL	  EMERGENCIES	  
	  
The	   domino	   effect	   of	   the	   emergency	   legislative	   code	   developed	   by	   Britain	   as	   part	   of	   its	  
governance	  of	  Ireland	  in	  the	  nineteenth	  century	  on	  the	  Defence	  of	  the	  Realm	  Acts,	  the	  Defence	  
of	   India	   Act,	   the	   Palestine	   Defence	   (Emergency)	   Regulations,	   and	   so	   on,	   was	   discussed	   in	  
section	  II.	  The	  incorporation	  of	  the	  doctrine	  of	  emergency	  into	  international	  human	  rights	  law	  
can	  be	  seen	  as	  an	  extension	  of	  that	  momentum.	  Beyond	  that,	   it	  may	  also	  be	  argued	  that	  this	  
effective	   approval	   of	   emergency	  measures	   by	  major	   international	   human	   rights	   conventions	  
has	  had	  an	   influence	  on	   the	  propensity	  of	   states	   to	  avail	  of	  emergency	  as	  a	   smokescreen	   for	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  Id.,	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  para.	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  Id.,	  at	  para.	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  Id.,	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repression.	  Had	  the	  British	  government	  not	  had	  the	  option	  of	  submitting	  a	  derogation	  to	   the	  
ECHR	  to	  circumvent	  the	  European	  Court	  of	  Human	  Rights’	  decision	  in	  Brogan	  in	  1988,	  would	  it	  
have	   been	   inclined	   to	   persevere	   with	   its	   detention	   policies	   in	   the	   north	   of	   Ireland?	   In	   the	  
absence	  of	  the	  right	  to	  derogate,	  would	  it	  have	  even	  introduced	  those	  policies	  in	  the	  first	  place,	  
under	   its	   original	   1957	   derogation?	  Would	   Turkey	   have	   felt	   comfortable	   enacting	   measures	  
contravening	   almost	   all	   of	   the	   non-­‐derogable	   rights	   enumerated	   in	   the	   ECHR194	   without	   the	  
legitimising	  blanket	  of	  derogation	  to	  wrap	  itself	  in?	  
	  
The	   influence	   of	   the	   doctrine	   of	   emergency	   in	   the	   states	   that	   acquired	   independence	   from	  
colonial	  rule	  also	  bears	  consideration.	  For	  such	  states,	  upon	  formal	  independence,	  sovereignty	  
over	   their	   own	  affairs	  was	   “the	   legal	   epitome	  of	   the	   fact	   that	   they	   are	  masters	   in	   their	   own	  
house”.195	   In	   Ireland,	   the	   legacy	   of	   Britain’s	   emergency	   doctrine	   lived	   on	   in	   emergency	  
measures	  introduced	  in	  the	  newly-­‐independent	  Free	  State	  in	  the	  face	  of	  civil	  war	  and	  internal	  
divisions.196	   Subsequently,	   the	   Emergency	   Powers	   Act	   of	   1939,	   enacted	   to	   deal	   with	   the	  
“national	   emergency	   affecting	   the	   vital	   interests	   of	   the	   State”	   brought	   about	   by	   the	   Second	  
World	  War,	  was	  kept	  on	  the	  statute	  books	  long	  after	  ‘The	  Emergency’	  had	  concluded,	  and	  was	  
used	   by	   the	   government	   as	   the	   basis	   to	   adopt	   broad	   powers	   in	   response	   to	   prevailing	   IRA	  
campaigns,	  and	  to	  derogate	  from	  the	  ECHR.	  
	  
Post-­‐colonial	   regimes	   from	   the	   Irish	   Free	   State	   to	   Egypt	   to	   Sri	   Lanka	   came	   from	   the	   colonial	  
experience	  to	  appreciate	  the	  value	  of	  emergency	  measures	  and	  techniques	  as	  political	  weapons	  
for	  the	  containment	  and	  suppression	  of	  opposition.	  In	  Asia,	  the	  doctrine	  of	  emergency	  helped	  
to	   legitimise	   “repressive	   measures	   and	   laws	   such	   as	   the	   Internal	   Security	   Act	   which	   is	   a	  
standard	   tool	   in	   the	   coercive	   apparatuses	   of	   states	   such	   as	   …	   India,	   Pakistan,	   Sri	   Lanka,	  
Malaysia,	   Indonesia,	  and	  Singapore.”197	  Continuous	   long-­‐term	  states	  of	  emergency	  have	  been	  
maintained	   in	   Arab	   states	   such	   as	   Algeria,	   Egypt,	   and	   Syria,	   where	   leaders	   “have	   learnt	   the	  
lessons	   taught	   by	   their	   former	   colonial	   masters	   –	   that	   international	   law	   need	   not	   be	   a	  
hindrance	   to	   action	   if	   one	   has	   the	   power	   to	   proceed”.198	   The	   concrete	   legacy	   of	   British	  
emergency	  measures	  is	  also	  very	  much	  in	  evidence	  in	  Israel,	  at	  once	  a	  post-­‐colonial	  and	  colonial	  
state	  that	  has	  been	  in	  a	  self-­‐declared	  state	  of	  emergency	  since	  1948.	  Israel	  continues	  to	  use	  the	  
Palestine	  Defence	  (Emergency)	  Regulations	  of	  1945—the	  very	  same	  emergency	   laws	   imposed	  
                                                
194	  See,	  for	  example,	  Letter	  from	  the	  Permanent	  Representation	  of	  Turkey,	  dated	  6	  August	  1990,	  registered	  at	  the	  Secretariat-­‐
General	  of	  the	  Council	  of	  Europe	  on	  7	  August	  1990,	  providing	  notification	  of	  derogation	  from	  Articles	  5,	  6,	  8,	  10,	  11	  and	  13.	  
195	  Georges	  M.	  Abi-­‐Saab,	  The	  Newly	  Independent	  States	  and	  the	  Rules	  of	  International	  Law:	  An	  Outline,	  8	  Howard	  L.	  J.	  	  95,	  103	  
(1962).	  
196	  For	  a	  full	  overview,	  see	  Seosamh	  Ó’Longaigh,	  Emergency	  Law	  in	  Independent	  Ireland,	  1922-­‐1948	  (2006).	  
197	  Rajagopal,	  supra	  note	  7,	  at	  177.	  
198	  Jean	  Allain,	  International	  Law	  in	  the	  Middle	  East:	  Closer	  to	  Power	  than	  Justice	  196	  (2004).	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by	  the	  British	  and	  used	  against	  Jewish	  activists	  in	  mandate	  Palestine	  before	  being	  denounced	  in	  
the	  Knesset	  following	  the	  creation	  of	  Israel	  as	  “Nazi,	  tyrannical,	  and	  unethical”199—as	  the	  basis	  
for	  repressive	  ‘emergency’	  policies	  against	  Palestinians.	  
	  
In	  this	  sense,	  the	  crucial	  point	  is	  that	  by	  virtue	  of	  human	  rights	  law	  embedding	  the	  concept	  of	  
emergency	   in	   its	   instruments,	  measures	  that	  were	  originally	  often	  conceived	  of	  as	  sui	  generis	  
responses	   in	   specific	   historical	   contexts	   have	   become	   normalised	   not	   just	   in	   our	   legal	  
documents	  but	   in	  our	   thinking.	  According	   to	  a	  1997	  UN	  Special	  Rapporteur	   report	  notes	   that	  
“between	   January	  1985	  and	  May	  1997,	   some	  100	  States	  or	   territories	  –	   in	  other	  words,	  over	  
half	   the	  Member	  States	  of	   the	  United	  Nations	  –	  have	  at	  some	  point	  been	  de	   jure	  or	  de	  facto	  
under	  a	  state	  of	  emergency.”200	  In	  this	  regard,	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  the	  resort	  to	  extraordinary	  powers	  
is	   by	   no	   means	   a	   novel	   phenomenon	   that	   has	   arisen	   in	   a	   post-­‐2001	   exceptional	   situation.	  
Rather,	   it	   has	   been	   prevalent	   before	   and	   since	   the	   channelling	   of	   emergency	   powers	   into	  
international	   law;	   a	   constant	   presence	   through	   shifting	   contextual	   sands	   of	   Third	   World	  
liberation	   movements	   and	   decolonisation,	   ideological	   Cold	   War	   totalitarianism,	   military	  
dictatorships,	  separatist	  conflicts,	  economic	  shock	  policies	  and	  national	  security	  doctrines.	  	  
	  
	  
VII.	  THEORISING	  THE	  STATE	  OF	  EXCEPTION:	  IMPLICATIONS	  OF	  THE	  COLONIAL	  FRAMEWORK	  
	  
In	   1865,	   an	   uprising	   of	   Jamaican	   peasants	   in	  Morant	   Bay,	   was	   put	   down	   by	   British	   colonial	  
troops	  acting	  pursuant	  to	  a	  declaration	  of	  martial	  law.	  While	  the	  rebellion	  itself	  was	  small	  and	  
easily	   contained,	   its	   suppression	   was	   defined	   by	   a	   period	   of	   prolonged	   and	   brutal	   state-­‐
sanctioned	  violence	  against	  the	  native	  population,	  involving	  collective	  punitive	  reprisals	  and	  an	  
excessive	  and	  disproportionate	  use	  of	  force.	  Intense	  debate	  in	  English	  legal	  circles	  ensued	  over	  
the	   legality	   and	   legitimacy	   of	   the	   actions	   of	   the	   troops,	   prompting	   Rande	   Kostal	   to	   note	   the	  
centrality	  of	   law	  in	  the	  world-­‐view	  of	  the	  English	  political	  class	  of	  the	  time.201	  A	  simultaneous	  
commitment	  to	  empire	  and	  the	  rule	  of	  law	  presents	  itself.	  The	  case	  of	  Jamaica,	  like	  many	  other	  
colonial	  situations	  before	  and	  after	  it,	  personifies	  the	  colonial	  ‘usurper’	  seeking	  to	  transform	  his	  
usurpation	  into	  legitimacy.	  The	  English	  governing	  class	  purported	  to	  balance	  its	   love	  of	  power	  
with	  a	  love	  of	  law,	  with	  both	  the	  colonial	  authorities	  in	  Jamaica	  and	  the	  imperial	  authorities	  in	  
London	   genuinely	   preoccupied	   with	   the	   legality	   of	   their	   actions.	   The	   ‘Jamaica	   affair’	   thus	  
                                                
199	  Statement	  of	  Menachem	  Begin,	  then	  leader	  of	  the	  opposition,	  Knesset	  Records,	  Volume	  9	  (12	  May	  1951),	  p.	  1807.	  Quoted	  in	  
B’Tselem,	  Detained	  Without	   Trial:	   Administrative	   Detention	   in	   the	  Occupied	   Territories	   Since	   the	   Beginning	   of	   the	   Intifada	   24	  
(1992).	  	  
200	   UN	   Commission	   on	   Human	   Rights,	   Report	   of	   Leandro	   Despouy,	   Special	   Rapporteur	   of	   the	   UN	   Sub-­‐Commission	   on	  
Prevention	  of	  Discrimination	  and	  Protection	  of	  Minorities,	  UN	  Doc.	  E/CN.4/Sub.2/1997/19,	  23	  June	  1997,	  at	  para.	  180.	  
201	  See	  generally	  Kostal,	  supra	  note	  38.	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prompted	   significant	   questions	   over	   the	   scope	   and	   substance	   of	  martial	   law,	   and	   crucially—
notwithstanding	  the	  centrality	  of	  law	  to	  the	  debates—over	  whether	  it	  was	  conceivable	  that	  in	  a	  
British-­‐controlled	  territory	  certain	  British	  policies	  and	  practices	  could	  be	  conducted	  outside	  the	  
ambit	  of	  the	  rule	  of	  law:	  	  
	  
[M]artial	  law	  was	  about	  taking	  extreme	  and	  extra-­‐legal	  measures	  to	  rescue	  the	  basis	  of	  
all	  law,	  the	  state.	  Could	  these	  measures	  be	  subject	  to	  law?	  Was	  ‘martial	  law’	  law,	  or	  was	  
martial	  law	  a	  state	  of	  non-­‐law,	  a	  state	  of	  official	  and	  pragmatic	  lawlessness?	  This	  order	  
of	   inquiry,	   at	   bottom	   philosophical	   in	   nature,	   was	   beyond	   the	   ken	   of	   most	   lawyers,	  
certainly	  of	  most	  politicians	  and	  imperial	  administrators.202	  
	  
Lawyers,	   political	   theorists	   and	   philosophers	   have	   long	   since	   been	   grappling	   with	   these	  
challenging	  questions,	  and	  continue	  to	  do	  so,	  both	  in	  respect	  of	  martial	  law	  specifically	  and	  the	  
state	   of	   exception	   more	   broadly.	   Although	   martial	   law	   is	   less	   common	   in	   its	   usage	   today,	  
particularly	   in	   liberal	   democracies,	   “it	   has	   clear	   analogues	   in	   declarations	   of	   states	   of	  
emergency,	  in	  delegations	  from	  the	  legislature	  to	  the	  executive	  of	  virtually	  unlimited	  authority	  
to	   deal	   with	   threats	   to	   national	   security,	   and	   in	   assertions	   of	   inherent	   jurisdiction	   by	   the	  
executive	   to	   respond	  as	   it	   sees	   fit	   to	   such	   threats.203	   Thus,	  what	  David	  Dyzenhaus	  dubs	   “the	  
puzzle	  of	  martial	  law”—the	  question	  of	  whether	  martial	  law	  is	  really	  law—“has	  obvious	  echoes	  
in	   post-­‐9/11	   debates”.204	   At	   this	   juncture,	   then,	   it	   is	   useful	   to	   recall	   the	   three	   alternative	  
theories	  of	  martial	  law	  discussed	  earlier.205	  The	  question	  as	  to	  whether	  martial	  law	  is	  in	  fact	  law	  
is	   answered	   in	   the	   negative	   by	   the	   approach	   that	   posits	   it	   as	   no	  more	   than	   the	   will	   of	   the	  
General	  who	  commands	  the	  army,	  acting,	  for	  all	  intents	  and	  purposes,	  beyond	  the	  pale	  of	  legal	  
constraint.	  Conversely,	  the	  two	  competing	  approaches	  both	  posit	  that	  martial	  law	  does	  operate	  
within	   the	   rule	   of	   law,	   in	   different	   forms:	   Dicey’s	   theory	   holds	   that	   it	   emanates	   from	   the	  
common	   law	   right	   to	   use	   force	   in	   self-­‐defence	   and	   functions	   autonomously	   within	   the	   law;	  
while	   the	   state	   of	   siege-­‐influenced	   approach	   suggests	   military	   rule	   temporarily	   replacing	   or	  
augmenting	   civilian	   rule	   during	   crises,	   but	   remaining	   nonetheless	   subject	   to	   certain	  
constitutional	  limitations.	  
	  
These	   three	  models	   are	   effectively	  mirrored	   in	   the	  more	   contemporary	   debates	   on	   states	   of	  
exception.	   The	   fundamental	   question	   remains	   the	   same:	   whether	   the	   exception	   is	   situated	  
within	   the	   rule	   of	   law,	   or	   in	   a	   lawless	   space	   beyond.	   	   Scholarship	   on	   the	   matter	   is	   divided	  
                                                
202	  Id.,	  at	  16.	  
203	  Dyzenhaus,	  supra	  note	  43,	  at	  2.	  
204	  Id.,	  at	  3.	  
205	  See	  Section	  II.i,	  supra.	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between	  those	  who	  seek	  to	  include	  the	  state	  of	  exception	  within	  the	  juridical	  order,	  and	  those	  
who	   consider	   it	   something	   external	   –	   an	   essentially	   political,	   or	   in	   any	   case	   ‘extra-­‐juridical’	  
phenomenon	   that	   manifests	   itself	   in	   fact,	   rather	   than	   in	   law	   (although	   it	   may	   have	  
consequences	  in	  the	  sphere	  of	  law).	  Within	  the	  first	  school	  of	  thought	  there	  are	  those	  who	  see	  
exceptional	   measures	   as	   an	   integral	   and	   autonomous	   part	   of	   law	   (similar	   to	   Dicey’s	  
engagement	  with	  martial	   law);	   while	   others	   consider	   the	   exception	   as	   the	   state’s	   subjective	  
right	  to	  invoke	  when	  necessary.206	  	  
	  
The	  debate	  on	  the	  theory	  of	  exception	  strikes	  to	  the	  very	  core	  of	  the	  state	  in	  terms	  of	  how	  it	  is	  
constituted	  and	  where	  power	   is	  ultimately	  vested.	  The	   idea	   that	  a	   state	  of	  exception—under	  
which	   law	   is	   suspended—may	   be	   itself	   initiated	   by	   law	   is	   a	   somewhat	   paradoxical	   situation,	  
inherently	  difficult	  to	  reconcile.	  Carl	  Schmitt,	  for	  one,	  was	  of	  the	  opinion	  that	  it	  is	  irreconcilable.	  
He	   deals	   with	   the	   dilemma	   by	   locating	   the	   source	   of	   the	   contradiction	   outside	   the	  
constitutional	  order,	  implying	  that	  the	  political	  authority	  of	  the	  state	  is	  not	  at	  root	  constituted	  
by	  law.	  The	  sovereign	  is	  he	  who	  decides	  on	  the	  exception,	  and	  is	  unconstrained	  by	  law	  both	  (i)	  
in	  making	  such	  a	  decision,	  and	  (ii)	  in	  responding	  to	  the	  exception.207	  At	  the	  same,	  the	  political	  
decision	  is	  nonetheless	  bound	  to	  the	  legal	  order:	  “like	  every	  other	  order,	  the	  legal	  order	  rests	  
on	  a	  decision	  and	  not	  on	  a	  norm”.208	  As	  such,	  for	  Schmitt,	  although	  the	  state	  of	  exception	  is	  an	  
act	  of	  political	  authority	  through	  which	  the	  relationship	  between	  state	  and	  law	  is	  thrown	  out	  of	  
kilter	   (where	   “the	   state	   continues	   to	   exist,	   while	   law	   recedes”209),	   the	   decision	   and	  
enforcement	  of	  the	  state	  of	  exception	  retain	  the	  force	  of	  law:	  “authority	  proves	  that	  to	  produce	  
law	  it	  need	  not	  be	  based	  on	   law”.210	  This	  approach	  has	  parallels	  to	  the	   idea	  of	  martial	   law	  as	  
being	  no	  more	  in	  its	  foundation	  than	  the	  will	  of	  the	  General	  who	  commands	  the	  army,	  but	  yet	  
having	  the	  full	  force	  of	  law	  in	  its	  implementation.	  
	  
Dicey,	  for	  his	  part,	  espouses	  the	  view	  that	  the	  state	   is	  constituted	  absolutely	  by	   law.	  As	  such,	  
the	  sovereign	  is	  fully	  subject	  to	  the	  rule	  of	  law	  and	  has	  no	  authority	  to	  use	  law	  to	  suspend	  law.	  
According	   to	   this	  approach,	  measures	   to	  be	   taken	  during	  an	  emergency	  are	  contained	  within	  
the	  law.	  This	  echoes	  what	  Oren	  Gross	  describes	  as	  the	  ‘business	  as	  usual’	  model	  of	  response	  to	  
an	  emergency,	  according	  to	  which:	  	  	  	  
	  
                                                
206	  See	  Agamben,	  supra	  note	  15,	  at	  22-­‐23.	  	  
207	   Carl	   Schmitt,	   Political	   Theology:	   Four	   Chapters	   on	   the	   Concept	   of	   Sovereignty	   (George	   Schwab	   trans.,	   University	   of	  
Chicago	  Press	  1985)	  (1922).	  
208	  Id.,	  at	  10.	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[A]	  state	  of	  emergency	  does	  not	  justify	  a	  deviation	  from	  the	  “normal”	  legal	  system.	  No	  
special	   “emergency”	   powers	   are	   introduced	   either	   on	   an	   ad	   hoc	   or	   permanent	   basis.	  
The	  ordinary	  legal	  system	  already	  provides	  the	  necessary	  answers	  to	  any	  crisis	  without	  
the	   legislative	   or	   executive	   assertion	   of	   new	   or	   additional	   governmental	   powers.	   The	  
occurrence	  of	  any	  particular	  emergency	  cannot	  excuse	  or	  justify	  a	  suspension,	  in	  whole	  
or	  in	  part,	  of	  any	  existing	  piece	  of	  the	  ordinary	  legal	  system.211	  	  
	  
This	  model	   is	   predicated	   on	   a	   rejection	   of	   the	   idea	   that	   a	   tension	   exists	   between	   a	   nation’s	  
security	  on	  one	  hand,	  and	  individual	  liberties	  and	  the	  rule	  of	  law	  on	  the	  other.	  Emergencies	  and	  
crises,	  when	  they	  do	  arrive,	  do	  not	  affect	  the	  constitutional	  order,	  of	  which	  a	  unitary	  vision	  is	  
offered.	  The	  obvious	  criticism	  of	  such	  a	  hypothesis	  is	  that	  it	  is	  naïve	  or	  even	  hypocritical.	  History	  
is	   testament	   to	   the	   fact	   that	  when	   faced	  with	   an	   emergency	   situation,	   government	  will	   take	  
whatever	  measures	   it	   deems	  necessary	   to	   abate	   the	   crisis.	   It	   is	   precisely	   for	   this	   reason	   that	  
Schmitt	   regarded	   this	   kind	   of	   approach	   as	   a	   liberal	   fallacy,	   blind	   to	   the	   reality	   that,	   when	   it	  
comes	  to	  it,	  political	  authority	  will	  not	  be	  constrained	  by	  law.	  In	  advancing	  his	  own	  version	  of	  
the	   ‘business	   as	   usual’	   paradigm	   in	   the	   common	   law	   context,	   Dicey’s	   arguments	   also	   raise	  
questions	  and	  contradictions.	  While	  generally	  adhering	  to	  a	  categorical	   impenetrability	  of	   the	  
rule	  of	  law,	  he	  does	  however	  sporadically	  acknowledge	  that	  a	  post-­‐emergency	  Act	  of	  Indemnity	  
can	   serve	   to	   protect	   those	   who	   have	   broken	   the	   law	   in	   the	   discharge	   of	   a	   political	   duty,	  
essentially	   legalising	   illegality.212	   In	   this	   sense,	   Dicey’s	   approach	   is	   echoed	   by	   the	   model	  
proposed	  by	  Gross	  as	  an	  alternative	  to	  the	  traditional	  approaches	  to	  emergency	  powers,	  which	  
he	  labels	  the	  ‘extra-­‐legal	  measures’	  approach.	  Under	  this	  proposed	  model,	  public	  officials	  may	  
respond	  ‘extra-­‐legally’213	  to	  an	  exceptional	  threat.	  This	  “entails	  going	  outside	  the	  legal	  order,	  at	  
times	   even	   violating	   otherwise	   accepted	   constitutional	   principles”,214	   something	   that	   is	  
acceptable	  once	  the	  officials	  openly	  acknowledge	  and	  disclose	  the	  nature	  of	  their	  actions,	  and	  
submit	   to	   the	   authority	   of	   ex	   post	   judgment	   of	   the	   necessity	   of	   those	   actions,	   to	   be	   either	  
punished	  or	  exempted.	  This	  differs	  from	  the	  conception	  of	  a	  void	  beyond	  law	  in	  that	  while	  the	  
actions	   may	   be	   ‘extra-­‐legal’,	   law	   still	   plays	   a	   central	   role	   in	   their	   subsequent	   ratification	   or	  
invalidation.	   This	  model	   also	   does	   not	   affect	   the	   substance	   of	   the	   applicable	   law,	   but	   rather	  
provides	  potential	  immunity	  from	  prosecution	  for	  breaches	  of	  that	  law.	  Gross	  goes	  as	  far	  as	  to	  
invoke	  the	  ‘extra-­‐legal	  measures’	  thesis	  to	  allow	  for	  retrospective	  justification	  of	  torture.215	  The	  
                                                
211	  Oren	  Gross,	  Chaos	  and	  Rules:	  Should	  Responses	  to	  Violent	  Crises	  Always	  be	  Constitutional?,	  112	  Yale	  L.	  J.	  1011,	  1043-­‐44.	  
212	  Dicey,	  supra	  note	  20,	  at	  554.	  
213	  Gross’	  choice	  of	  terminology	  is	  somewhat	  misleading.	  By	  characterising	  acts	  as	  ‘extra-­‐legal’,	  he	  implies	  them	  to	  be	  outside	  
the	  scope	  of	  what	  the	  law	  governs,	  when	  in	  reality	  such	  acts	  will	  generally	  not	  be	  beyond	  law,	  but	  rather	  illegal.	  
214	  Gross,	  supra	  note	  211,	  at	  1097.	  Gross	  does	  therefore	  acknowledge,	  albeit	  tacitly,	  that	  ‘extra-­‐legal’	  measures	  may	  in	  fact	  be	  
simply	  illegal.	  	  
215	  See	  Oren	  Gross,	  The	  Prohibition	  on	  Torture	  and	  the	  Limits	  of	  the	  Law,	  in	  Torture	  229-­‐250	  (Sanford	  Levinson,	  ed.	  2004).	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fundamental	   flaw	   inherent	   in	   this	   paradigm	   is	   that	   public	   officials,	   acting	   ‘extra-­‐legally’	   on	  
behalf	   of	   their	   government	   invariably	   against	   alien	   or	   perceived	   subversive	   individuals	   or	  
groups,	  will	  have	  a	  well-­‐grounded	  expectation	  of	  ultimate	  indemnity	  for	  their	  actions.	  This	  way,	  
repressive,	   illegal	   measures	   are	   liable	   to	   seep	   into	   common	   and	   accepted	   usage	   during	  
situations	  of	  real	  or	  perceived	  emergency.	  
	  
The	   second	   of	   the	   two	   traditional	  models	   of	   response	   to	   exceptional	   threats	   that	  Gross	   had	  
identified	  is	  that	  of	  ‘accommodation’,	  which	  allows	  “a	  certain	  degree	  of	  accommodation	  for	  the	  
pressures	   exerted	   on	   the	   state	   in	   times	   of	   emergency,	  while,	   at	   the	   same	   time,	  maintaining	  
normal	  legal	  principles	  and	  rules	  as	  much	  as	  possible”.216	  Here,	  the	  power	  to	  declare	  a	  state	  of	  
emergency	  and	  to	  suspend	  law	  to	  the	  degree	  necessary	  is	  an	  exceptional	  one,	  but	  one	  which	  is	  
rooted	   in	   the	   constitution	   or	   its	   equivalent.	   When	   this	   power	   is	   invoked	   by	   the	   sovereign,	  
therefore,	   it	   is	   subject	   to	   constitutional	   restraints	   on	   its	   exercise.	   The	   ‘state	   of	   siege’	   style	  
interpretation	   of	  martial	   law	   can	   be	   construed	   as	   a	  model	   of	   accommodation,	   and	   it	   is	   this	  
construction	   that	   perhaps	   best	   illuminates	   the	   imposition	   of	   martial	   law	   as	   an	   exceptional	  
measure	   in	   the	   British	   empire	   to	   accommodate	   the	   use	   of	   force	   in	   suppressing	   anti-­‐colonial	  
sentiment.	   Similarly,	   the	   system	   of	   emergency	   legislation	   introduced	   in	   nineteenth-­‐century	  
Ireland	   and	   further	   throughout	   the	   empire	   in	   the	   twentieth	   century	   is	   most	   accurately	  
described	   as	   a	   model	   of	   ‘accommodation’.217	   The	   ‘normal’	   legal	   system	   in	   England	   was	  
insufficient	  to	  accommodate	  British	  imperial	  ambitions	  abroad,	  and	  thus	  flexibility	  was	  required	  
in	  retaining	  the	  ability	  to	  legislate	  for	  exceptional	  threats.	  As	  we	  have	  seen,	  such	  flexibility	  was	  
exploited	  during	  the	  course	  of	  the	  colonial	  project	  as	  a	  technique	  of	  domination	  and	  in	  order	  to	  
mask	  widespread	  dispossession	  and	  exploitation	  in	  a	  shroud	  of	  legitimacy.	  	  
	  
The	   influence	   of	   the	   British	   colonial	   emergency	   paradigm	   on	   the	   derogations	   regime	   in	  
international	  human	  rights	  law	  has	  also	  been	  suggested	  herein.	  This	  regime	  itself	  can	  likewise	  
be	   diagnosed	   as	   a	   model	   of	   accommodation,	   whereby	   parts	   of	   the	   given	   human	   rights	  
convention	  are	   suspended,	  but	  not	  without	   constraints,	  while	   at	   the	   same	   time	  normal	   legal	  
principles	   and	   rules	   are	   retained	   as	   much	   as	   possible.	   From	   a	   Schmittian	   perspective,	   the	  
accommodation	  model	   is	   flawed	   as	   the	   legal	   constraints	   are	   ultimately	   illusory.	   As	   such	   it	   is	  
liable	  to	  lead	  to	  the	  absorption	  of	  the	  exception	  into	  the	  norm,	  rendering	  the	  executive	  free	  to	  
act	  with	  full	  discretion	  while	  simultaneously	  claiming	  deference	  to	  the	  rule	  of	  law.	  	  
	  
Similarly,	  the	  suggestion	  that	  the	  partial	  or	  total	  suspension	  of	  law	  can	  be	  inscribed	  within	  the	  
legal	  order	  itself	  is	  what	  prompts	  Georgio	  Agamben	  to	  explicate	  the	  state	  of	  exception	  as	  “the	  
opening	  of	  a	  fictitious	  lacuna	  in	  the	  order	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  safeguarding	  the	  existence	  of	  the	  
                                                
216	  Gross,	  supra	  note	  211,	  at	  1058.	  
217	  Gross	  explicitly	  identifies	  special	  emergency	  legislation	  as	  a	  model	  of	  accommodation.	  See	  id.,	  at	  1065.	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norm	  and	  its	  applicability	  to	  the	  normal	  situation”.218	  Agamben	  sees	  the	  norm-­‐exception	  divide	  
within	  law	  as	  essentially	  artificial	  and,	  effectively	  arrives	  at	  a	  conclusion	  that	  goes	  even	  beyond	  
Schmitt	  in	  understanding	  the	  state	  of	  exception	  as	  “a	  space	  devoid	  of	  law,	  a	  zone	  of	  anomie	  in	  
which	  all	  legal	  determinations	  …	  are	  deactivated”.219	  	  
	  
The	   predicament	   that	   this	   conclusion	   presents	   for	   proponents	   of	   the	   rule	   of	   law	   is	   clear:	   to	  
accept	   that	   the	  state	  of	  exception	   is	  situated	   in	  a	  space	  beyond	   law	   is	   to	  concede	  that	   law	   is	  
powerless	  to	  regulate	  emergencies.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  however,	  to	  facilitate	  the	  emergency	  by	  
the	  creation	  of	  an	  exceptional	  legal	  regime	  implicates	  the	  law	  insofar	  as	  it	  provides	  legitimacy	  
to	   whatever	   executive	   action	   is	   taken.	   To	   overcome	   this	   predicament,	   it	   is	   necessary	   to	  
“respond	  through	  law	  to	  emergencies	  without	  creating	  an	  exceptional	  legal	  regime—alongside	  
the	  ordinary	  one—that	  will	  permit	  government	  to	  claim	  that	  it	  is	  acting	  according	  to	  law	  when	  
it	  in	  effect	  has	  a	  free	  hand	  and	  will,	  the	  longer	  the	  exceptional	  regime	  lasts,	  create	  the	  problem	  
of	  seepage	  of	  government	  outside	  of	  the	  rule	  of	   law	  into	  the	  ordinary	  legal	  order”.220	  Toward	  
this	  end,	  Dyzenhaus	  argues	  that	  Dicey’s	  denial	  that	  the	  English	  constitution	  made	  any	  place	  for	  
martial	   law	  in	  the	  sense	  of	  the	  French	  state	  of	  siege	  provides	  the	  foundational	  framework	  for	  
such	  a	  response.	  Such	  an	  argument,	  however,	  overlooks	  Dicey’s	  express	  proviso	  that	  this	  denial	  
did	  not	  extend	  to	  the	  empire.	  The	  colonial	  paradigm	  of	  states	  of	  emergency	  may	  indeed	  throw	  
a	   spanner	   in	   the	  works.	   For	   the	   exceptional	   legal	   regime	   that	  was	   applied	   in	   the	   colony	   and	  
deviated	  from	  the	  ordinary	  one	  in	  the	  metropole—the	  very	  prototype	  which	  Dyzenhaus	  seeks	  
to	   avoid—is	   the	   model	   that	   has	   influenced	   modern	   emergency	   measures,	   more	   so	   than	  
common	  law	  responses	  that	  applied	  to	  English	  citizens.	  	  
	  
At	  root	  here	  is	  the	  use	  of	  the	  state	  of	  emergency	  to	  legitimise	  colonial	  ‘usurpation’	  throughout	  
the	  empire,	  and	  as	  a	  technique	  of	  control	  over	  the	  native	  ‘other’.	  The	  doctrine	  of	  emergency	  is	  
ostensibly	  tied	  to	  that	  of	  non-­‐discrimination,	  but	  it	  is	  difficult	  to	  envisage	  situations	  in	  practice	  
where	  it	  would	  be	  invoked	  without	  certain	  groups	  being	  targeted,	  particularly	  in	  the	  context	  of	  
the	  prevailing	  emergency	  paradigm	  of	  hegemonic	   control	  or	   repression.	  Gross	  describes	   “the	  
greater	  willingness	   to	  confer	  emergency	  powers	  on	  the	  government	  when	  the	   ‘other’	   is	  well-­‐
defined	  and	  clearly	  separable	  from	  the	  members	  of	  the	  community.	  The	  clearer	  the	  distinction	  
between	   ‘us’	   and	   ‘them’	   and	   the	   greater	   the	   threat	   ‘they’	   pose	   to	   ‘us,’	   the	   greater	   in	   scope	  
become	  the	  powers	  assumed	  by	  government”.221	  
	  
                                                
218	  Agamben,	  supra	  note	  15,	  at	  31.	  
219	  Id.,	  at	  50.	  
220	  David	  Dyzenhaus,	  Schmitt	  v.	  Dicey:	  Are	  States	  of	  Emergency	  Inside	  or	  Outside	  the	  Legal	  Order?,	  27:5	  Cardozo	  L.	  Rev.	  2005,	  
2030	  (2006).	  
221	  Gross,	  supra	  note	  211,	  at	  1037.	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Experience	  suggests	  that	  expectations	  of	  the	  principle	  of	  non-­‐discrimination	  operating	  as	  a	  self-­‐
imposed	   restraint	   on	   the	   state	   of	   emergency	   are	   somewhat	   idealistic.	   Among	   the	   reasons	  
proffered	   for	   the	   eventual	   implosion	   of	   the	   Roman	   dictatorship	   is	   the	   corruption	   of	   the	  
institution	  by	   its	  use	  as	  a	  coercive	  tool	  against	  the	  plebeians	   in	  the	  Roman	  class	  war.222	  More	  
contemporaneously,	   in	  A.	   v.	  UK,	   the	   European	   Court	   of	  Human	  Rights	   found	   that	   the	   British	  
‘war	   against	   terrorism’	   emergency	  measures	   in	   question	   “were	  disproportionate	   in	   that	   they	  
discriminated	   unjustifiably	   between	   nationals	   and	   non-­‐nationals”.223	   In	   appraising	   the	   post-­‐
September	  11th	  emergency	  measures	   in	   the	  United	  States,	  Agamben	  asserts	   that	   the	  military	  
order	   regime	   of	   indefinite	   detention	   of	   noncitizens	   suspected	   of	   endangering	   US	   national	  
security	  is	  entirely	  removed	  from	  the	  law	  and	  from	  judicial	  oversight.	  Insofar	  as	  it	  “erases	  any	  
legal	  status	  of	  the	  individual,	  thus	  producing	  a	  legally	  unnamable	  and	  unclassifiable	  being”,	  it	  is	  
comparable	  only	  to	  “the	  legal	  situation	  of	  the	  Jews	  in	  the	  Nazi	  Lager	  [camps],	  who,	  along	  with	  
their	   citizenship,	   had	   lost	   every	   legal	   identity”.224	   But	   like	   much	   of	   the	   contemporary	  
scholarship	   on	   the	   state	   of	   exception,	   Agamben’s	   focus	   does	   not	   envelop	   past	   or	   lingering	  
colonial	  situations.	  Agamben’s	   ‘bare	   life’	   thesis	  has,	  however,	  much	  resonance	   in	  the	  colonial	  
context.	  The	  colonised	  native,	  the	  epitome	  of	  ‘otherness’,	  was	  denied	  status	  in	  the	  legal	  system	  
of	  the	  coloniser,	  ruled	  by	  law,	  but	  not	  entitled	  to	  the	  rule	  of	  law	  protections	  afforded	  to,	  in	  the	  
British	  case,	  subjects	  of	  the	  Crown	  by	  the	  common	  law	  of	  England.	  In	  a	  similar	  vein,	  Palestinians	  
in	  the	  occupied	  West	  Bank	  and	  Gaza	  Strip	  have	  no	  claim	  to	  the	  Israeli	  constitutional	  protections	  
that	  their	  Jewish-­‐Israeli	  neighbours	  in	  those	  territories	  benefit	  from.	  
	  
Appraising	  the	  use	  of	  the	  doctrine	  of	  emergency	  through	  the	  lens	  of	  its	  colonial	  underpinnings,	  
therefore,	  brings	  additional	  perspectives	  to	  the	  state	  of	  exception	  discourse,	  and	  the	  debate	  as	  
to	  whether	  the	  state	  of	  exception	  is	  something	  grounded	  in	  law,	  or	  exists	  in	  a	  zone	  of	  anomie	  
beyond	  law.	  Faith	  in	  the	  notions	  of	  the	  state	  of	  emergency	  and	  the	  right	  to	  derogate	  as	  integral	  
to	   the	   rule	   of	   law	   is	   based	   on	   the	   principles	   of	   full	   judicial	   oversight,	   temporality,	   and	   the	  
validity	  of	  the	  norm-­‐exception	  divide.	  In	  the	  colonial	  context	  and	  in	  its	  continuing	  legacy,	  these	  
principles	   have	   been	   erased	   or	   at	   best	   severely	   blurred.	   While	   the	   fact	   that	   emergency	  
derogations	   from	  human	  rights	  obligations	  may	  be	  subjected	  to	   judicial	  scrutiny	   is	  held	  up	  as	  
evidence	   of	   the	   overarching	   primacy	   of	   the	   rule	   of	   law,	   in	   reality	   the	   degree	   of	   judicial	  
supervision	   is	   found	   wanting.	   A	   review	   of	   the	   jurisprudence	   of	   the	   House	   of	   Lords	   and	   the	  
European	   Court	   of	   Human	   Rights	   demonstrates	   that	   that	   even	   where	   a	   Court	   will	   rule	   that	  
special	  measures	  implemented	  under	  an	  emergency	  are	  excessive,	  it	  will	  invariably	  refrain	  from	  
questioning	   the	   state’s	   decision	   to	   declare	   the	   emergency	   in	   the	   first	   instance.	   Temporal	  
limitations	   on	   a	   state	   of	   emergency	   in	   practice	   were	   conspicuous	   by	   their	   absence	   during	  
                                                
222	  Reinach,	  supra	  note	  16,	  at	  16.	  
223	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  supra	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Britain’s	   entrenched	   colonial	   emergencies;	   a	   reality	   which	   has	   only	   proliferated	   through	   the	  
‘permanent’	   emergencies	   that	   we	   see	   in	   the	   ‘post-­‐colonial’	   age.	   The	   conceptual	   and	   spatial	  
aspects	  of	  the	  normalcy-­‐emergency	  divide,	  tied	  to	  the	  metropole-­‐colony	  distinction,	  have	  been	  
distorted	  by	  the	  evolution	   in	  forms	  of	   imperialism	  and	  the	  rise	  of	  transnational	   ‘wars’	  against	  
amorphous	   terrorist	   threats.	   Illuminating	   the	   colonial	   shadows	   from	   which	   the	   doctrine	   of	  
emergency	  emerged,	  therefore,	  reveals	  the	  state	  of	  emergency	  as	  a	  vehicle	  for	  law’s	  violence,	  
grounded	  in	  the	  dynamics	  of	  domination.	  
	  
